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Scientific knowledge has characteristics of a pure public good. It is non-rivalrous in the sense that once generated, it is neither depleted nor diminished by use. Knowledge is also non-excludable since, once it is made available, in the absence of clearly defined property rights, users cannot be excluded from using it. These aspects imply that private market mechanisms will not provide adequate incentives for knowledge creation. Legal property rights, such as patents, are one means of dealing with this problem. Patronage in the form of government support for research provides another solution, as does the priority system of awarding credit for scientific discoveries to the first to find them. In the last two decades, there has been a growth in the relative importance of the use of legal property rights in the university setting and with it a growing controversy as to whether the costs may be outweighing the benefits. In this chapter, we discuss issues and evidence with regard to the ownership and licensing of publicly funded research intellectual property rights (IPR). We begin with an overview of incentives created by the patent system and discuss the ways in which these incentives differ from traditional norms of science. We then draw on the legal and economic literatures which distinguish among the incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate, and argue that the rationale for providing IPR for university research stems from the last of these. Finally, we discuss the available evidence on the creation and diffusion of academic research under current IPR regimes.

Academic entrepreneurship (defined in this case as the involvement of university faculty and researchers in commercial development of their inventions) has been a unique characteristic of the U.S. higher education system for most of the past 100 years. This long history of interaction, as well as academic patenting and licensing, contributed to the formation of the political coalitions that led to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. This paper reviews the evidence on university–industry interactions and technology transfer, focusing in particular on the role of the Bayh-Dole Act in (allegedly) transforming this relationship. I also examine recent research that considers the Act's effects on the formation of new, knowledge-based firms that seek to exploit university inventions. This research is in its infancy, and much remains to be done if we are to better understand the relationships among high-technology entrepreneurship, the foundation of new firms, and the patenting and licensing activities of U.S. universities before and after 1980.

Licensing from US universities is done within the overall legal framework of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 and the employment agreements of universities. This chapter explains common contracts used by universities to license technologies developed by their faculty and students within the context of these laws. In addition to the legal framework, the nature of license agreements is affected by the embryonic nature of most university inventions, which necessitates faculty and student involvement in development, and the entrepreneurial goals of the university. Universities have diverse goals in terms of revenue, licenses executed, inventions commercialized, patents filed, and number of startups formed. The somewhat obvious problem is that the goals of faculty, students, the university, and the licensee may not be aligned. Common contracts used are meant to align these goals. While some contracts include multiple terms such as upfront fees, running royalties, annual payments, and equity, Express Licenses are increasingly being used to accommodate the entrepreneurial environment. This chapter discusses these issues and also the importance of the rights to sublicense inventions.

The social licence literature contains two quite different accounts of the concept. Sometimes social licence is presented as an essentially empirical matter; sometimes it is portrayed as having normative significance. Both advocates and critics assume that the normative version is easy to generate from the empirical version but the author argues that it is difficult to account for the normativity of social licence. It is commonly claimed that social licence is a ‘metaphor’ or ‘analogy’ drawing on familiar understandings of institutional licences, and standard accounts purport to ‘build in’ normativity. Neither strategy establishes the normativity of social licence. If that is correct, we have reason to be sceptical about the normative significant of claims about the possession of empirical social licence. The approval or acceptance by affected communities may be one factor to be taken into account in such analysis, but it will not itself settle whether a practice ought to be approved or accepted or licenced.

Purpose – This chapter examines the licensing behavior of patent pools when they are unconstrained by antitrust rules.

Design/methodology/approach – Patent pools allow competing firms to combine their patents and license them as a package to outside firms. Regulators today favor pools that license their patents freely to outside firms, making it difficult to observe the unconstrained licensing strategies of patent pools. This chapter takes advantage of a unique period of regulatory tolerance during the New Deal to investigate the unconstrained licensing decisions of pools. Archival evidence suggests that – in the absence of regulation – pools may not choose to license their technologies.

Findings/originality/value – Eleven of twenty pools that formed between 1930 and 1938 did not issue any licenses to outside firms. Three pools granted one, two, and three licenses, respectively, to resolve litigation. Six pools issued between 9 and 185 licenses. Archival evidence suggests that the pools studied in this chapter used licensing as a means to limit competition with substitute technologies.