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Motivated by managers’ intentions to pursue private interests by engaging in earnings management, this paper aims to investigate whether voting with hands (shareholders cast votes on shareholder proposals) by shareholders acts as an external disciplining mechanism over earnings management relative to corporate governance. Also, as corporate governance can scrutinize managers’ behavior, this study also examines whether there is a substitutive relation between shareholder proposals and corporate governance mechanism.

First, this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discrepancy accruals on the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals to test the incremental effect of shareholder proposals on earnings management. Second, firms receiving shareholder proposals are matched with those not receiving proposals by propensity scores, and the levels of earnings management and corporate governance between these two groups are compared by univariate analysis and OLS regressions. In addition, six portfolios are created based on whether firms receive shareholder proposals, as well as on the levels of corporate governance, to assess whether external control from shareholder proposals can substitute internal control for corporate governance in disciplining earnings management. Regressions of earnings management on corporate governance (shareholder proposals) are conducted in the sub-samples formed on shareholder proposals (corporate governance) to further explore the above substitution effects.

Based on a sample of 2,041 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the “For” votes received from the shareholder proposals have a significant negative relationship with the practice of earnings management, even when corporate governance is controlled. The negative relationship between shareholder proposal and magnitude of earnings management is also found to be stronger when firms have weak corporate governance. The overall evidence suggests that the external control from “voting-with-hand” shareholders has a significant impact on earnings management. In addition, shareholder proposals can substitute the monitoring mechanism for corporate governance in constraining managers’ myopic behavior.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by using the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals as a proxy for shareholder pressure and concerns. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by showing the disciplinary effect of outside shareholders on managers’ reporting behavior. Also, it contributes to the corporate governance research by presenting that shareholder proposals can substitute for the internal control of corporate governance in decreasing earnings management. This paper should be of interest to investors and standard setters.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.

This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined.

The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.”

It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context.

The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.

We examine the perceived influence of externally generated firm ratings of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on voting for shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals. Using stakeholder and legitimacy theories, we introduce two rationales that relate shareholder voting decisions to the firm’s CSR performance: the complementary perspective where investors rely on management’s branding or image of the firm for CSR performance, and the sufficiency perspective where shareholders consider legitimacy effects of firm CSR performance. Our examination of 473 CSR shareholder-sponsored proposals during the 2013 to 2015 proxy seasons reveals a negative relationship between support for shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals and CSR strengths, particularly for social and environmental CSR strengths. We also find a positive relationship between support for shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals and CSR concerns, particular in the area of environmental CSR concerns. These results partially support the sufficiency perspective that incorporates shareholder legitimacy concerns. When companies have poor CSR performance, shareholders may view further CSR initiatives as beneficial to the firm.

Briefly reviews knowledge management (KM) and its development from concept to core competence. Shows how knowledge management is the tool that really enables organizations to “work smarter.” Works through the steps of the KM project lifecycle. Details the KM proposal development process and the elements and method for a truly successful KM project application. Emphasises the importance of knowledge validation. Reviews some organizations that are using KM successfully.

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.

Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.

The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.

A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.

With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.

To explain SEC Division of Corporation Finance Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H), which provides interpretive advice on how the Staff will treat shareholder proposals under the “directly conflicts” and “ordinary business” exclusions under Rule 14a-8.

Explains Rule 14-8 concerning the inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company’s proxy materials, Rule 14a-8(i)(9) on substantive bases for exclusion of shareholder proposals, guidance from SLB 14H on shareholder proposals that do and do not directly conflict with company proposals, Staff guidance prior to SLB 14H, the “ordinary business” exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and how SEC staff guidance differs from the majority opinion in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. on the ordinary business exclusion.

The SEC Staff’s new standard for conflicting proposals is likely to make it more difficult for companies to exclude a shareholder proposal that is different from a management proposal if the two proposals are not “mutually exclusive”. Staff guidance also states that companies may not exclude proposals focusing on a significant policy issue under the ordinary business exclusion if “the proposals would transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a shareholder vote”.

Expert guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

This study aims to analyze withdrawn shareholder proposals to gain insight into the role of shareholder proposals in the governance of public corporations.

A cursory look at the data suggests that unions are the most likely group to withdraw proposals. The authors focus on the behavior of unions and find that unions often resubmit a shareholder proposal which had garnered significant support in the previous year, only to withdraw the proposal in the second year.

The contention is that the proposals were withdrawn in Year 2 because the issue was settled in a manner agreeable to the union. Furthermore, this research suggests that unions are more likely to withdraw proposals when the prior years’ appeal is higher, when firms have a record of poor performance, lower insider ownership or relatively independent boards. This phenomenon suggests that unions submit and withdraw shareholder proposals strategically. The authors contend that unions use shareholder proposals and the withdrawal of proposals to improve conditions for union workers at the expense of shareholder value.

This study suggests that unions submit and withdraw shareholder proposals strategically. The authors contend that unions use shareholder proposals and the withdrawal of proposals to improve conditions for union workers at the expense of shareholder value.

This paper aims to examine when and how the main management paradigms have emerged and prevailed in Finnish management research. It seeks to offer a country‐specific case on the diffusion of management paradigms in the field of management research.

This paper is a historical study that uses quantitative content analysis as a methodology. The data consist of research proposals funded by eight of the largest Finnish funding agencies during the period 1937‐2007. The results obtained from these data are compared to the emergence and prevalence of the paradigms in Finnish academic management education, as depicted by course descriptions obtained from the study guides of eight main Finnish academic institutions that provide graduate level education in management.

Management research and management education do not seem to follow the same patterns of adopting different management paradigms. Management paradigms seem to experience upswings in their patterns of use, on average a decade earlier in management research than in education.

As the position of formal scientific management knowledge varies greatly across countries and historical periods, the study contributes to this line of research by giving a descriptive account of the paradigmatic development of management research schemes in Finland which can be compared and contrasted to the development of management research in other countries. The relevance of the study for management theory‐building is in contemplating the relationships between the actors creating, diffusing and using managerial knowledge.

The rapid technological growth, changes in consumer demands, products’ built-in obsolescence, presence of more non-repairable parts, shorter lifespan, etc., lead to the generation of e-waste at an unprecedented rate. Although a number of research proposals and business products to manage e-waste exist in the literature, they lack in many aspects such as incomplete coverage of product’s life cycle, access control, payment channels (in few cases), incentive mechanisms, scalability issues, and missing experimental validation. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel blockchain-based e-waste management system aiming to mitigate the above-mentioned downsides and limitations of the existing proposals.

This paper proposes a robust and reliable e-waste management system by leveraging the power of blockchain technology, which captures the complete life cycle of e-products commencing from their manufacturing as new products to their disposal as e-waste and their recycling back into raw materials.

While the use of blockchain technology increases accountability, transparency and trust in the system, the proposal overcomes various challenges and limitations of the existing systems by providing seamless interactions among various agencies.

This paper presents a prototype implementation of the system as a proof-of-concept using solidity on the Ethereum platform and this paper performs experimental evaluations to demonstrate its feasibility and effective performance in terms of execution gas cost and transaction throughput.

The main purpose of this research is to support corporate Human Management, based on the notion of subject and subjectivity in relation to Foucault's proposal of self-care, as a search for overcoming the disjunction that exists today between economic organisations and the people who make them up.

This study aims at creating a proposal based on Foucault's theory of self-care through which the care of others is salvaged for human management, from the perspective of the philosophical intention to make life a “work of art”. To such end, a qualitative methodology was used based on the hermeneutics that served as the methodology to review Foucault's work. Subsequently, research was conducted on scientific data, and the following variables were analysed: Subject, Subjectivity and Self-care by means of a cross-reference search with the human management and organisation variables. This provides meaning and interpretation to reality, from the idea of constructing subjectivity in turn from an ethical–aesthetic resistance.

The ethical concern that gave rise to this study is based on the characteristics of economic rationality, which is imposed on business organisations and affects not only the behaviour of people but also the interventions or interpretations about other. Thus, Foucault's self-care becomes a possibility not only to take care of oneself but also, in terms of the main goal of human management, to take care of others.

From this research, it is possible to break the excluding paradigm traced from the various theoretical positions of the subject present in the vision of human management, for an inclusive vision, which, without ignoring the economic objective established by the organisations, allows approaching the subject from the pragmatic point of view alone. As can be seen in the course of this article, it was intended, from hermeneutics as a possibility and search for meaning, to approach Human Management from a critical viewpoint accompanied by Foucault, who allowed to approach the notion of subject and subjectivity from the care of oneself, with the intention of proposing an ethical stance towards the subject working in the company, as a way to see oneself and to look at others. In this sense, the impact of the research is placed, from this perspective, in the teaching and practice of Human Management as an area of productive organisations.