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Purpose – To develop an alternate metaethical framework based upon a specific modality of difference.

Methodology/approach – A radicalisation of Moore's naturalistic fallacy and the application of the open question argument within the broader context of the continental tradition allow one to direct the ethical question away from non-naturalism and towards a speculative ethics.

Findings – Suggesting an ethical modality irreducible to ontological description or political prescription, the chapter argues for a metaethics of ‘exhortation’.

Originality/value of chapter – The chapter opens a new space for thinking ethics, and further encourages the continuing rapprochement between continental and analytical traditions in philosophy.

Practical implications – Questions of practical ethics will find new modes of engagement and expression in the context of a hortative metaethics.

Traditionally, information security management standards listing generic means of protection have received a lot of attention in the field of information security management. In the background a few information security management‐oriented maturity criteria have been laid down. These criteria can be regarded as the latest promising innovations on the information security checklist‐standard family tree. Whereas information security maturity criteria have so far received inadequate attention in information security circles, software maturity endeavours have been the focus of constructive debate in software engineering circles. Aims to analyze what the alternative maturity criteria for developing secure information systems (IS) and software can learn from these debates on software engineering maturity criteria. First, advances a framework synthesized from the information systems (IS) and software engineering literatures, including six lessons that information security maturity criteria can learn from. Second, pores over the existing information security maturity criteria in the light of this framework. Third, presents, on the basis of results of this analysis, implications for practice and research.

The critical dimension and the one that can unify knowledge through systemic interrelationships, is unification of the purely a priori with the purely a posteriori parts of total reality into a congruous whole. This is a circular cause and effect interrelationship between premises. The emerging kind of world view may also be substantively called the epistemic‐ontic circular causation and continuity model of unified reality. The essence of this order is to ground philosophy of science in both the natural and social sciences, in a perpetually interactive and integrative mould of deriving, evolving and enhancing or revising change. Knowledge is then defined as the output of every such interaction. Interaction arises first from purely epistemological roots to form ontological reality. This is the passage from the a priori to the a posteriori realms in the traditions of Kant and Heidegger. Conversely, the passage from the a posteriori to a priori reality is the approach to knowledge in the natural sciences proferred by Cartesian meditations, David Hume, A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, as examples. Yet the continuity and renewal of knowledge by interaction and integration of these two premises are not rooted in the philosophy of western science. Husserl tried for it through his critique of western civilization and philosophical methods in the Crisis of Western Civilization. The unified field theory of Relativity‐Quantum physics is being tried for. A theory of everything has been imagined. Yet after all is done, scientific research program remains in a limbo. Unification of knowledge appears to be methodologically impossible in occidental philosophy of science.

The problem this essay addresses is the IS‐OUGHT problem as it is related to science, economics and ethics. The problem is especially provocative in ethics, for though ethics would seem to concern the OUGHT most directly, not a few thinkers have despaired of ever finding a way to ground ethics in an IS of some sort. Parallel to this is the dual challenge confronting economics: to ground economics is the IS, in reality, and at the same time warrant and ground economically prescriptive statements, that is, to justify OUGHT statements in economics.

This chapter aims to identify the impact of misbelief and heuristics on the engagement of giggers and customers with gigging organisations. This is of value due to the plethora of gigging opportunities and our lack of knowledge about how and why people choose to take up these opportunities. In addition, the gigs may frequently go unrecorded with payments made through systems such as PayPal which can allow international payments to be made without remittances. This chapter utilises some of the primary evolutionary theories to explore the efficacy and conflict in communications between gigging organisations, their customers and providers (giggers). Those selected are: misbelief in the conscious mind; and heuristics, such as the availability and confirmatory heuristics in the unconscious mind. Misbelief is addressed as a spandrel, and heuristics are discussed through the lens of fast and frugal approaches. Through a text analysis of 77 international gigging organisations, the messages conveyed are assessed against both evolutionary theory and prior research into the gig economy. The findings are that evolutionary psychology provides a useful framework for analysing these messages, as well as aiding understanding of gigging behaviours. HRM practitioners could make use of this form of analysis to support their design of interactions with giggers to ensure clarity on both sides.

Provides an overview of a rather large research program, developed over the last 15 years, that seeks to offer a new perspective on the nature of theory and practice in educational administration. The core ideas of the program, together with a considerable amount of detail, can be found in three books by Evers and Lakomski. However, because these volumes stand in a developmental sequence, there is merit in presenting in a brief compass an account of our overall strategy, especially in relation to the nature of administrative theory, and some of the conclusions reached along the way. The discussion has two main parts. First, the central theoretical features of our program are outlined, indicating some earlier results flowing from their application to various debates in educational administration. Then, some examples are offered focused on the main concern of our most recent research – developing and applying this framework to a cluster of problems about administrative practice and the nature of practical knowledge.

Human dignity is a crucial concept in international and domestic human rights law. It is understood to be the foundation of human rights, and while we know what human rights are, the nature, content, and grounds of human dignity remain unclear. The aim of this chapter is to propose scientific grounds for human dignity. In this context, the author will explore contemporary evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology, where it is claimed that human nature is constituted by tendencies to cooperate (Tomasello, 2009), or under a different formulation, by narrow altruism and imperfect prudence (Załuski, 2009). Evolutionary psychology holds that we have basic tendencies to cooperate with one another and to behave altruistically in order to achieve a common good. This means that our basic evolutionary default and scientifically proven mode of being are optimistic and can be labelled as morally good. The author argues that this human nature constitutes scientific grounds for human dignity. The author’s argument holds that since human dignity comprises the inherent worth of every human being, this positive moral fact about the scientifically understood human nature is human dignity. The author then present this issue within two broader philosophical frameworks of analytic philosophy – namely, naturalism (especially methodological naturalism) and metaphysical realism. Following this, the author contends that references to natural sciences in debates on the foundations of human dignity and human rights argue against the strongest objection to human rights – the objection of Western ethnocentrism.