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11 – 20 of over 7000Yiwei Su and Mingyu Tian
In this paper, the authors explore the consequences of showrooming and price matching strategy to combat showrooming under the consideration that brick-and-mortar (BM) stores and…
Abstract
Purpose
In this paper, the authors explore the consequences of showrooming and price matching strategy to combat showrooming under the consideration that brick-and-mortar (BM) stores and online retailers hold different costs.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use a duopoly model to analyze the impact of showrooming behavior on competition between a BM store and an online retailer with different types of customers and different costs. Then, they consider the price matching strategy that a BM store could employ to combat showrooming and explore the effect of such a strategy.
Findings
Showrooming behavior is detrimental to the profit of the BM store, and the online retailer suffers a loss of their profit unless the relative cost of the BM store is high and only part of the customers exhibit showrooming behavior. As the fraction of customers who seek price matching increases, profits of both the BM store and the online retailer initially decrease and then may increase, even if there is no showrooming.
Originality/value
Unlike existing studies that ignore different costs between online and offline retailers, the authors set different costs between the BM store and the online retailer to consider the effects of showrooming and price matching strategy.
Details
Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to suggest possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure – applied to the negotiation of stationary infinitely termed…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to suggest possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure – applied to the negotiation of stationary infinitely termed contracts – that incorporate a direct reference to the “ideal” utilities of the players. This is a feature of the Kalai‐Smorodinsky cooperative solution – even if not of the generalized Nash maximand; it is usually not encountered in non‐cooperative equilibria.
Design/methodology/approach
First, it is argued that different bargaining protocols than conventionally staged are able to incorporate temporary all‐or (and)‐nothing splits of the pie. Scenarios are advanced where such episodes are interpreted either as – out of bargaining – war or unilateral appropriation events, or free experience contracts. Second, some modifications to the Rubinstein infinite horizon paradigm are experimented with, allowing for mixed strategies under alternate offers, and matching or synchronous decisions in a simultaneous (yet, discrete) bargaining environment. Solutions are derived where the reference to the winner‐takes‐it‐all outcome arises as a parallel – out‐of‐the‐protocol – outside option to the status quo point. In some cases, the limiting maximand for instantaneous bargaining was derived.
Findings
Rubinstein's optimal periodic division in a closed contract remained robust to most of the settings.
Originality/value
Presents possible extensions of the baseline Rubinstein sequential bargaining structure.
Details