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The authors use laboratory experiments to test two self-assessment tax mechanisms for facilitating land assembly. One mechanism is incentive compatible with a complex tax function, while the other uses a flat tax rate to mitigate implementation concerns. Sellers publicly declare a price for their land. Overstating its true value is penalized by using the declared price to assess a property tax; understating its value is penalized by allowing developers to buy the property at the declared price. The authors find that both mechanisms increase the rate of land assembly and gains from trade relative to a control in which sellers’ price declarations have no effect on their taxes. However, these effects are statistically insignificant or transitory. The assembly rates in our self-assessment treatments are markedly higher than those of prior experimental studies in which the buyer faces bargaining frictions, such as costly delay or capital constraints.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relational impact of using win-win or win-lose negotiation strategies within different types of buyer-supplier relationships.

A multi-method approach is used. Qualitative interviews with supply chain managers reveal that relationship-specific assets and cooperation are important relational factors in buyer-supplier negotiations. Framing interview insights within the social exchange theory (SET), hypotheses are tested using a scenario-based behavioral experiment.

Experimental results suggest that win-lose negotiators decrease their negotiating partner’s commitment of relationship-specific assets and levels of cooperation. In addition, the use of a win-lose negotiation strategy reduces levels of relationship-specific assets and cooperation more in highly interdependent buyer-supplier relationships than relationships that are not as close.

Buyer-supplier relationships are complex interactions. Negotiation strategy choice decisions can have long-term effects on the overall relationship. As demonstrated in this study, previous research focusing on one side “winning” a negotiation as a measure of success has oversimplified this complex phenomenon.

The use of a win-lose negotiation strategy can have a negative impact on relational outcomes like cooperation and relationship-specific assets. For companies interested in developing strong supply chain relationships, buyer and suppliers should choose their negotiation strategy carefully as the relational impact extends beyond the single negotiation encounter.

Previous research predominantly advocates for the use of a win-win negotiation strategy within interdependent relationships. This research offers evidence that the use of a win-lose strategy does have a long-term relational impact.

This paper's objective is to test the main effect of negotiation training‐level on acquiring negotiation skills. Training level refers to the time a trainee spends in a negotiation training course receiving the standard style and methods of training. Negotiation skills are manifested through trainees' performance after receiving training.

Six meta‐analyses were conducted over 57 lab experiments from 36 studies. The six meta‐analyses were divided into two groups each with a sub‐study. The objective of study one is finding effect of training level on negotiators' individual and joint performance. The objective of study two is contrasting the effects of three training levels on negotiators' performance.

Study one results show that training level has an effect on individual performance that is more evident for the long training (r=0.76) than for the short training (r=0.22). Training level has a medium effect on joint performance (r=0.37). Results of study two show an increase in negotiators' performance the higher the training level. That performance rate ranged from point estimate=2.03 after spending a day in training to point estimate=5.2 after spending three weeks or more in training.

The results indicate significant association between the time trainees spend in negotiation training programs and their negotiation performance. Level of training should be controlled for when conducting experiments during negotiation courses. Future research should focus on effects of personality traits of both trainees and trainers on negotiation training effectiveness.

The findings highlight the importance of investing in increasing the level of negotiation training and spending more in making it a routine practice for top executives. After all, skilful negotiators are important assets that should be maintained. They make important deals that add to the firm's financial performance of the firm. Higher levels of negotiation training deliver more values to firms.

Training methods and styles followed in courses and programs of negotiation training are effective and are of value providing they last for enough time. The study highlights the importance of negotiation training, an area worthy of more research. Findings are valuable for training practitioners to pay attention to what is considered enough time of training against what is being practiced. Training can be effective in building soft skills and experience in other managerial fields if designed in the appropriate way.

The purpose of this study is to examine the unique effect that shared metacognition has on negotiation – over and above the effect of simply having similar views.

An experiment was conducted where it was systematically varied whether the negotiators explicitly knew or did not know that their opponent had a similar view of the negotiation task.

Results showed that having shared metacognition promoted: cooperative negotiation, accurate insight into the opponent's point values (which was correlated with increased joint gain), and increased satisfaction regarding the negotiation outcome. Moreover, this was the case across different conditions in which negotiators' negotiation task view and motivation were varied.

The paper suggests that negotiators and mediators can benefit by developing a common understanding of the negotiation and explicitly exchanging this understanding with each other (establishing shared metacognition) prior to engaging in the negotiation. Future studies should examine closely the underlying process of shared metacognition in terms of its impact on negotiation.

Prior research suggests that successful, integrative negotiation depends on negotiators' view of the negotiation task and whether they hold similar views of the negotiation task (shared cognition). Implicit in this research is that the negotiating parties not only had similar views of the negotiation task but also may have explicitly known that they did so (shared metacognition).

This paper investigates the use of deception in two negotiation studies. Study 1 (N = 80) demonstrates that direct questions and solidarity curtail deception. Study 2 (N = 74 dyads) demonstrates that direct questions are particularly effective in curtailing lies of omission, but may actually increase the incidence of lies of commission. These findings highlight the importance of misrepresentation to the negotiation process and suggest approaches for contending with deception.

The paper aims at modelling a game‐theoretical framework that covers the basic mechanisms of lease contract negotiations while making allowance for relevant behavioural aspects.

Based on a review of literature about negotiation processes the work initially models, analyses, and solves lease contract negotiations as basic non‐cooperative game situations. It develops a game‐theoretical model based on the simple bi‐matrix normal form and the Rubinstein bargaining game while successively approximating real estate practice by integrating behavioural concepts.

On a conceptual level the work demonstrates that a game‐theoretical modelling of lease contract negotiations allows for a systematic structuring of the conflict situation between landlords and tenants. Different market situations that affect the perception of utility of the negotiating parties, as well as the consequences of mutual concessions and the creation of additional negotiation subjects that enhance the perceived contract utility can be taken into account by integrating simple mental models. On a practical level the paper shows that brokers' influence on the behavior of the negotiating partners can contribute to the efficiency of negotiation processes and the perceived contract utility. It identifies mutual concessions and the creation of incentives and additional negotiation subjects as possibilities to improve the attractiveness of a lease contract and to reach more beneficial contract provisions.

The paper offers a systematic examination of bargaining processes between landlords and potential tenants which can help professionals to understand lease contract negotiations as conflict situations and reach more profitable and satisfying results.

There is a tendency for opposing partisans to ideological disputes to imagine that their opponents are extremist, biased, and in diametric opposition to themselves. The current investigation examined the role of these imagined ideological differences in face‐to‐face negotiations. Experiment 1 examined the problems that develop when negotiators attend to irrelevant ideological differences. Dyads who were made aware of political differences, even imagined ones (i.e., their political views were actually similar), required more time to allocate hypothetical funds and perceived their partner less favorably than did dyads who were unaware of their political differences. Experiments 2 and 3 tested the hypothesis that ideological opponents who acquire accurate information about their counterpart's beliefs (thus reducing the effects of imagined ideological differences) will have more successful negotiations. Opposing partisans to abortion (Experiment 2) and the death penalty (Experiment 3) reached more comprehensive, integrative agreements and perceived each other more favorably when they disclosed their own views to each other before negotiating. The relevance of these findings to other mediation techniques and real world conflicts was discussed.

Like conflict in general, budgetary conflict is perceived by conflicting parties as a zero-sum game or distributive: one party's gain is the other party's loss. We identify an organizational culture that promotes this view as “traditional.” We propose that changing certain elements of organizational culture is sufficient to produce more integrative, nonzero-sum outcomes. We call this changed organizational culture “empowering.” We propose and test the effects of an empowering organizational culture (EOC) in contrast to the traditional organizational culture (TOC). We hypothesize that an EOC would produce more integrative conflict resolution than the typical TOC. Based on our review of the literature, we identify two elements of the EOC that are essential in producing more integrative solutions to budgetary conflict. The two elements that we simultaneously manipulate are the superior's empowering style (or lack thereof) as reflected in encouragement to freely negotiate, and the superior's intervention process in failed negotiations (a process that encourages the search for integrative solutions and avoids imposed compromises that dampen the desire to negotiate). Using a laboratory experiment, 84 subjects forming 42 dyads negotiated the allocation of discretionary budgets face-to-face. The results of the experiment confirm our hypotheses that the EOC produces more integrative budget negotiation outcomes, greater convergence, and greater satisfaction with the outcome than TOC.

This paper aims to present a review of articles on business negotiation published between 1995 and 2015.

This literature review is based on 490 articles on business negotiation.

When analyzing the conceptual underpinnings of this field, two paradigms emerge as dominant. The most prominent paradigm is a cognitive, psychological approach, typically relying on experiments and statistical testing of findings. The second dominating paradigm is a behavioral one, largely concerned with mathematical modeling and game-theoretical models.

Besides offering a description of the characteristics adhered to the business negotiation field, this paper will also suggest recommendations for further research and specify areas in which the research field needs further conceptual and empirical development.

This literature review serves to be the first representation of the characteristics adhered to the budding research field of business negotiation.

This study aims to investigate when integrative tactics are more effective in generating higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation. The authors test whether, first, the moral identity of the negotiators and, second, the concurrent use of distributive tactics increase the effectiveness of integrative tactics on joint outcomes.

Two weeks prior to the experiment, moral identity was measured using SIMI. Participants were classified into three groups: high, medium, and low SIMI. Two participants from the same group played a modified version of the Towers Market negotiation exercise. Distributive and integrative tactics were measured.

Results show that negotiators with high moral identity achieve higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation by using integrative tactics more effectively. In addition, the positive effects of integrative tactics on joint outcomes increase as the two negotiators employ distributive tactics along with integrative tactics rather than integrative tactics alone.

Results support the firm‐flexibility rule and dual‐concern model of negotiation. In addition, the results of this study are consistent with the argument of the differentiation‐before‐integration principle.

Contradictory to the assumption that negotiators should not use distributive tactics to increase joint outcome, negotiators can increase joint outcome when they use distributive tactics along with integrative tactics. In addition, this study shows that negotiators with high morality do a better job in an integrative negotiation not because they adopt integrative tactics more frequently, but because they use them more effectively, especially when coupled with negotiators with a similar level of morality.