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This chapter presents reflections and considerations regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and contemporary and future warfare. As “an evolving collection of computational techniques for solving problems,” AI holds great potential for national defense endeavors (Rubin, Stafford, Mertoguno, & Lukos, 2018). Though decades old, AI is becoming an integral instrument of war for contemporary warfighters. But there are also challenges and uncertainties. Johannsen, Solka, and Rigsby (2018), scientists who work with AI and national defense, ask, “are we moving too quickly with a technology we still don't fully understand?” Their concern is not if AI should be used, but, if research and development of it and pursuit of its usage are following a course that will reap the rewards desired. Although they have long-term optimism, they ask: “Until theory can catch up with practice, is a system whose outputs we can neither predict nor explain really all that desirable?” ¹ Time (speed of development) is a factor, but so too are research and development priorities, guidelines, and strong accountability mechanisms. ²

The subject of Jihad has been a fiercly debated topic in the past few decades. Contradictory translations have been adopted by differing religious groups and political camps. In some quarters Jihad has been associated with violence and war. Other quarters perceive the Jihad to mean a striving within oneself and the struggle for self‐improvement. In this paper, the historical and contemporary perspectives of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam regarding Jihad are outlined. The evolution of the meaning of Jihad in each religion is clarified and similarities and dissimilarities among the three religions are highlighted. Various forms of Jihad are presented. The paper, however, argues that true Jihad means an active participation in social improvement and economic development. In addition, the paper provides implications of Jihad for business and organizations.

This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.

Harnessing the power and potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues a centuries-old trajectory of the application of science and knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Such an endeavor has great promise, but also the possibility of creating conflict and disorder. This chapter draws upon the strengths of the previous chapters to provide readers with a purposeful assessment of the current AI security landscape, concluding with four key considerations for a globally secure future.

For a variety of reasons, both ordinary citizens and political leaders have failed since 1914 to be passionate and imaginative enough in the pursuit of peace. As technological advances have made it possible to kill increasing numbers of people and put civilians increasingly at risk, our moral development has lagged far beyond. We need to emulate Gandhi more, whose moral passion and non-violent resistance tactics have inspired other seekers of peace like Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King, Jr. Although political leaders have different responsibilities than ordinary citizens, they too can be ardent and imaginative peace seekers, as the examples of West Germany’s Willy Brandt, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy (during the last year of his life) demonstrate. At present, the Ukrainian Crisis cries out for just such leadership, but heretofore has not been forthcoming.

The relation between moral judgements, policy decisions and economic implications is a challenging subject for analysis, especially when the isues are the arms race and war‐fighting capabilities. How to translate moral judgements into policy decisions with their economic consequences is a complex and troublesome question because of the enormous stakes for national and worldwide survival. The problem confronting us is clearly illustrated by the US Catholic bishops' pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace, May 1983, which addressed the moral dimension of the nuclear arms race and warfare without coming to grips adequately with the issues of policy decisions and economy which their moral conclusions raised. Their later pastoral letter, Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the US Economy, November 1986, compounded their failure by omitting to confront directly the economic implications of translating their moral conclusions into practical policies. The economic side of the arms race is a concern which must be recognised and addressed if policy decisions are to be made effective. The harshest critics of The Challenge of Peace have noted this failure realistically to confront policy decisions in terms of geopolitical, strategic and economic consequences.

During the four years of preliminary meetings that led to the 1977 Protocols Additional I and II governing internal armed conflict, the prohibitions against superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering – two concepts that gird the regulation and moderation of war and limit the use of certain means and methods of warfare – were invoked as a means of calling into account the actions of imperial states. These meetings took place in the context of the conflicts in Southeast Asia, following the wars of decolonization and national liberation in the 1950s and 1960s. The participants in these meetings were freedom fighters and liberation movements who used this forum, which was open to them for the first time, to push for a wider understanding of the concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Their intention was to hold imperialism and imperial states accountable for suffering and injury beyond that of physical death or wounding and to recognize the violence of colonization and the social and cultural devastation it brought. These interventions were a critical attempt to broaden and deepen the meaning of the laws of war, to make them responsive to more than established sovereign state violence, and to ensure that they reflected the experience of colonization/decolonization. This episode matters because the prohibitions against unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury are two elements that detail the general prohibition first codified in 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 22, namely that the “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” However, the history and formulation of these two concepts has yet to be fully explored, the meaning of each is debated, and taken together the two are among “the most unclear and controversial rules of warfare.”

Against the backdrop of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy – an instrument with which the UN seeks to protect vulnerable civilians from gross violations of human rights – this study examines the application of R2P in the Libyan intervention and the various efforts to replicate similar claim to intervene in Syria. While proposing that the roles of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) is increasingly influential to the success of an intervention, this study asks the question: what are the general conditions for success of R2P application in Libya and Syria during the period 2011-2014?

In its examination of the policy and scholarly works that have informed, justified and evaluated the processes and outcomes of the principles of R2P policy, this paper used relevant search terms for conditions for success of humanitarian military intervention (COSI). Specific keywords such as R2P, BRICS and humanitarian intervention are scrutinised for relevance to the research question. Documents that failed to satisfy the criteria of research quality were excluded, whereas the key problems and findings identified in each studied document were tabulated into inclusion and exclusion.

Despite the role of BRICS in the Libyan and Syrian interventions, existing literature failed to explicitly make this connection, although much of the literature agreed on a number of general conditions for success. This paper problematise the relationship between success and BRICS role. One of the reasons for this is the emerging nature of the literature that is beginning to appreciate the plausibility that the BRICS influences the success of an intervention.

This piece synthesises studies that focus on COSI with preference for works that engaged this study’s case countries. Much rich data which even until now are always in need of close examination emerged during data collection, making it useful to craft a third part for BRICS-focused literature that has informed the R2P debate.

Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies and Autonomous Unmanned Vehicles are shaping our daily lives, society, and will continue to transform how we will fight future wars. Advances in AI technologies have fueled an explosion of interest in the military and political domain. As AI technologies evolve, there will be increased reliance on these systems to maintain global security. For the individual and society, AI presents challenges related to surveillance, personal freedom, and privacy. For the military, we will need to exploit advances in AI technologies to support the warfighter and ensure global security. The integration of AI technologies in the battlespace presents advantages, costs, and risks in the future battlespace. This chapter will examine the issues related to advances in AI technologies, as we examine the benefits, costs, and risks associated with integrating AI and autonomous systems in society and in the future battlespace.