Search results

International relations and security studies suffer from an inadequate understanding of established theories in organizational leadership and management studies. This chapter contributes to these disciplines by drawing upon such models to analyze the changes in political leadership approaches of China and the United States in their interactions over maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). Using the transactional–transformational and directive–participative leadership paradigms as its foundation, the analysis argues (1) that contextual factors unique to the each country shape its political leadership styles and (2) the leadership styles within each case study have changed dramatically over the past decades in terms of their rhetoric and policies for managing the SCS disputes. Empirical evidence is based on the policies, leaders’ statements, and official documents of China, a claimant to SCS maritime territory, and the United States, an influential stakeholder in the disputes. In the two case studies, the chapter discusses the implications of the changing leadership styles for the understanding of political interaction in the region and the future of the SCS disputes.

Southeast Asia’s position between the continents of Asia and Oceania gave the region a distinctive identity. Over the years, Southeast Asia has witnessed several important political changes and the emergence of new security threats. Historical mistrust, enduring territorial disputes and competition for maritime claims and resources have combined to weaken the regional security structure. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether China’s growing assertive position in the region bring some fresh air in the region following Beijing’s collaborative initiatives.

Seas are a central concern for Southeast Asian countries, so it is hardly surprising that the countries in the region are strongly nationalistic in asserting and protecting their claims. Maritime policy analyst, Mark Valencia, comments, “Indeed, when countries in Asia think maritime, they think first and foremost about boundary disputes, not the protection of the deteriorating marine environment or management of dwindling fisheries […] [it] is these perceptions that must change.” This paper will explore whether China’s growing assertive position in the name of diplomatic cooperation will mellow down and bring some fresh air into the South China Sea (SCS) region following Beijing’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiatives.

The world is still unsure when it comes to SCS! It often feels like “Pengci” or the art of staging drama to get the desired outcome? Beijing has to address the increasing global fears and uncertainty about her motives and talk more about its dracoplomacy. At one point, Beijing followed Xiaoping’s famous guideline: “hide our capacities and bide our time.” But now, things have changed. China is no longer actively avoiding international limelight. The motto has become “going international.” This change was not all talk either rather it was accompanied by significant, short-term action. Since becoming president, Xi has already visited more than 40 countries with his OBOR dream! It is important for Beijing to emphasize the purpose of her massive infrastructure push. That is, to achieve economic development, rather than to satisfy her growing political ambitions on the global stage. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and other major geo-economic projects are signs that Beijing is using her coercive diplomacy in a subtler way. Therefore, this paper checks whether Beijing’s Silk Road spirit will be successful enough to maintain its agility and grace in the future.

This is an original piece of work, and it adds value to the special issue titled “China’s Rise and Power Shifts in Asia: Geopolitical, Socio-Economic and Historical Perspectives.”

This paper aims to seek to and understand how civil conflict and international claims inform one another. Does the existence of ongoing civil and international conflicts affect how a government addresses an international claim? The paper builds on existing literature that link international and domestic conflict. However, it suggests that the logic behind civil conflicts may be different from that for international ones as states decide how to deal with any one claim.

The paper posits that states faced with domestic conflicts and additional international claims are more likely to seek to resolve an international claim than those without similar conflicts. It develops a series of hypotheses about the likelihood of claim escalation and peaceful settlement attempts and proceed to test them quantitatively using the Issue Correlates of War data combined with the uppsala conflict data program/peace research institute oslo Armed Conflict Data.

On the one hand, the paper finds support for the argument regarding the difficulty states are faced with when seeking to resolve multiple international claims. On the other hand, it finds that the presence of civil conflicts incentivizes states to resolve international claims either by force or peacefully, suggesting internal violence can both lead to diversionary behavior and attempts at conflict resolution.

The findings have important implications for work considering the complexity of domestic and international conflict linkages.

While many studies of claim militarization and peaceful attempts focus on dyadic and international characteristics, this paper creates a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of this foreign policy decision process.

Business continues to face increasing world‐wide political and economic risks, despite signs of a modest economic recovery. This survey of 80 countries shows risks increasing for exporters and financial institutions. However, companies with direct foreign investment will face little increased risk because the desire for new foreign investment will continue to constrain nationalist pressures in most countries. Political violence from terrorist groups, dissidents, and guerrilla forces is not expected to exceed last year's levels. However, the threat of violence from international hostilities is greater for many territorial and maritime disputes.