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What would have been the hypothetical effect of monetary policy shocks had a country never joined the euro area, in cases where we know that the country in question actually did join the euro area? It is one thing to investigate the impact of joining a monetary union, but quite another to examine two things at once: joining the union and experiencing actual monetary policy shocks. The authors propose a methodology that combines synthetic control ideas with the impulse response functions to uncover dynamic response paths for treated and untreated units, controlling for common unobserved factors. Focusing on the largest euro area countries, Germany, France, and Italy, the authors find that an unexpected rise in interest rates depresses inflation and significantly appreciates exchange rate, whereas gross domestic product (GDP) fluctuations are less successfully controlled when a country belongs to the monetary union than would have been the case under the independent monetary policy. Importantly, Italy turns out to be the overall beneficiary, since all three channels – price, GDP, and exchange rate – deliver the desired results. The authors also find that stabilizing an economy within a union requires somewhat smaller policy changes than attempting to stabilize it individually, and therefore provides more policy space.

The establishment of a currency union is a topical issue in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). The subject of currency union formation needs to be reassessed in light of the recent efforts towards the economic integration of west African countries. This study employs the Markov Switching Model (MSM) to determine whether a currency union in WAMZ is feasible. The study analyzes the regime switching behavior in WAMZ countries’ foreign exchange markets before and after the formation of the union. The contribution of this study is two-fold. First, the study accounts for the success or otherwise of the latest efforts to integrate the fiscal and monetary strategies in the zone. Secondly, the study contributes to the literature on the currency union literature in WAMZ by using Markov Switching Model (MSM) to generate novel results. The results of the study revealed that prior to the WAMZ formation, the real exchange rates of member states were more divergent. In contrast, a growing but marginal, convergence was observed after the formation of the zone amongst four (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Liberia) of the six countries. The authors conclude that while WAMZ is on course for establishing a currency union, their monetary authorities must work together, particularly with Ghana and Liberia, to synchronize their policy efforts, and policy makers must implement policies to strengthen harmonious trade interactions.

This paper investigates the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies. It identifies an anti-growth bias in the ECB’s monetary policy approach: the ECB is quick to hike, but slow to ease. Similarly, while other players and institutional deficiencies share responsibility for the euro’s failure, the bank has generally done “too little, too late” with regard to managing the euro crisis, preventing protracted stagnation, and containing deflation threats. The bank remains attached to the euro area’s official competitive wage repression strategy which is in conflict with the ECB’s price stability mandate and undermines the bank’s more recent unconventional monetary policy initiatives designed to restore price stability. The ECB needs a “Euro Treasury” partner to overcome the euro regime’s most serious flaw: the divorce between central bank and treasury institutions.

This chapter examines several viable monetary regimes including the introduction of a Palestinian currency operating under a managed float, a Palestinian currency operating under a currency board, a monetary union with Jordan, the status quo that permits the Jordanian dinar, Israeli shekel, and U.S. dollar as legal tender, and finally, dollarization coupled with the introduction of Palestinian coins. Each of these options is compared on the basis of whether or not it enhances macroeconomic stability, provides the benefits of seignorage, deters inflation, stimulates investment, and encourages fiscal and monetary discipline.

This chapter builds monthly time-series of Divisia monetary aggregates for the Gulf area for the period of June 2004 to December 2011, using area-wide data. We also offer an “economic stability” indicator for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) area by analyzing the dynamics pertaining to certain variables such as the dual price aggregates, aggregate interest rates, and the Divisia aggregate user-cost growth rates. Our findings unfold the superiority of the Divisia indexes over the officially published simple-sum monetary aggregates in monitoring the business cycles. There is also direct evidence on higher economic harmonization between GCC countries – especially in terms of their financial markets and the monetary policy. Monetary policy often uses interest rate rules, when the economy is subject only to technology shocks. In that case, money is nevertheless relevant as an endogenous indicator (Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.). Properly weighted monetary aggregates provide critical information to policy-makers regarding inside liquidity created by financial intermediaries. In addition, policy rules should include money as well as interest rates, when the economy is subject to monetary shocks as well as technology shocks. The data show narrow aggregates growing while broad aggregates collapsed following the financial crises. This information clearly signals problems with the financial system's ability to create liquidity during the crises.

This chapter aims to demonstrate how the colonial legacy in general, and in its monetary area in particular, has been one of the major obstacles to African countries' ability to mobilize financial resources for their development. In fact, the monetary systems inherited from colonialism serve as an instrument to plunder African resources and extract surplus for capital accumulation in former colonial powers. One of the best examples is found in the relationships between France and its former colonies in West and Central Africa. The monetary system imposed on those countries is essentially perpetuating the Colonial Pact, under which the role of the colonies is to serve the political, economic, and strategic interests of the colonial power. For African countries, the monetary arrangement, illustrated by the use of CFA franc as their currency, has been a major obstacle to capital accumulation, productive capacity building and effective structural transformation of their economies. Unless African countries break free from the CFA monetary system and reclaim their sovereignty, there will be no development. The struggle for monetary sovereignty in former French colonies is now part of a broader continental struggle to reclaim Africa's sovereignty over its resources and the formulation of its development policies.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.