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This chapter investigates whether and to what extent tax benefits affect the likelihood of firms undertaking leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

With an identified sample of LBO firms and similar non-LBO counterparts, this chapter utilizes staggered changes in state corporate income tax rates as exogenous shocks and adopts a Logistic regression to analyze how these tax changes affect firms' probability of engaging in LBOs.

Firms are more likely to engage in LBOs after increases in corporate income tax rates. Specifically, the increase in the likelihood of firms undertaking LBOs following tax increases is between 6.9% and 12.9%. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of return on assets (ROA) and marginal tax rates (MTR). Finally, we report that the mean value of tax benefits accounts for between 28.5% and 170% of the premium paid to pre-buyout shareholders.

This chapter provides strong evidence that tax benefits constitute an important source of value creation in LBOs and adds to the debate regarding the role of tax benefits in LBOs.

Management buyout (MBO) is a specialized form of acquisition with different motives. Sometimes, there are initiatives taken by the senior management to bailout the firm from sickness. The predominant agency theory focuses only on the governance issues in the MBO firms and this theory can be applied to understand how managerial discretion can play vital roles in mitigating value destruction in the post-MBO firm. A CEO-led MBO is presumed to be greed-driven (Bebchuk, L., Cremers, M., & Peyer, U. (2011). The CEO pay slice. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 199–221.). But a senior management team-led MBO is said to be a socialistic move. By default, MBOs are debt-driven, unless the buying management team is financially affluent, which may be rare, considering the price for the buyout. Private equity (PE) players play a dominant role in providing and or arranging funds in the form of equity and or debt. There is a notion that the PE investors help promote entrepreneurial and modern management practices. The MBO target firm has to ensure returning the entire money back to the sponsors within the shortest possible time out of the operational cash flow. Therefore, various issues like identifying a target firm, sourcing mix of finance, MBO price determination, value creation and value delivery to all stakeholders are all important for understanding the subject. This chapter attempts to construct a robust model for structuring MBO to ensure value fairness to all parties involved in the transaction.

This paper investigates the capital structure of a large sample of U.S. private firms from 2004 to 2013. There is a considerable heterogeneity in private firm capital structure not only in terms of the level of leverage but also with regard to the issuance of specific debt instruments. Leverage, debt type usage, and debt specialization are dynamic and strongly related to observable firm characteristics largely in support of contract theory. Unobservable firm and industry characteristics are strong determinants of leverage levels and debt specialization. Macro credit conditions are not related to private firm leverage but are strong determinants of the degree to which firms diversify their debt capital structures.

Private equity has acquired multiple large nursing home chains within the past few years; by 2007, it owned 6 of the 10 largest chains. Despite widespread public and policy interest, evidence on the purported impact of private equity on nursing home performance is limited. In our review, we begin by briefly reviewing the organizational and environmental changes in the nursing home industry that facilitated private equity investments. We offer a conceptual framework to hypothesize the relationship between private equity ownership and nursing home performance. Finally, we offer a research agenda focused on the important parameters of nursing home performance: financial performance, and quality of care.

Purpose – Although there is extensive work on labor mobility, research on entrepreneurial mobility is fragmented and many aspects are largely neglected. We develop a framework for analysis that integrates different perspectives on entrepreneurial mobility to provide a broad agenda for future research.

Design/methodology – We build upon the strategic entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial behaviour theory, resource-based theory and other literatures, to distinguish four quadrants involving high and low geographical mobility and high and low organizational mobility.

Findings – Within each quadrant we identify different types of entrepreneurial mobility, specifically habitual entrepreneurs, management buyouts, university spin-offs, returnee entrepreneurs and transnational entrepreneurs. Issues concerning the development of research programs and methods, with particular emphasis on datasets, are discussed.

Originality/value – It is hoped that this chapter will spur entrepreneurship and strategy scholars to recognize that the scope of the entrepreneurial mobility concept is considerably greater than hitherto appreciated, providing interesting new avenues for theoretical and methodological development in this area.

Although employee stock ownership may result in increased cash flows due to enhanced organizational productivity or improved governance, this benefit is counterbalanced by the increased risk premium due to a higher correlation between the returns to the firm and the returns to human capital in general. For corporations that employ people with commonplace skills, employee stock ownership results in increased systematic risk, so the optimal level of employee stock ownership is small. When skills are unique, however (so the returns have low correlation with the returns to human capital in general), the optimal level of employee stock ownership is high, with strong incentives for outsourcing – not just the routine easily repeatable tasks but also research, product development, and other highly specialized tasks requiring knowledge not present within the firm. These conclusions hold even without conflicts of interest between owners and employees, but are strengthened in the presence of such conflicts. Incentives for greater employee ownership are further strengthened by the higher costs of becoming or remaining a public corporation that have been imposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. This analysis provides a framework for optimizing employee incentives from stock ownership.