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This study aims to examine the effect of board gender diversity on corporate litigation in China’s listed firms. The key questions this study addresses are: what are the effect of board gender diversity on corporate litigation in terms of both the frequency and severity of consequence, is there any heterogeneous effects of the relationships across firm performance?

A sample consists of 25,668 firm-year observations from over 3,340 firms is examined using logistic regression analysis and negative binomial regression analysis. The authors also use event study method and ordinary least square (OLS) regression to explore female directors’ effects on reducing the negative consequences of litigation. The logistic regression and OLS regression are reestimated with interaction terms when examining the firm performance heterogeneity.

The authors document that firms with greater female representation on their boards experience fewer and less severe corporate litigations. Moreover, in high-performing firms, board gender diversity plays a more potent role in reducing the frequency and consequences of corporate litigation than low-performing firms.

This study is among the first to examine the relationship between board gender diversity and the comprehensive corporate litigations under Chinese context. It sheds new light on China’s boardroom dynamics, offering valuable empirical implication to Chinese corporate policymakers on the role of female directors.

This study aims to investigate whether accounting-related litigation is associated with a break in the client’s earnings string and the auditor’s response to a break in the earnings string.

The authors use regression models on a sample of publicly-traded USA companies with earnings strings.

The authors find that clients’ earnings string breaks are associated with increased accounting litigation risk and audit fees. The results are more prevalent for larger breaks.

The findings suggest auditors anticipate string breaks by clients which implies that audit fee research should consider earnings string characteristics in the fee models.

The auditor’s access to private information allows them to anticipate string breaks and potential increase in litigation risk.

An earnings string break represents a convergence of concerns highly relevant to the auditor: more users relying on the financial statements with greater expectations, increased likelihood of losses to those users, an environment where the likelihood of misstatement may increase, and explicitly stated professional responsibilities in response to the latter. Despite that, and a rich earnings string literature, prior studies have not directly examined auditors’ response to a client’s string break.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the likelihood that a firm will face financial statement fraud litigation is affected by the disclosure of internal control material weaknesses (MW) and the “busyness” of a firm’s board of directors.

The results are derived from logistic regression models and data are collected from the Audit Analytics database augmented by data from CompuStat, the Stanford Law School website and the SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases. The authors also test for endogeneity with a propensity score matching procedure.

The authors find that an MW report is strongly associated with the likelihood of subsequent financial statement fraud litigation, and that the influence of entity-level MW on litigation likelihood is stronger than that of account-level MW. Moreover, the number of outside board directorships significantly increases the influence of entity-level MW on the likelihood of litigation, indicating that board of directors’ busyness significantly increases the risk of litigation.

Previous research notes that board members holding multiple directorships cannot effectively oversee the financial reporting process and, thus, are associated with poorer governance. The authors extend this implication of board busyness to the association between disclosure of MW type and the filing of subsequent litigation alleging financial statement fraud. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other research has done so.

Judiciary plays a pivotal role in the overall development of a nation's economy and its involvement assures process transparency and impartiality. However, litigation is often expensive, uncertain and prone to delays. Notwithstanding such inherent challenges associated with litigation, it is observed that parties in construction disputes do resort to litigation. This study attempts to understand the potential paths triggering litigation of contractual disputes in construction. While extant researchers have identified focus areas or factors influencing litigation, the underlying paths connecting these focus areas, leading parties to litigation, is explored in this study.

Considering the framework of Rachlinski's “framing theory of litigation” and the mixed-methods approach (qualitative and quantitative approaches), this study proposes and validates a model that identifies the paths to litigation of contractual disputes in construction.

The results of in-depth interviews, followed by validation through structural equation modelling (SEM), reveal four critical paths, namely positional focus (PF) – contract and dispute characteristics (CDC) – decision to litigate (DTL), milieu influence (MI) – CDC – DTL, MI-PF-DTL and CDC-DTL.

The identified paths highlight the areas policymakers can consider while developing policy interventions to mitigate litigation.

Researchers have identified factors causing litigation in construction. However, attempts to examine the existence of multi-factor “paths” on the decision to litigate (DTL) have hitherto received a muted response, so this study focuses on identifying the project-level path(s) leading to the litigation of contractual disputes in construction.

This study aims to address the following four research questions: first, whether auditors report critical audit matters (CAMs) to shield themselves against possible litigation; second, whether reporting quality affects auditors’ propensity to report CAMs; third, whether auditors’ tenure length – reflecting familiarity with clients’ financial reporting – affects their likelihood to report CAMs; and fourth, whether auditors’ conservatism increases the likelihood of CAMs reporting.

Data are manually collected from audit reports including CAMs in 10-K, then financial data are collected from the Capital IQ database, and market data are collected from the CRSP database. Using propensity score matching, the initial sample of companies with CAMs is matched with companies without reported CAMs. Performance adjusted discretionary accruals, real earnings management proxy, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score, propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-Score, Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) model and Houston et al.’s (2010) model are used to measure reporting quality, auditor conservatism, misstatement risk and litigation risk, respectively.

The results do not show that auditors report CAMs opportunistically to shield themselves from litigation risk. However, the results do suggest that auditors have a greater tendency to report CAMs when reporting quality is low and when they are more conservative. On the other hand, they have less tendency to report CAMs in their first year of engagement.

The findings of this study have important implications for the auditor behavior literature as it shows that, when it comes to reporting CAMs, auditors actually behave objectively and do not report in a trite way. This study also provides early archival evidence on a standard that relates to the first major change to the auditor’s report in decades. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first to provide evidence on the association between auditor conservatism and auditors tendency to report CAMs and the first to triangulate prior research on auditor litigation risk by providing the first archival evidence on the auditors “litigation-shielding” concern.

This study examines whether auditors attempt to meet the stated objective of reporting CAMs by signaling information about reporting quality. This study demonstrates that reporting CAMs is not a “boilerplate” communication. This study has implications for standards setters, as it shows that CAMs are reported in a way consistent with the objectives of the new standard, namely, via signaling information in the audit report on the quality of the financial statements.

In terms of originality, this paper uses a manually collected sample and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to focus on auditor’s behavior rather than on investors or clients reactions to CAMs. Also, this paper addresses a recently issued standard using US data and archival approach, rather than experimental. This paper also provides relevant evidence related to concerns raised earlier but were not empirically examined, such as reporting CAMS as “boilerplate” expectations. This paper provides new evidence on the auditors’ behavior with regard to litigation risk.

Despite the availability of amicable means to resolve construction disputes, litigation remains a mainstream dispute resolution process in some countries. This tendency to litigate (TTL) calls for research to develop appropriate precautions to encourage stakeholders to resolve most commercial disputes through alternate dispute resolution (ADR) techniques. While a claimant's TTL arise from the individual, project and organisation preferences, this study, which can benefit both potential claimants and employers by saving time and money on litigation, identifies a bidder's financial parameters that may increase its litigation propensities, as a first step towards aiding employers to incorporate precautions to discourage such tendencies.

After the literature review, the theoretical construct proposed by Rachlinski's “framing theory of litigation” (based on Kahneman and Tversky's Prospects Theory) is used to explain organisation-level litigation decision-making. The study sources data from the financial statements of Indian construction/real estate firms, followed by panel regression analysis to test the theoretical construct's validity.

The results show that the TTL (risk-seeking behaviour) generally increases with a lower value of sales, higher assets and profitability. Interestingly, organisation-level cash flow shows an insignificant influence on litigation tendencies.

Knowing which financial parameters may increase litigation tendencies could help employers evaluate a bidder's propensity to litigate project disputes.

Researchers use financial statements to explore correlations among financial variables. However, in the construction context, there are no empirical studies with data from construction firms to understand potential litigation expenses compared to specific financial ratios.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether firm-specific litigation risk affects independent director conservatism in the oversight of financial reporting.

This study considers the enactment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the main US stock exchanges' corresponding corporate governance regulations in 2002–2003 as an exogenous shock event to increase board independence. OLS regressions with fixed effects are conducted to test the hypothesis.

Changes in discretionary accruals from the pre-event year (2001) to the post-event year (2004) are more negatively associated with an exogenous increase in board independence for firms with high litigation risk than for firms with low litigation risk.

The results suggest that independent directors are more conservative in overseeing financial reporting when they face higher litigation risk, consistent with the notion that they are still concerned about liability risk although they seldom have to pay damages or legal fees out of their own pockets.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The practice of management having control over auditor appointment and compensation is believed to be a fundamental cause for the lack of auditor independence. While researchers propose alternative auditor appointment procedures to improve auditor independence, there are a few settings that allow researchers to examine alternative auditor appointment procedures such as regulator designation of auditors. This research aims to investigate the effects of regulator designation of auditors and litigation risk on auditor independence in a Chinese setting

This study adopts a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. A total of 110 surveys were sent out and 81 were collected from eastern China.

The results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors indicate that regulator designation of auditors improves auditor independence. In particular, auditors designated by the regulator feel less pressure from the audited company, perceive themselves to be more independent and are more willing to challenge the audited company’s aggressive financial reporting compared with those directly hired by the company. In addition, litigation risk moderates the effect of regulator designation of auditors on auditor independence such that regulator designation of auditors has a stronger impact on auditor independence when the litigation risk is low.

This study is also subject to limitations. First, regulator designation of auditors in China was examined. While regulator designation of auditors seems to improve auditor independence in the Chinese context, it is unclear if the same results will be observed in other economies, as China is a unique setting. For example, the majority of listed companies in China are under the control of government-related agencies. Consequently, the government has significant power in influencing auditor appointment policy. In contrast, the majority of other economies are more market-oriented with less government influence. Future studies in other markets will further enrich the understanding on regulator designation of auditors. Second, only regulator designation of auditors for state-owned enterprises was examined. It is unclear how regulator designation of auditors would affect non-state-owned enterprises. Moreover, future research could investigate the designation of auditors in other forms such as the designation of auditors by investors. Third, auditor appointment procedure may affect perceived risk of loss of client which in turn influences auditor independence. Future research could further investigate the mechanism through which regulator designation of auditors affect auditor independence.

Results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors show that regulator designation of auditors can improve auditor independence. In a decision context where auditors must provide judgments relating to a proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively material and will affect the client’s ability to meet debt covenants, auditors designated by the State-Owned Assets Management Bureaus are more resistant to management pressure and are less willing to accept the management’s aggressive financial reporting practice than those directly hired by the company.

In this chapter, the options for funding large‐scale corruption actions for the recovery of assets and the seizure of assets as part of civil claims for damages for human rights abuse are considered. We have sought to set out our understanding of particular funding mechanisms which are either available to be used in England and Wales or are available in other jurisdictions and thus could potentially be made available in England and Wales.