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Political economy is a term in wide use and has been for centuries. Yet standard economic theory reduces politics to ethics or economics. This reduction is enabled by the presumption of closed choice data or given utility and cost functions. In this conceptual framework, the political vanishes into an activity of preference satisfaction according to a welfare function (ethics) or into trade (economics). To bring the political back to life within a theory of political economy requires that closed schemes of thought be replaced by open schemes. The ways in which individuals react to the indeterminacy of their subjective choice data, in innocuous small-scale settings as well as in situations of dramatic exception to constitutional rules, separates them into leaders and followers. Followership creates an opportunity for political enterprise at the social level (enterprise in rules) and at the subjective level (enterprise in visions of options, and hence preferences). At both levels the political comes to the fore of political economy as an answer to the “challenge of exception.” Much of our inspiration for this argument traces to the work of Friedrich Wieser, Carl Schmitt, and Vincent Ostrom.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.

The Mexican government has been criticized for its implementation of neo-liberal economic policies that threaten to further impoverish indigenous populations. Given this, it is surprising that in 1997 some members of the Mixe people – one of the poorest indigenous groups in Mexico – condemned the implementation of a new government funding project that was specifically intended to alleviate hardship caused by free trade. The paper argues that objections to both free trade and the new funding program stem from the overarching problem the Mixe face, namely their systematic exclusion from decision-making processes and citizenship at the national level.

This chapter examines jury nullification, through which American juries refuse to convict criminal defendants in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt to express disapproval of specific criminal laws or of their application to particular defendants, through the political theory of Carl Schmitt. It distinguishes liberal components of American jurisprudence, especially the rule of law, from democratic sovereignty, and shows how the two are in deep tension with one another. In light of this tension it argues that jury nullification amounts to democratic sovereignty applied counter to the liberal state in a way that paradoxically upholds individual liberty.

Telecommunications comprises a vital component of information infrastructures and services, with a historically strong public interest dimension. For the best part of 30 years, the telecommunications sector in Europe has been the subject of a radical reorganisation in structural and operational terms along the lines of neo‐liberalism. This paper aims to analyse the significance of the neo‐liberal project in telecommunications in respect of the related dimensions of ideology and practice.

The paper presents a public policy critique of the manifestation of neo‐liberalism in the telecommunications sector in the European Union, employing desk‐based research on relevant primary and secondary source documentation.

The paper finds that proponents of neo‐liberalism have been able to secure the broad acceptance of neo‐liberalism as a “view of the world” for telecommunications. It shows that in practice, however, the neo‐liberal model in telecommunications provides evidence of a less than efficacious adoption process in three respects: neo‐liberalism requires an elaborately managed system the regulatory burden of which has been under‐emphasised; the normative success of neo‐liberalism has masked how difficult it has actually proven to be to create competition; the preoccupation with markets and competition has resulted in de‐emphasis of public interest issues in telecommunications.

This paper contributes up‐to‐date knowledge of the nature and effects of neo‐liberalism in the European telecommunication sector. It provides a challenge and counterweight to the “received wisdom” that neo‐liberalism has been an overwhelmingly successful approach to the re‐ordering of European telecommunications.