Search results

This paper can be integrated in the set of studies that following the first work by Borcheding and Deacon have tested different specifications of Median Voter Models. The main innovation in this paper results from the use of a proxy variable for income distribution, in order to test in what degree the amount demanded of public goods reflects the existence of different income concentrations. An adjustment in the tax share for spatial tax incidence is also used. Finally, the fit of the model for counties above and under median population is analyzed allowing us to make some inference about the relationship between the adequacy of the analysis and “distance” between voters and representatives.

There were 398 bond referenda by Texas school districts from 1990-95. On average, these received a 58% voter approval rating and almost 75% of the referenda passed. A public choice model suggests many factors related to the voter percentage, including the amount of the bond issue per voter, percent of non-white population, and the amount of state and federal aid in the districts. Districts with Big Six auditors received higher voter percentages ceteris paribus, suggesting increased voter confidence in districts reviewed by brand name auditors. Districts with higher standardized test scores (TAAS) had more favorable votes, which can be interpreted that voters are willing to fund more infrastructure when output performance levels are adequate. A public choice model focusing on capital outlays was successful in explaining spending levels. A Big Six audit was associated with higher capital outlays, although TAAS was insignificant.

Municipal financial decisions involve the interaction of political actors (including voters, elected officials, and bureaucrats) pursuing their own interests. Although voters should determine public choices through elected officials, bureaucrats have the incentives and may have the monopoly power to dominate the process. This study investigates the relationships among municipal spending, fiscal manipulation, and financial monitoring. Fiscal illusion (as measured by revenue complexity) is employed as an empirical surrogate for bureaucratic manipulation and it is hypothesized that financial audits are an effective monitoring technique for moderating possible bureaucratic manipulation. The results of the study suggest that expenditure levels are related to political power and that fiscal illusion is significant for explaining expenditure levels, especially for cities having qualified opinions. Weak support is provided for the hypothesis that the financial audit is a monitoring technique that may constrain bureaucratic overspending. These findings have important implications for both public administration and governmental accounting and suggest the need for further research on monitorig effectiveness.

Purpose – The goal of this chapter is to explore whether variation in the distribution of union members across the income distribution affects the role of unions in redistributive politics.

Design/methodology/approach – The conceptual part of the study provides a theoretical motivation for disaggregating organized labor by income. The empirical part uses European Social Survey data for 15 West European countries 2006–2008 to describe the composition of union membership by income across countries and to explore, in a preliminary fashion, the implications of where union members are located in the income distribution for social protection and redistribution.

Findings – In most countries, workers with incomes above the median are better organized than workers below the median and the income of the median union member exceeds the income of the median voter. The political implications of the overrepresentation of relatively well-off workers depend on the mechanism of preference aggregation within unions and the influence of unions in the policymaking process. While leaving a thorough examination of these issues for future research, we present descriptive regression results suggesting that the membership composition of unions by income is related to income inequality and redistribution but not social insurance.

Originality/value of paper – This is the first comparative study to map the distribution of union members across the income distribution and to examine the implications of compositional variation by income for redistributive politics.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non‐poor in the local demand for income redistribution and, in particular, to provide an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed by Pauly, incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers.

First, the authors motivate the discussion by allowing for an “iceberg cost” as participation for the poor individuals in Pauly's original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, the authors estimate the effect of the proximity between poor and non‐poor on the demand for redistribution.

All of the authors' distance‐related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non‐poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a one‐hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth et al., but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in the demand for redistribution and might reduce targeting in Brazil. Lastly, the results indicate that “size matters”; i.e. the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting.

Our results suggest that a totally centralized supply of transfers may be more inefficient than local redistribution in terms of targeting, either due to higher participation costs or because of the eventual greater geographical distance between the national median voter and poor individuals. However, a partial role for the federal government, such as providing funds for redistribution, seems to improve targeting.

In particular, the paper provides an empirical test for the geographically limited altruism model proposed by Pauly, incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers. The authors motivate this discussion by adding the possibility of distance‐related “iceberg costs” of delivering benefits to poor individuals and show that these two effects of distance may act to lower the demand for transfers, making it difficult to distinguish between the two effects. These two effects of distance act by lowering the demand for transfers, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of altruism from the effect of cost. The authors' empirical strategy seems to allow to identify each of them and to provide a suggestion on whether it is advantageous to carry out redistribution at the local level.

A public finance framework is used to examine the relationship between community composition, namely occupancy status, and the provision of governmental services. A comprehensive literature survey suggests that a systematic relationship exists between the fraction of renters in a given jurisdiction and the level of fiscal expenditures. More particularly, it would appear that renters ceteris paribus are willing to support a higher level of publicly provided goods than homeowners. The competing hypotheses of renter illusion and renter rationality are discussed, as are the differing implications for public policy. Suggestions are also made on how future research on this important topic might proceed.

Special districts comprise over 40% of local governments, prompting debate on the merits of general versus special entities. Previous research focused on relative cost-efficiency and tended to ignore how special districts impact government accountability. This study fills a critical need by testing how type of government (general versus special) impacts citizen awareness of and familiarity with government, a precondition for accountability. Drawing from two theoretical perspectives (institutional reform and public choice), we used survey research to assess familiarity with the goals and performance and financial practices of local governments in Indiana. Our study participants were more aware of and familiar with general than special governments, which supports the institutional reform perspective more than public choice. We conclude that efforts to improve accountability should be expanded to include special districts.

This chapter investigates the relationship between social norms and the local population's attitude toward immigration. Although there are benefits from immigration in terms of greater consumption opportunities, disutility from changes in social norms due to immigration may vary across different segments of the local population. This social disutility leads to opposition to foreigners even through anti-immigrants actions. The chapter shows how the disutility from changes in social norms will affect behavior toward immigrants and the formulation of immigration policy.