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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the welfare gains from risk sharing among African countries and regional groupings in Africa that are planning to establish monetary unions either in the short or longrun.

The paper empirically tested two hypothesis; potential welfare gains and unexploited welfare gains. It uses a utility-based measure to quantify the gains that would accrue from joining a risk sharing arrangement such as a monetary union. The regional groupings considered include the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).

The results provide support for both hypotheses. Overall, the average potential welfare for AU, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC groups under full risk sharing are found to be 1.9, 2, 3.4 and 1.6 percent, respectively, each higher than the 1 percent estimated for the OECD countries and 0.6 percent for the 14-EU countries. The average unexploited gains are, however, even bigger for AU at 3.5 percent, ECOWAS at 8.6 percent and for SADC at 2.6 percent.

The finding of enormous potential welfare gains could partly reinforce the desire of the African countries to establish monetary unions. On the other hand, the paper provides insights to policy makers in designing policies to promote risk sharing given the finding that the unexploited welfare gains are on average still too low – implying that many African countries or groups still have very low risk sharing.

Previous studies on welfare gains and risk sharing have basically left out the African regional groupings and never related the issue of gains to the monetary union projects. Besides, previous studies focus on unexploited welfare gains at the expense of total potential welfare gains. Considering the two types, however, presents a more complete picture of total gains from joining any risk sharing arrangement such as a monetary union.

Explores how European monetary systems have become an heterogeneous conglomerate with the passing of time, questioning the failures of the modern gold standard and the international monetary fund. Asks what kind of monetary and economic union is desirable, examining the choice in terms of the monetary and economic systems. Offers practical measures for the realization of a free and stable monetary and economic union which can be taken at community and national levels. Concludes with an examination of the problems of the accumulated US dollar in European central banks.

Monetary unification within Europe appears to be on target. Eleven nations pegged their currency to the euro in 1999. The euro‐zone is experiencing varying levels of growth related to GDP. Balancing policy for 11 nations will be difficult. The true test will take place when asymmetric shocks hit one or several of the nations and unemployment rises to unmanageable levels forcing the European Union and European Central Bank to make tough decisions. Cultural issues and national identities are ever present. Optimum currency areas and comparative advantage discussed. The paper is divided into four major sections – reasons for unification, benefits, issues and conclusion.

When sectoral shocks hit a large, regionally heterogeneous economy, it is likely that regions with sectoral specialization will be affected in different ways. In these cases, it might be optimal for the country to decentralize the currency into a number of regional currencies, thus allowing for differentiated monetary policy. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The author explicates the potential benefits and costs to decentralization. The author also highlights characteristics that should be satisfied in order to consider multiple currencies. This paper uses a theoretical and empirical model to test if the USA contains regional optimal currency areas. The author tests five potential divisions of the states into monetary subunions.

One of these divisions is proven to result in higher welfare (a 2 percent increase) than the status quo national monetary union. Thus, the USA is not an optimal currency area, and monetary decentralization could be a feasible and welfare-improving option for future policy.

There have been no previous studies of monetary divisions. Given the importance of fiscal decentralization, it is important to also understand the implications of monetary decentralization.

This chapter examines several viable monetary regimes including the introduction of a Palestinian currency operating under a managed float, a Palestinian currency operating under a currency board, a monetary union with Jordan, the status quo that permits the Jordanian dinar, Israeli shekel, and U.S. dollar as legal tender, and finally, dollarization coupled with the introduction of Palestinian coins. Each of these options is compared on the basis of whether or not it enhances macroeconomic stability, provides the benefits of seignorage, deters inflation, stimulates investment, and encourages fiscal and monetary discipline.

Uses recently developed techniques in the estimation of non‐stationary time series to construct money demand functions for four African economies, using quarterly data. Finds that money demand depends not only on income, inflation and interest rates, but also on variability of inflation and interest rates: the more variable the return to an asset, the lower its demand. Reports the first quarterly models of money demand (as far as we are aware) in Cameroon, Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Finds that the model for Kenya encompasses existing models. The estimated models have important policy implications. Since high inflation tends to be associated with highly variable inflation, any calculation of the seignorage‐maximizing rate of inflation which ignores the variability effect will overestimate the optimal rate of inflation. Insofar as membership of a monetary union reduces not only the rate of inflation but also its variability, there are extra gains from membership of such a union (Cameroon and Ivory Coast are Franc Zone members; Nigeria and Kenya are not). However, the heter‐ogeneity of the estimated functions suggests that it would be very difficult to have an effective monetary policy were the four countries considered members of the same monetary union.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the proposed eco currency union has sufficient business cycle synchronization among its members to avoid problems such as those experienced in the last several years by countries in the eurozone. This monetary union would potentially include 18 countries – Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo – which collectively have a GDP of over 744 billion dollars and a population of over 300 million people.

The authors will apply some recently created econometric tools that were developed specifically to investigate business cycle synchronization in the eurozone. These tools – denoted synchronicity and similarity – overcome some of the limitations of previous studies which have used vector autoregressions and suffered simultaneity bias as a result.

The different measures employed suggest that the potential members of the eco exhibit a very low level of synchronization. Nigeria in particular, which is heavily dependent on oil, as are some, but not all potential members, would be the largest member, and exhibits a very low level of synchronization with other prospective eco member nations. Finally, preliminary evidence from several countries which have joined the existing African currency unions does not indicate that the act of joining a currency union improves synchronization, and this result contradicts the “endogenous optimal currency area” hypothesis.

Like previous studies on the topic, the authors rely on the available data. The number of observations is more limited than would be optimal.

The results would strongly caution against the creation of the eco currency union, as members appear even less ready for monetary integration than countries in the eurozone did.

This is the first study to apply the synchronicity and similarity tools to the prospective West African eco nations.

This chapter builds monthly time-series of Divisia monetary aggregates for the Gulf area for the period of June 2004 to December 2011, using area-wide data. We also offer an “economic stability” indicator for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) area by analyzing the dynamics pertaining to certain variables such as the dual price aggregates, aggregate interest rates, and the Divisia aggregate user-cost growth rates. Our findings unfold the superiority of the Divisia indexes over the officially published simple-sum monetary aggregates in monitoring the business cycles. There is also direct evidence on higher economic harmonization between GCC countries – especially in terms of their financial markets and the monetary policy. Monetary policy often uses interest rate rules, when the economy is subject only to technology shocks. In that case, money is nevertheless relevant as an endogenous indicator (Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.). Properly weighted monetary aggregates provide critical information to policy-makers regarding inside liquidity created by financial intermediaries. In addition, policy rules should include money as well as interest rates, when the economy is subject to monetary shocks as well as technology shocks. The data show narrow aggregates growing while broad aggregates collapsed following the financial crises. This information clearly signals problems with the financial system's ability to create liquidity during the crises.