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Anatomy of a Murder, a beloved, highly influential, seemingly liberal 1959 classic law-film seems to appropriate some of the fading western genre’s features and social functions, intertwining the professional-plot western formula with a hero-lawyer variation on the classic western hero character, America’s 19th century archetypal True Man. In so doing, Anatomy revives the western genre’s honor code, embracing it into the hero-lawyer law-film. Concurrently, it accommodates the development of cinematic imagery of the emerging, professional elite groups, offering the public the notion of the professional super-lawyer, integrating legal professionalism with natural justice. In the course of establishing its Herculean lawyer, the film constitutes its female protagonist as a potential threat, subjecting her to a cinematic judgment of her sexual character and reinforcing the honor-based notion of woman’s sexual-guilt.

This article combines two sources of data to shed light on the nature of transactional legal work. The first consists of stories about contracts that circulate among elite transactional lawyers. The stories portray lawyers as ineffective market actors who are uninterested in designing superior contracts, who follow rather than lead industry standards, and who depend on governments and other outside actors to spur innovation and correct mistakes. We juxtapose these stories against a dataset of sovereign bond contracts produced by these same lawyers. While the stories suggest that lawyers do not compete or design innovative contracts, their contracts suggest the contrary. The contracts, in fact, are consistent with a market narrative in which lawyers engage in substantial innovation despite constraints inherent in sovereign debt legal work. Why would lawyers favor stories that paint them in a negative light and deny them a potent role as market actors? We conclude with some conjectures as to why this might be so.

“Guantánamo lawyers” are a variegated group of lawyers from diverse practice settings, backgrounds, and beliefs. Drawing from interview and archival data, this chapter explores why these lawyers have mobilized to work on Guantánamo matters. What processes engender “heterogeneous mobilization” (i.e., mobilization from different practice settings, and diverse professional, as well as political backgrounds, and beliefs) of lawyers? What are the impacts of such mobilization on the work of lawyers? Adopting a social movement lens and a contemporary historical perspective, this chapter identifies lawyers’ perceptions of their role vis-à-vis the “rule of law” as the most significant cross-cutting motivation for participation. The overlap in human rights orientation of legal nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the legal academy, and the corporate pro bono practice at top law firms, facilitates collaborative lawyering between lawyers. Despite some potential limitations of such collaborations, heterogeneous mobilization appears to contribute, at least in the case of Guantánamo, to a greater likelihood of resistance by lawyers to the retreat from individual rights in the name of national security.

The traditional and most common conception of cause lawyers has viewed them as necessarily oppositional to the state, leftist, and, at best, transgressive. This conception is significant to our analysis because of its tendency to treat “the state” as a rather singular arena of power – an “it” – rather than a multi-dimensional entity made up of competing institutions and personnel. Following work on the disaggregated and embedded state, we suggest that conflict and competition among state institutions and state personnel allow cause lawyers and state actors to engage in mutually-beneficial action in service of their agendas. Litigation has important benefits for both cause lawyers and state actors: within the arena of law, processes that usually require the backing of large constituencies in the context of majoritarian institutions require, instead, convincing legal arguments. We briefly present evidence from two highly disparate cases of similar processes of interaction among cause lawyers and state actors in Vermont and Israel, which we believe indicates that this type of interaction is far from idiosyncratic.

In this chapter, we show how embedded social relations affect economic transactions and intraprofessional stratification in the market for legal services. We argue that networks are critical in fostering individual upward mobility not only because they provide valuable information to ego (lawyer) but also because they function as a crucial mechanism by which the focal actor’s (lawyer’s) status is transmitted to outside alters (clients). Consistent with Podolny’s (1993) general theoretical statement, we claim that ties to prestigious network partners send positive signals concerning the ability and trustworthiness of legal professionals. That is, networks help reduce the information asymmetries faced by potential buyers concerning the actual (unknowable) quality of legal services. Our argument is that, in doing so, the network-embedded status of lawyers serves to contribute to their earnings. We demonstrate this point empirically by examining how networks relate to the process of income attainment among a random sample of lawyers in Chicago (1995).

The study of cause lawyers has focused heavily on the private sector, but both public and private attorneys bring voting rights litigation. This chapter first situates voting rights litigation within cause lawyering, as described by Scheingold and Sarat. It then suggests criteria for analyzing cause lawyering across public and private sectors and applies them to the attorneys who have done the majority of voting rights litigation for American Indians: The Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division and the Voting Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union. The chapter suggests that the public and private attorneys are more similar than one might expect in their motivation, relationship to clients, and range of political strategies used. Their organizational practice sites differ greatly, but the dynamics of the public practice site confirm that Voting Section attorneys are cause lawyers.

As the demand for affordable legal services grows, law schools and the legal profession struggle to respond. By examining lessons from successful social movements in the last century, Cause Lawyering and Social Movements: Can Solo and Small Firm Practitioners anchor Social Movements looks at the Law School Consortium Project and its potential to participate in and anchor the social movements of our time. The collaboration of the law schools, networks of solo and small firm attorneys and activists at the local, regional and national level provide key elements for powerful change given the technological developments of the 21st century.

In the Canadian province of Ontario government-funded legal aid underwent significant change in the 1990s in ways that mirror the trajectory of other governmental programs typically referred to in the governmentality literature as a shift to neo-liberalism. Through an analysis of interviews with lawyers and programmatic texts closely linked to legal aid practices this chapter reveals that legal aid is shaped by neo-liberal and pastoral rationalities. The implications of these findings both for legal aid research and governmentality studies are discussed.

This chapter proposes a research agenda for the study of large law firm culture and explains how the research would contribute to both legal ethics and organizational theory. It focuses on two sets of questions that are uniquely suited to investigation in large law firms. First: what is the significance of organizational culture, relative to that of professional networks and subgroups? To what extent does organizational membership shape lawyers’ understandings about “how things are done”? Second: how is organizational culture sustained? What are the mechanisms of cultural integration in volatile, multioffice firms? The chapter draws on a pilot study of law firm culture in one 500-lawyer firm.

This chapter focuses on dispute resolution in French labor courts. We empirically investigate the forces that shape decision-making in the pretrial conciliation phase. For that purpose, we compiled a new database from legal documents. The results are twofold. First, conciliation is less likely when plaintiffs are assisted by a lawyer. Although this result might be interpreted in various ways, further analysis shows that the lawyers’ remuneration scheme is the most likely cause of this effect. Second, we find that the likelihood of settlement decreases as the amount at stake increases. These results contribute to the ongoing debate about French labor court reform.