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The Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann claimed that Keynes was a lifelong subjectivist. To evaluate this, we start by distinguishing Keynes’ writings on probability theory from his writings on economics. In the General Theory (1936), Keynes’ treatment of expectations provides the basis for Lachmann’s view that Keynes was a subjectivist at heart. In his Treatise on Probability (1921), Keynes refers explicitly to the subjectivism–objectivism divide in probability theory and pins his colors to the objectivist mast. In this essay, we present the objectivist slant in Keynes’ earlier writings on probability theory. Thereafter, we evaluate the criteria Lachmann employed to cast Keynes as a subjectivist.

Uncertainty was a lifetime preoccupation for J. M. Keynes. The notion of uncertainty features prominently in his economic writings and implicitly in his fellowship dissertation, A Treatise on Probability. A substantial interpretative literature has arisen on the nature of the conceptualisation of uncertainty and epistemic roots of Keynes’s discussion of the importance of expectations in the General Theory. Much of this literature has approached Keynes’s discussion from a variety of different perspectives exploring the nexus of Keynes’s contribution to the history of economic thought, philosophy, the foundations of probability, economics, psychology and contemporary economic events and analysis. Substantial light has been shed on Keynes’s discussion.

Using recent literature, examines developments in seven macroeconomic schools of thought: orthodox Keynesian, monetarist, new classical, real business cycle theory, new Keynesian, Austrian and post‐Keynesian. Describes all of these and classifies them as orthodox, new or radical. After setting out the differences, discusses the degree of agreement between the schools of thought. Concludes that macroeconomics is constantly evolving, resulting in new disagreements requiring a new consensus.

Presents the scientific methodology from the enlarged cybernetical perspective that recognizes the anisotropy of time, the probabilistic character of natural laws, and the entry that the incomplete determinism in Nature opens to the occurrence of innovation, growth, organization, teleology communication, control, contest and freedom. The new tier to the methodological edifice that cybernetics provides stands on the earlier tiers, which go back to the Ionians (c. 500 BC). However, the new insights reveal flaws in the earlier tiers, and their removal strengthens the entire edifice. The new concepts of teleological activity and contest allow the clear demarcation of the military sciences as those whose subject matter is teleological activity involving contest. The paramount question “what ought to be done”, outside the empirical realm, is embraced by the scientific methodology. It also embraces the cognitive sciences that ask how the human mind is able to discover, and how the sequence of discoveries might converge to a true description of reality.

This chapter documents an exchange between Leonard Savage, founder of the subjective probability approach to decision-making, and Karl Popper, advocate of the so-called propensity approach to probability, of which there is no knowledge in the literature on probability theory. Early in 1958, just after being informally tested by Daniel Ellsberg with a test of consistency in decision-making processes that originated the so-called Ellsberg Paradox, Savage was made aware that a similar argument had been put forward by Popper. Popper found it paradoxical that two apparently similar events should be attributed the same subjective probability even though evidence supporting judgment in one case was different than in the other case. On this ground, Popper rejected the subjective probability approach. Inspection of the Savage Papers archived at Yale University Library makes it possible to document Savage’s reaction to Popper, of which there is no evidence in his published writings. Savage wrote to Popper denying that his criticism had paradoxical content and a brief exchange followed. The chapter shows that while Savage was unconvinced by Popper’s argument he was not hostile to an axiomatically founded generalization of his theory.

The objective of the paper is to amalgamate theories of text retrieval from various research traditions into a cognitive theory for information retrieval interaction. Set in a cognitive framework, the paper outlines the concept of polyrepresentation applied to both the user's cognitive space and the information space of IR systems. The concept seeks to represent the current user's information need, problem state, and domain work task or interest in a structure of causality. Further, it implies that we should apply different methods of representation and a variety of IR techniques of different cognitive and functional origin simultaneously to each semantic full‐text entity in the information space. The cognitive differences imply that by applying cognitive overlaps of information objects, originating from different interpretations of such objects through time and by type, the degree of uncertainty inherent in IR is decreased. Polyrepresentation and the use of cognitive overlaps are associated with, but not identical to, data fusion in IR. By explicitly incorporating all the cognitive structures participating in the interactive communication processes during IR, the cognitive theory provides a comprehensive view of these processes. It encompasses the ad hoc theories of text retrieval and IR techniques hitherto developed in mainstream retrieval research. It has elements in common with van Rijsbergen and Lalmas' logical uncertainty theory and may be regarded as compatible with that conception of IR. Epistemologically speaking, the theory views IR interaction as processes of cognition, potentially occurring in all the information processing components of IR, that may be applied, in particular, to the user in a situational context. The theory draws upon basic empirical results from information seeking investigations in the operational online environment, and from mainstream IR research on partial matching techniques and relevance feedback. By viewing users, source systems, intermediary mechanisms and information in a global context, the cognitive perspective attempts a comprehensive understanding of essential IR phenomena and concepts, such as the nature of information needs, cognitive inconsistency and retrieval overlaps, logical uncertainty, the concept of ‘document’, relevance measures and experimental settings. An inescapable consequence of this approach is to rely more on sociological and psychological investigative methods when evaluating systems and to view relevance in IR as situational, relative, partial, differentiated and non‐linear. The lack of consistency among authors, indexers, evaluators or users is of an identical cognitive nature. It is unavoidable, and indeed favourable to IR. In particular, for full‐text retrieval, alternative semantic entities, including Salton et al.'s ‘passage retrieval’, are proposed to replace the traditional document record as the basic retrieval entity. These empirically observed phenomena of inconsistency and of semantic entities and values associated with data interpretation support strongly a cognitive approach to IR and the logical use of polyrepresentation, cognitive overlaps, and both data fusion and data diffusion.

Keynes' criticisms of Tinbergen's pioneering econometric work are traced back to Keynes' concept of “inductive probability logic”. Induction had already been rejected by Popper as the basis of scientific method. He argued that theories could be corroborated but not proved by the failure of attempts to falsify them by observation and experiment. Economic theory is proto‐theory, which is not fully falsifiable, but which yields falsifiable results if appropriate econometric methods, or a method‐theory is applied to it. A useful method‐theory needs to go beyond description and forecasting to policy optimisation.

Presents the thoughts on decision processes of Chester I. Barnard, one of the century’s greatest management theorists. Includes his classic article, “Mind in everyday affairs”; his unpublished book, “The Significance of Decisive Behaviour in Social Action”; his correspondence with Herbert Simon, and significant comments found in his personal papers.

With continuous scaling of digital circuit CMOS technology, the vulnerability of these circuits are significantly increasing against the soft errors. On the other hand, the effects of process variation in the electrical properties of nano-scale circuits, have introduced the statistical methods as an unavoidable choice for the soft error rate (SER) estimation. The purpose of this paper is to provide a statistical soft error rate (SSER) estimation approach for combinational circuits in the presence of process variation.

In this paper a new method is proposed for the SSER estimation of combinational circuits based on the Bayesian networks (BNs). This allows to factor the joint probability distributions over variables in a circuit graph. The distribution of the initial transient fault pulse is estimated by the pre-characterization tables. Timing signals are propagated by BN theory and the probability distribution of electrical and timing masking are calculated.

Simulation results for some benchmark circuits show that the proposed method is accurate with 3.7 percent difference with the Monte-Carlo SPICE simulation and with orders of magnitude improvement in runtime.

The proposed framework is the scheme giving the low estimation time with plausible accuracy compared to other schemes. The comparison exhibits that the designer can save its estimation time in terms of performance and complexity. The deterministic-based methods also are able to evaluate the SER of combinational circuit, yet in an unacceptable time.

This paper aims to initiate a new, formal theory of sociocultural physics.

Its intended scope is limited to predicting either long‐term, large‐scale or short‐term, small‐scale sociocultural events. The theory that the authors develop, called sociohistory, links three independent but relatable approaches: part of Sorokin's epistemological theory of sociocultural dynamics, Frieden's epistemological theory of extreme physical information (EPI), and Yolles's social viable systems (SVS) theory.

Although not all of Sorokin's ideas are universally accepted, a subset of them is found to be extremely useful for describing the conceptual context of complex systems. This includes how sociocultural processes link closely into political processes.

The theory that develops helps explain how opposing, cultural enantiomers or yin‐yang forces (represented, for instance, by the polar mindsets represented in Islamic fundamentalism and global enterprise) can result in violent conflict, or in either viable or non‐viable social communities. The informations I and J of EPI theory are regarded, respectively, as sensate and ideational enantiomers.

While the resulting sociocultural physics is in its infancy, an illustrative application to the developmental dynamics of post‐colonial Iran demonstrates its potential utility.