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This empirical study seeks to understand how mutual fund firms interpret conflicting pressures to conform or differentiate in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Research suggests that organizations engage in practices that conform to industry standards in order to be seen as legitimate members of their industry. Other studies suggest that organizations differentiate themselves in order to compete and outperform their rivals. Pressures for organizational conformity and differentiation are explored in two types of organizations in the mutual fund industry: socially responsible investment (SRI) and non-SRI firms.

The research is based on qualitative in-depth interviews with twenty-six mutual funds.

The analysis revealed that pressures for conformity and differentiation were salient among mutual fund executives but emphasized differently for the two types of mutual funds.

The study concluded by suggesting SRI firms use both strategies of conformity and differentiation to amplify the message that they adhere to the values of CSR.

The present article aims to evaluate the performance of sixteen equity mutual funds operating in the Greek financial market over the period 1/1/1995‐31/12/1999. In doing so, the sample mutual funds were ranked on the basis of their return, total risk, coefficient of variation, systematic risk, and the techniques of Treynor, and Sharpe. Four mutual funds achieved lower return than the General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). All sixteen mutual funds showed lower total risk, and risk‐return coefficient than the General Index of the ASE. In all mutual funds the beta coefficient was statistically significant at 5 per cent level of significance. The alpha coefficient was also statistically significant at 5 per cent level of significance in eight mutual funds. The movements of the General Index of the ASE explain more than 80 per cent of the variation in return in all sixteen mutual funds. Eight mutual funds were ranked in the same order on either Treynor’s or Sharpe’s technique.

The present article aims to evaluate the performance of thirty‐nine domestic bond mutual funds operating in the Greek financial market over the period 15/3/1999‐31/12/1999. The ranking of the sample mutual funds is different between the average daily return, and the total risk. On the basis of the coefficient of variation the sample mutual funds are classified in nine categories. The performance of thirty‐three mutual funds is affected, and can be explained to a satisfactory level by the movements in the Bond Index. On the other hand, the performance of twenty‐five mutual funds is affected, and can be explained to a satisfactory level by the movements in the General Index of the ASE. The Bond Index appears to approximate the market portfolio closer than the General Index of the ASE. Twenty‐seven from the sample mutual funds show values for alpha coefficient different than zero value that is assumed by the capital asset pricing model.

The current and ongoing controversy that has come to be known as the “Mutual Fund Scandal of 2003” was based in large part on abusive market timing activities that were allowed to occur in select mutual funds. There are many ways in which amarket timer can steal profits through short‐term trading activities but the primary opportunity arises in those mutual funds that invest in foreign shares of stock. This 2004 article looks at a sampling of those mutual funds that invest in companies based in the United Kingdom and evaluates the potential for abusive market‐timing activities.

The present article aims to evaluate the performance of ten domestic balanced mutual funds operating in the Greek financial market over the period 1/1/1995‐31/12/1998. In doing so, the sample mutual funds were ranked on the basis of their return, total risk, coefficient of variation, systematic risk, and the techniques of Treynor, Sharpe and Jensen. The ten mutual funds achieved lower return than the General Index of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). However, the mutual funds achieved satisfactory return in relation to the total and systematic risk undertaken. The sample mutual funds followed defensive investment policy that was in line with their objectives. The General Index of the ASE appeared to be a close approximation of the market portfolio. To some extent the ranking of the mutual funds varied among the techniques of Treynor, Sharpe and Jensen, although certain mutual funds were ranked in the same order regardless of the technique used. According to Jensen, seven mutual funds had superior performance, while the remaining three demonstrated poor performance.

Recent empirical and theoretical developments related to the microprocesses of institutional logics have helped to cultivate a powerful theory of agency. We build on these developments to show how the institutional logics perspective can shed light on important questions related to frame construction and how institutions matter. In particular, we show how the emergence of an economic democracy frame in post-war Sweden generated different efforts to define that frame with concrete ideas and practices linked to different logics – socialism and neoliberalism. We show how socialists tried to define economic democracy as requiring a radical transformation in the nature of ownership and control embedded in the innovative financial practice of wage earner’s funds. In contradistinction, conservatives drew on neoliberal ideas and extant mutual fund practices to construct alternative meanings and practices related to economic democracy that enrolled citizens in Capitalism without challenging extant Capitalist ownership structures. While mutual funds and wage earner’s funds initially existed in a state of parabiosis – existing side by side without much interrelationship – struggles over the meaning of economic democracy led these practices to become competing solutions in a framing contest. Implications for the study of institutional logics, frames and the social organization of society are discussed.

This study aims to analyze the impact of different governance characteristics on the ratings of both Islamic and conventional mutual funds.

This study used panel data ordered probit regression model. Furthermore, to capture the mutual funds rating persistence effect and address the issue of endogeneity dynamic panel model is used and the results are estimated using the generalized method of the moment (GMM) technique.

The results indicated that amongst the corporate governance characteristics, board size, the board independence, directors and institutional ownership, and overall governance quality positively affect the ratings of both Islamic and conventional funds. However, chief executive officer (CEO) duality and board gender diversity did not show a significant impact on the ratings of these funds.

The current research provides input to the asset management firms as to how they can increase the fund ratings by implementing strong governance practises. Furthermore, the study also provides input to the rating agencies to account for governance characteristics along with financial indicators, when issuing the rating of any fund.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to analyze the impact of corporate governance characteristics on the rating of both Islamic and conventional mutual funds and hence provides a significant contribution to the literature.

The uncertainty as to whether investments in riskier and less efficient markets allow managers to ‘beat the market’ remains a question to which answers are required. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to offer new insights on portfolios of the US, European and Emerging Market (‘EM’) domiciled equity mutual funds whose objectives are the investment in emerging economies, and specifically analyses two main issues: alpha generation and the influence of the funds’ characteristics on their risk-adjusted performance.

The dataset is made up a survivorship-bias controlled sample of 137 equity funds over the period January 2004 to December 2014, which are then grouped into equally weighted portfolios according to the scheme’s origin. The Jensen’s (1968) Single-Factor model along with the Fama and French’s (1993) and Carhart’s (1997) multifactor models are employed to authenticate results and answer both research questions.

Research analysis reveals that EM exposed fund managers fail to collectively outperform the market. It thereby offers ground to believe that the emerging world is very close to being efficient, proving that the Efficient Market Hypothesis (‘EMH’) ideal exists in this scenario where market inefficiency might only be a perception of market participants as any apparent opportunity to achieve above-average returns is speedily snapped up by very active managers. Overall these managers take a conservative approach to portfolio construction, whereby they are more unperturbed investing in large cap equity funds so as to lessen somewhat the exposure towards risks associated with liquidity, stability and volatility.

Furthermore, the findings show that large-sized equity portfolios have the lead over the medium and small-sized competitors, whilst the high cost and mature collective investment vehicles enjoy an alpha which although is negative is superior to their peers. The riskiest funds generated the lowest alpha, and thereby produced doubts as to whether investors should accept a higher risk for the hope of earning higher returns, at least when aiming to gain an exposure into the emerging world.

Mutual fund performance is not an innovative topic so to speak. Nonetheless, researchers and academia have centred their efforts on appraising the behaviour of fund managers domiciled primarily in developed and more efficient economics, leaving the emerging region highly uncovered in this respect. This study, therefore aims at crafting meaningful contributions to the literature as well as to the practical perspective.

We develop our theoretical framework from the viewpoint of the information asymmetry and the agency theory that the Chinese mutual funds exhibit herd behaviour, and provide empirical evidence by using cross-sectional data of all the Chinese mutual funds between 1999 and 2003. We find that the Chinese mutual funds show overall herding, buy herding and sell herding, and the degree of sell herding is higher than that of buy herding. The degree of Chinese herding is higher than their US counterpart from all the three perspectives. This may be largely due to the institutional factors rather than those firm-specific factors that influence the US mutual funds investment decision.

The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.