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The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of sports sponsorship on brand equity using two managerially related outcomes: price premium and market share.

This study uses a best–worst discrete choice experiment (BWDCE) and compares the outcome with that of the purchase intention scale, an established probabilistic measure of purchase intention. The total sample consists of 409 fans of three soccer teams sponsored by three different competing brands: Nike, Adidas and Puma.

With sports sponsorship, fans were willing to pay more for the sponsor’s product, with the sponsoring brand obtaining the highest market share. Prominent brands generally performed better than less prominent brands. The best–worst scaling method was also 35% more accurate in predicting brand choice than a purchase intention scale.

Future research could use the same method to study other types of sponsors, such as title sponsors or other product categories.

Sponsorship managers can use this methodology to assess the return on investment in sponsorship engagement.

Prior sponsorship studies on brand equity tend to ignore market share or fans’ willingness to pay a price premium for a sponsor’s goods and services. However, these two measures are crucial in assessing the effectiveness of sponsorship. This study demonstrates how to conduct such an assessment using the BWDCE method. It provides a clearer picture of sponsorship in terms of its economic value, which is more managerially useful.

This case is used in Darden's required first-year course, “Strategic Thinking and Action.”

In 2015, Steve and Heidi Crandall, the founders of Devils Backbone Brewing, LLC (DBB), were looking back on eight years of unanticipated success and significant growth. DBB had created a destination, a brand, and beer that drew people from all over, and it was the largest craft brewery in its region. The entire community, not just loyal beer drinkers, had supported DBB. In addition to funding and zoning accommodations, so many local residents had built their own economic lives around what had been their “little brewery that could.”

But the success had brought challenges, specifically in terms of growth. DBB was consistently not meeting demand in its existing markets and was receiving complaints about out-of-stocks. The Crandalls and their team had to figure out how to grow with, or preferably ahead of, demand for DBB's product. Should DBB build further capacity despite an already exhausted line of credit? Should it employ a contract brewer despite the local authenticity concerns such a move might stir up? Or should it just keep trying to manage business within its existing footprint, comfortably serving its loyal customer base?