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This purpose of this paper is to examine four separate though interconnected questions concerning corporations operating, in Anglo American jurisdictions.

The paper first examines the nature of the limited liability corporation as an entity dedicated to maximizing shareholder value, and how far this role is consistent with the pursuit of wider policies of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Second, it reviews the ownership arrangements of the corporation, the fiduciary duties of board directors and how this is translated into the task of maximizing shareholder value through the pursuit of profits. Third, it investigates how directors position themselves commercially in maximizing shareholder value and whether shareholders express views on how shareholder value can best be maximized. Finally conclusions are drawn on how best corporations and their directors can address the challenge of meeting shareholder value and how far this implies realignment in terms of wider societal expectations. The method of research used includes an examination of statute law governing the corporation, judge's law, regulatory law, other soft law in the context of outsider controlled capital markets. Relevant published research material is also declared in the bibliography.

Conclusions drawn suggest that the premise of maximization of shareholder value may very well entail the pursuit by directors of wider social and economic objectives consistent with CSR, if this is consistent with the enhancement of shareholder value. They also point to a lack of clarity on the question of what is expected of directors in meeting their fiduciary and broader director's duties as expressed in the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Evidence suggests that there is little effective communication between shareholders and directors on how best shareholder value can be maximized. Specifically the analysis focuses on how best to overhaul the mechanisms of governance and accountability if directors and the shareholders they represent are to develop and execute rational commercial policies aimed at maximizing shareholder value.

The paper breaks new ground in linking CSR to the enhancement of shareholder value and in suggesting that directors may be negligent in their duty to promote shareholder value if they fail do so. The paper should be of interest to company directors, company legal advisors; other corporate lawyers involved in litigation against directors, and policy makers in government.

The article outlines the arguments by the proponents and opponents of maximizing shareholder value and identifies the true threat the concept poses to U.S. businesses.

The author quotes authorities on both side of the debate over the validity of maximizing shareholder value as a driving principle of management and points out the risks and the alternatives. He notes that many long-established public corporations in the U.S. have chosen to bow to the power of shareholders and reward them instead of attempting risky initiatives that might create new customers or enhance customer value.

Maximizing shareholder value is either the guiding principle of business success that provides a rightful reward for investors or a corrupting influence that thwarts investment in employee talent, sustaining innovation, product quality and customer loyalty.

Since the C-suite is hugely compensated for increases in the current stock price, decisions based on “shareholder value” tend to be decisions that boost the current stock price.

As evidence the problem is being recognized, some CEOs have already spoken out against preferentially rewarding stockholders instead of investing to sustain the organization.

The author concludes that shareholder value theory has not only failed on its own narrow terms of making money for shareholders. It has been steadily destroying the productive capacity and dynamism of the entire economy.

Many investors view maximizing shareholder wealth as the only obvious and defensible, corporate objective function. But to contradict this view, the paper aims to consider the shortcomings of the “shareholder first” view and offer an alternative.

To make strategic tradeoffs effectively the whole organization needs a clear sense of what it is trying to achieve, and how choosing between specified alternatives serves its highest goal. Organizations need a “best metric” for the corporate strategy. The paper considers what ultimate end should corporations – that is, the managers who run them – refer to when making these difficult and sometimes painful tradeoffs?

The widely held shareholder‐value view holds that every choice should be made with an eye to creating as much financial wealth as possible for the providers of equity capital. But none of the familiar justifications for this view stand up to scrutiny. It is not true that: shareholders are owners; shareholders bear the most risk; maximizing shareholder value is a clear goal; and maximizing shareholder value is a legal requirement.

The corporation‐first view is a better alternative principle. It is that the ultimate purpose of the corporation is the survival of corporation itself. The corporation should not seek to maximize the interests of shareholders, or employees, or suppliers, or the environment, or anyone or anything else. The Costco model is examined.

This paper provokes some serious soul‐searching about the largely unquestioned primacy of shareholder interests as the objective function of the corporation and makes the case for a better alternative.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the claim that the pursuit of maximum value (wealth) for shareholders optimises economic and social benefits for society as a whole.

Evidence cited in support of the claim and the methodology employed by its supporters are examined. Counter‐evidence from a wide range of disciplines, including accounting, economics, finance, and medical sociology, is considered.

The evidence does not support the claim. Bias and severe methodological flaws in its supporters' research is revealed. Considerable evidence of adverse consequences is identified.

This paper draws from an unusually wide range of disciplines to expose the fallacy and a number of powerful myths about the economic and social benefits of making maximizing shareholder value the primary aim of corporate governance.

Discusses the agency issues underlying corporate governance, refering to research on managerial attitudes/incentives for maximizing shareholder value and pressures to align the interests of directors and shareholders. Reports a survey of finance executives in 175 large firms in 7 EU countries to analyse their strategies and the influence of pressure groups on strategy choice. Shows that market leadership and increased operating margins are the most successful operating strategies; changing productive capacity, generating new/better products and buying business with complementary products are the best investment strategies; and a leveraged buyout is the most effective capital strategy to maximize shareholder returns. Adds that UK managers (like US managers) have a shorter term focus than other European managers, perhaps because their relationships with institutional investors are less close.

The paper was written with the intention of drawing attention to a fundamental dysfunction that is widespread in large organizations today – a myopic focus on maximizing shareholder value.

The paper identifies the source of the dysfunction, the reasons why it has spread, and explains the corrective measures required, namely, a shift in goal from maximizing shareholder value to delighting the customer.

The dysfunction is widespread and dangerously counterproductive to long‐term business success.

Further quantification is needed, both of the business results over time of firms that have failed to make the shift and of those firms that have made the transition.

The paper proposes transformation of business practices throughout the world – the adoption of radical management and goals that produce stakeholder value.

The findings and implications of the paper, which draw on recent work by writers such as Roger Martin, will be controversial to many business executives and academics.

In this study, I explore the link between workforce downsizing and the predominance of a corporate governance model that espouses a shareholder value maximization principle. Specifically, I examine how top managers’ shareholder value orientation affects the adoption of a downsizing strategy among large, publicly traded corporations in the United States. An analysis of CEOs’ letters to shareholders indicates that firms with CEOs who use language that espouses the shareholder value principle tend to have a higher rate of layoffs, after controlling for various indicators of the firm’s adherence to the shareholder value principle. The finding suggests that corporate governance models, particularly those advocated by powerful organizational elites, have a significant impact on workers by shaping corporate strategies toward the workforce. The key actors in this process were top managers who embraced the new management ideology and implemented corporate strategy to pursue shareholder value maximization.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how in recent years the rediscovery that extreme inequality is returning to advanced economies and has become widespread. What is at issue are the causes of this inequality. It is becoming clear that the wider population, particularly in Anglo-American economies have not shared in the growing wealth of the countries concerned, and that the majority of this wealth is being transferred on a continuous and systemic basis to the very rich. Corporate governance and the pursuit of shareholder value it is argued has become a major driver of inequality.

The current statistical evidence produced by leading authorities including the US Federal Reserve, World Economic Forum, Credit Suisse and Oxfam are examined. The policy of shareholder value and the mechanisms by which the distributions from business take place are investigated from a critical perspective.

While the Anglo-American economies are seeing a return to the extremes of inequality last witnessed in the 19th century, the causes of this inequality are changing. In the 19th century great fortunes often were inherited, or derived by entrepreneurs from the ownership and control of productive assets. By the late 20th century as Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) and others have highlighted, the sustained and rapid inflation in top income shares have made a significant contribution to the accelerating rate of income and wealth inequality.

The intensification of inequality in advanced industrial economies, despite the consistent work of Atkinson and others, was largely neglected until the recent research of Picketty which has attracted international attention. It is now acknowledged widely that inequality is a serious issue; however, the contemporary causes of inequality remain largely unexplored.

The significance of inequality, now that it is recognized, demands policy and practical interventions. However, the capacity or even willingness to intervene is lacking. Further analysis of the debilitating consequences of inequality in terms of the efficiency and stability of economies and societies may encourage a more robust approach, yet the resolve to end extreme inequality is not present.

The analysis of inequality has not been neglected and this chapter represents a pioneering effort to relate the shareholder value orientation now dominant in corporate governance to the intensification of inequality.

This paper aims to examine the nature and role of contemporary CSR in the current neoliberal age. It offers an insight into the tension that exists between the ideologies of “neoliberal” shareholder value and that of “effective” CSR, and argues that both ideologies are fundamentally antithetical. It aims to identify and analyse the inter-connected but distinguishable barriers (ideological, practical and political) that militate against the realization of effective CSR.

The method applied is a critical evaluation of concepts and a thorough review of existing literature on neoliberalism, shareholder value and contemporary CSR. It uses existing literature to highlight the inability of contemporary CSR to transform into an effective mechanism for development.

The paper emphasizes the failure of contemporary CSR to equate to a successful mechanism for development. It concludes that the existence and operations of these barriers militate against the realization of an effective CSR regime capable of leading to development.

Given the current dominance of the “maximizing shareholder value” model of corporate governance internationally, it appears unreasonable to pin too much hope on contemporary CSR as a mechanism for development, especially in emerging economies. Neither the culture of corporations nor the pressures to which they are currently subjected encourage socially responsible behaviour.

The paper extends the body of knowledge in the area of contemporary CSR, by identifying and analysing the inter-connected but distinguishable barriers that render the CSR practices of corporations ineffective.

Shareholder‐value proponents claim a new, economically sound way to maximize profits, create wealth, measure performance, and reward executives. That invalid claim is dangerous. Stocks of shareholder‐value firms appreciated barely 15 percent as much as another, time‐tested strategic‐management system. Shareholder‐value strategies are easily countered. Shareholder value mis‐allocates resources, revives old fallacies, and debases the reputation of economics as a useful business discipline.