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This chapter presents reflections and considerations regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and contemporary and future warfare. As “an evolving collection of computational techniques for solving problems,” AI holds great potential for national defense endeavors (Rubin, Stafford, Mertoguno, & Lukos, 2018). Though decades old, AI is becoming an integral instrument of war for contemporary warfighters. But there are also challenges and uncertainties. Johannsen, Solka, and Rigsby (2018), scientists who work with AI and national defense, ask, “are we moving too quickly with a technology we still don't fully understand?” Their concern is not if AI should be used, but, if research and development of it and pursuit of its usage are following a course that will reap the rewards desired. Although they have long-term optimism, they ask: “Until theory can catch up with practice, is a system whose outputs we can neither predict nor explain really all that desirable?” ¹ Time (speed of development) is a factor, but so too are research and development priorities, guidelines, and strong accountability mechanisms. ²

This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.

Harnessing the power and potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) continues a centuries-old trajectory of the application of science and knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Such an endeavor has great promise, but also the possibility of creating conflict and disorder. This chapter draws upon the strengths of the previous chapters to provide readers with a purposeful assessment of the current AI security landscape, concluding with four key considerations for a globally secure future.

For a variety of reasons, both ordinary citizens and political leaders have failed since 1914 to be passionate and imaginative enough in the pursuit of peace. As technological advances have made it possible to kill increasing numbers of people and put civilians increasingly at risk, our moral development has lagged far beyond. We need to emulate Gandhi more, whose moral passion and non-violent resistance tactics have inspired other seekers of peace like Dorothy Day and Martin Luther King, Jr. Although political leaders have different responsibilities than ordinary citizens, they too can be ardent and imaginative peace seekers, as the examples of West Germany’s Willy Brandt, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela, and U.S. President John F. Kennedy (during the last year of his life) demonstrate. At present, the Ukrainian Crisis cries out for just such leadership, but heretofore has not been forthcoming.

During the four years of preliminary meetings that led to the 1977 Protocols Additional I and II governing internal armed conflict, the prohibitions against superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering – two concepts that gird the regulation and moderation of war and limit the use of certain means and methods of warfare – were invoked as a means of calling into account the actions of imperial states. These meetings took place in the context of the conflicts in Southeast Asia, following the wars of decolonization and national liberation in the 1950s and 1960s. The participants in these meetings were freedom fighters and liberation movements who used this forum, which was open to them for the first time, to push for a wider understanding of the concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering. Their intention was to hold imperialism and imperial states accountable for suffering and injury beyond that of physical death or wounding and to recognize the violence of colonization and the social and cultural devastation it brought. These interventions were a critical attempt to broaden and deepen the meaning of the laws of war, to make them responsive to more than established sovereign state violence, and to ensure that they reflected the experience of colonization/decolonization. This episode matters because the prohibitions against unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury are two elements that detail the general prohibition first codified in 1907 Hague Convention IV, Article 22, namely that the “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” However, the history and formulation of these two concepts has yet to be fully explored, the meaning of each is debated, and taken together the two are among “the most unclear and controversial rules of warfare.”

Advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies and Autonomous Unmanned Vehicles are shaping our daily lives, society, and will continue to transform how we will fight future wars. Advances in AI technologies have fueled an explosion of interest in the military and political domain. As AI technologies evolve, there will be increased reliance on these systems to maintain global security. For the individual and society, AI presents challenges related to surveillance, personal freedom, and privacy. For the military, we will need to exploit advances in AI technologies to support the warfighter and ensure global security. The integration of AI technologies in the battlespace presents advantages, costs, and risks in the future battlespace. This chapter will examine the issues related to advances in AI technologies, as we examine the benefits, costs, and risks associated with integrating AI and autonomous systems in society and in the future battlespace.

This short chapter is an introduction to my 2018 book: The Ethics of Surveillance: An Introduction (Macnish, 2018). It is provided at the start of this PRO-RES collection of essays because it anticipates and supplements the range of issues covered in this collection and lays out some of the fundamental considerations necessary to ensure if surveillance must be conducted, it will be done as ethically as possible.

When is surveillance justified? We can largely agree that there are cases in which surveillance seems, at least prima facie, to be morally correct: police tracking a suspected mass murderer, domestic state security tracking a spy network, or a spouse uncovering partner’s infidelity. At the same time, there are other cases in which surveillance seems clearly not to be justified: the mass surveillance practices of the East German Stasi, an employer watching over an employee to ensure that they do not spend too long in the toilet, or a voyeur watching the subject of his lust undress night after night.

As an introductory text, my book does not seek to provide a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for ethical surveillance. What it does provide is an overview of the current thinking in surveillance ethics, looking at a range of proposed arguments about these questions, and how those arguments might play out in a variety of applied settings. It hence provides a useful and accessible volume for policymakers wishing to rapidly get up to speed on developments in surveillance and the accompanying ethical discussions.

Purpose – The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the current limitations in compensating the civilian victims of armed conflicts and to examine the possibility of extending this practice.

Methodology/approach – The first half of the chapter employs legal and political analysis of the current framework of international law and the practice of the United States. The latter half of the chapter examines the literature on theory of liability in economics and philosophy.

Findings – The framework of international law, which does not require compensation for the victims of lawful attacks, is increasingly at odds with the current trend in which military force is used by a powerful state against a much weaker state on the grounds that the local population would benefit from the operation. The system developed by the United States is the most extensive and can form a model for other states and international institutions. Keating's analysis of enterprise liability can be applied to compensation of victims in military operations that are deemed to be beneficial to the population. Economic analysis, on contrary, suggests that compensation of civilian victims has minimal effect on the level of risks.

Originality/value – This chapter makes a unique contribution by applying theory of liability to a situation that widely diverges from the context in which the theory has developed. It critically examines the current practice and proposes a morally preferable and economically sustainable alternative model.