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Robert Hauptman first raised awareness about the ethical issues of reference service in 1976. Hauptman, a library school student at the time, did a study on the culpability, or lack thereof, in reference service provided by librarians. In his study, Hauptman posed as a library patron seeking potentially dangerous information. The behavior examined was how librarians respond to the request for material on how to build a bomb that would be powerful enough to blow up a house. Hauptman tried to present himself as a person of questionable character. He used six public and seven academic libraries in this study. Hauptman first made sure that he was speaking to the reference librarian. He then requested information for the construction of a small explosive, requesting specifically the chemical properties of cordite. He then asked for information on the potency of such an explosive, whether or not it could blow up a suburban house (Hauptman, Wilson Library Bulletin, 1976, p. 626).

Ethics is fundamentally a science of social and collective responsibility. Ethics concerns human behavior as responsible or accountable. Because of the nature of social interaction, certain members of the society will bear greater authority, and hence, greater individual and social responsibility than others. In our world, personal responsibility and social responsibility are hardly separable. Personal responsibility becomes responsibility for the world because the person and the world are inseparable. In this chapter, we use the term responsibility from a legal, ethical, moral, and spiritual (LEMS) standpoint as some promise, commitment, obligation, sanctioned by self, morals, law, or society, to do good, and if harm results, to repair harm done on another. Hence, responsibility from a moral perspective is trustworthiness and dependability of the agent in some enterprise. Its inverse is exoneration – the extent to which one is excused from commitment and repairing the harm done to others by one’s actions. We apply the theories and constructs of executive responsibility to two contemporary cases: (1) India’s Super Rich in 2014 and (2) the Fall and Rise of Starbucks. After exploring the basic notion of responsibility, we present a discussion on the nature and obligation of corporate responsibility into three parts: Part I: Classical Understanding and Discussion on Corporate Responsibility; Part II: Contemporary Understanding and Discussion on Corporate Responsibility, and Part III: A synthesis of classical and contemporary views of responsibility and their applications to corporate executive responsibility.

This chapter addresses one of the most crucial areas for critical thinking: the morality of turbulent markets around the world. All of us are overwhelmed by such turbulent markets. Following Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2004, 2010), we distinguish between nonscalable industries (ordinary professions where income grows linearly, piecemeal or by marginal jumps) and scalable industries (extraordinary risk-prone professions where income grows in a nonlinear fashion, and by exponential jumps and fractures). Nonscalable industries generate tame and predictable markets of goods and services, while scalable industries regularly explode into behemoth virulent markets where rewards are disproportionately large compared to effort, and they are the major causes of turbulent financial markets that rock our world causing ever-widening inequities and inequalities. Part I describes both scalable and nonscalable markets in sufficient detail, including propensity of scalable industries to randomness, and the turbulent markets they create. Part II seeks understanding of moral responsibility of turbulent markets and discusses who should appropriate moral responsibility for turbulent markets and under what conditions. Part III synthesizes various theories of necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting or assigning moral responsibility. We also analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of moral responsibility such as rationality, intentionality, autonomy or freedom, causality, accountability, and avoidability of various actors as moral agents or as moral persons. By grouping these conditions, we then derive some useful models for assigning moral responsibility to various entities such as individual executives, corporations, or joint bodies. We discuss the challenges and limitations of such models.

Information ethics, as is well known, has emerged as an independent area of ethical and philosophical inquiry. There are a number of academic journals that are devoted entirely to the numerous ethical issues that arise in connection with the new information communication technologies; these issues include a host of intellectual property, information privacy, and security issues of concern to librarians and other information professionals. In addition, there are a number of major international conferences devoted to information ethics every year. It would hardly be overstating the matter to say that information ethics is as “hot” an area of theoretical inquiry as medical ethics. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview on these and related issues.

The paper presents a review of relevant information ethics literature together with the author's assessment of the arguments.

There are issues that are more abstract and basic than the substantive issues with which most information ethics theorizing is concerned. These issues are thought to be “foundational” in the sense that we cannot fully succeed in giving an analysis of the concrete problems of information ethics (e.g. are legal intellectual property rights justifiably protected?) until these issues are adequately addressed.

The paper offers a needed survey of foundational issues in information ethics.

The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate Kant’s idea of grounding morality within the limits of practical reason. Kant argues that morality must be devoid of emotions if the authors must make the right decisions. His idea of morality is basically ratiocentric. This paper, therefore, seeks a justification of Kant’s ratiocentricism, which excludes subjective emotional dimensions in moral actions and judgements.

This paper adopts a critical and analytic method of research. It is not empirical research, and hence, does not make use of tables and quantifiable data. The methodology is exclusively qualitative in nature.

The major finding of this research work is that an application of practical reason is necessary for the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency. The existential realities demand a synthetic application of reason and emotion in moral issues. So then, a good will is determined by the rational principle. The reason is an organic whole that is capable of functioning both practically and theoretically. The practical reason is not reasoned functioning to acquire knowledge but reason operating as a guide and as the directing force of the will. The application of pure, practical reason and relevant emotional considerations is both necessary and sufficient for moral agency.

This paper is the outcome of deep critical reflections on Kant’s moral philosophy by the author.

It is no longer merely far-fetched science fiction to think that robots will be the chief combatants, waging wars in place of humans. Or is it? While artificial intelligence (AI) has made remarkable strides, tempting us to personify the machines “making decisions” and “choosing targets”, a more careful analysis reveals that even the most sophisticated AI can only be an instrument rather than an agent of war. After establishing the layered existential nature of war, we lay out the prerequisites for being a (moral) agent of war. We then argue that present AI falls short of this bar, and we have strong reason to think this will not change soon. With that in mind, we put forth a second argument against robots as agents: there is a continuum with other clearly nonagential tools of war, like swords and chariots. Lastly, we unpack what this all means: if AI does not add another moral player to the battlefield, how (if at all) should AI change the way we think about war?

In this chapter, I analyze the notion of corporate responsibility from the person-centric perspective. I offer a four-dimensional exposition in terms of which I examine the corporate moral personhood view. These four dimensions are explained and critiqued to arrive at a definition of moral responsibility and status appropriate to corporations. I suggest that a corporation cannot be construed as a person in the sense in which individuals are persons. Since a corporation cannot be an independently existing entity, it cannot have an independent moral personality of its own as individual persons have. Therefore, I argue that a reasonable construal of corporate moral personhood has to exploit a different point of view altogether. With this difference of standpoint, I develop what is called the institutional personhood view. I argue that corporations do acquire a sort of collective institutional moral personality.

This paper analyses what is seen as a crisis of authority in financial reporting. It considers the view that an element of authority may be restored to accounting through communicative reason. The paper argues that the justice‐oriented rationality of traditional, Habermasian, communicative ethics is incapable of providing a solid foundation for the re‐authorisation of financial reporting. The paper argues that a more adequate foundation might be found in an enlarged communicative ethics that allows space to the other of justice‐oriented reason. The inspiration for the enlargement is found in Ricoeur's analysis of narrative, his exploration of its role in the figuration of identity, and in his biblical hermeneutics which reveals the necessity of an active dialectic of love and justice.

Classical assumptions of agency theory (AT) fall short of providing satisfactory answers to modern management and organizational knowledge (MOK) problems, and there is a need for extending the scope of the field. This article aims to compare modern AT assumptions with the agency perspective of Islamic historical political treatises (namely, siyasetnamas) and point out how AT can be furthered.

This article applies content analysis method to find out agency perspectives in Islamic political treatises and then compare them with those of the basic AT assumptions to find out similarities and differences between them in explaining agency problems.

The agency perspective in siyasetnamas are based on the following assumptions which could contribute to the development of AT with their emphasis on (1) responsibilities beyond contracts, (2) entrustment rather than ownership, (3) shared societal responsibility rather than conflicting individual interests, (4) importance of self-control for both principals and agents and (5) trust discourse which emphasizes inner virtues rather than control discourse.

Agency perspectives cannot be considered independent of cultural imprints. By introducing siyasetnamas' agency perspective, this article makes an effort to suggest implications for how to further modern MOK based overwhelmingly on individualistic cultural assumptions to rediscuss agency problems from the viewpoint of specifically the emerging markets in which collectivist culture plays an important role in social and economic life. In this respect, siyasetnamas' agency perspective based on the notion of entrustment seems, arguably, to be a better fit to the contextual realities and managerial practices of emerging markets.