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The very contextual nature of most mitigating evidence runs counter to America’s individualistic culture. Prior research has found that capital jurors are unreceptive to most mitigating circumstances, but no research has examined the capital sentencing decisions of trial judges. This study fills that gap through a content analysis of eight judicial sentencing opinions from Delaware. The findings indicate that judges typically dismiss contextualizing evidence in their sentencing opinions and instead focus predominately on the defendant’s culpability. This finding calls into question the ability of guided discretion statutes to ensure the consideration of mitigation and limit arbitrariness in the death penalty.

This study stresses the importance of considering a “joint” governance of interfirm relations as an alternative to external governance (by the State) and self-governance (by the business community) of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint governance because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by “consular” judges (i.e. judges elected through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market, and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint governance: The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court that enforces this joint governance will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses. It thus characterizes joint governance of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists’ attention.

Opinion polls show that contributions to judicial candidates create an appearance of corruption. This perception damages the institutional legitimacy of the courts. This chapter explores the relationship between integrity ratings of Illinois trial judges and campaign contributions. Specifically, it examines the Illinois State Bar Association judicial poll integrity scores of 253 elected judges seated in 101 Illinois counties during 1994–2012. Regression analysis reveals that judicial candidates’ integrity scores declined as (a) the amount of attorney contributions increased; (b) the number of reported attorney contributors enlarged; and (c) the number of large attorney contributors grew. This chapter also discusses the efficacy and limitations of four policies meant to diminish the appearance of corruption: recusal and disqualification rules; anonymous contributions; public financing; and the elimination of the election of judges. Although a radical solution, the policy of abolishing judicial elections is more likely to overcome the appearance of corruption than the other reforms.

In this chapter I discuss judicial contributions to Italian penality. I look at the penal incentives produced by interactions between judicial and political classes, and ask whether judges and prosecutors have been forces for punitiveness or moderation. I discuss the relevance of the Italian case for broader analyses of Western penality.

My chapter offers a political-sociological account of judicial contributions to punishment. I analyse the penal incentives created by different national institutional set-ups, specifically addressing judicial contributions to penality using a framework developed by Joachim Savelsberg and Nicola Lacey. The framework examines judicial structure in the institutional context looking at the penal implications of bureaucratisation of the judiciary and the capacity for co-ordination between judges and politicians. I include judicial legitimacy as an additional dimension in this framework.

I conclude that the Italian judiciary have been forces for punitiveness and moderation. Their contributions can be systematised by looking at the waxing and waning of judicial legitimacy, and the consequent expansion and contraction of judicial powers. I claim that judicial legitimacy is also relevant to other (‘non-Italian’) analyses of judicial contributions to contemporary Western penality.

By adding legitimacy to investigations of judicial contributions to penality I provide an organising principle with which to analyse the penal role of Italian judicial actors. I thus allow Italy to be kept in conversation with existing comparative models, without assuming that it either conforms to the models entirely, or that the models should otherwise be eschewed. I use the Italian case to demonstrate the relevance of legitimacy when analysing judicial contributions to Western penality, arguing that changing legitimacy affects the terms and effect of interaction between judicial and political classes.

In this article, I examine the role of judicial narratives in constructing, constraining, and delimiting the boundaries of social scientific and expert knowledge – specifically, in the context of gay and lesbian parents’ custody and adoption cases. Examining not only the judicial narratives in appellate cases over the last fifty years in the United States, but also expert reports and briefs obtained from attorneys in these cases and interviews with judges, attorneys and litigants, I investigate the role of judicial narratives in adjudicating between competing social scientific claims about sexuality and child welfare, constructing expertise, and ultimately deciding what is valid knowledge and what is not. I focus specifically on the ways in which judges credit and discredit social scientific evidence, experts, and knowledge claims. The power of legal actors and particularly judges to police the boundaries of knowledge and expertise in the context of the custody case and the judicial narrative is complicated by the observation that this form of social scientific knowledge is not only the object acted upon and shaped by these power dynamics, but is also itself a source of power and legitimation.

Purpose – This chapter considers the consequences on liberty in relationship to the development of the international problem-solving court movement.

Design/methodology/approach – The research, which relies principally on ethnographic fieldwork in six different common law countries (England, Ireland, Scotland, Australia, Canada, and the United States), explores the development of local problem-solving courts in each jurisdiction. These include drug courts, community courts, domestic violence courts, and mental health courts. The ethnographic fieldwork was supplemented with data from various other sources, including government reports, parliamentary debates, evaluations of individual court programs, publications issued by various advocacy groups, media accounts, public statements and articles by problem-solving court judges, and analyses of specialty courts in law reviews and other academic journals.

Findings – The research reveal that the five countries outside of the United States demonstrate greater concern with protecting the dignity of the court, due process, and individual rights – or what the Australians refer to as open and natural justice.

Originality/value – It is the first large-scale comparative study of problem-solving courts in the common law countries where the movement is most advanced.

Following in the footsteps of critics of the 1920s and 1930s, Caleb Foote's 1954 study of the bail system in Philadelphia set the agenda for bail reform in the United States focusing on judicial discretion and the inequities of a predominantly financially based pretrial detention system. This article argues that the bail reform movement originating in the 1960s fell short of its objectives in its failure to engage judges in the business of reform. From Foote's study on, Philadelphia has played a role historically in studies of bail, detention, and reform. The article considers the experience of Philadelphia's judicial pretrial release guidelines innovation from the 1980s to the present and its implications as an important contemporary bail reform strategy in addressing the problems of bail, release, and detention practices. The implications of the judge-centered pretrial release guidelines strategy for addressing pretrial release problems in urban state court systems are discussed in light of the original aims and issues of early bail reform.

The statement that evaluation works differently in different contexts might seem fairly obvious, but given how central it is to virtually all aspects of modern life, it is important to understand how these differences affect the objects of evaluation and the people doing the evaluation. Drawing on a mixed-methods study of evaluation in figure skating and classical music, the author addresses how evaluation practices affect judging and performance. In the early- to mid-2000s, the figure skating world transitioned from a judging system where judges used two overall marks to rank skaters to a much more rigid system where judges rate very specific aspects of performances without actively ranking them. These changes have impacted judges and skaters. In the classical music competitions the author focuses on, judges use deliberations to rank performances. The relative flexibility of these evaluation practices generally does not affect judges or performances as much. Building on research on the effects of measurement and evaluation systems, the author argues that formal, specific rules surrounding evaluation shape judging and performance more than informal, diffuse rules. Focusing on competition settings in skating and music, the author discusses how evaluation practices affect program and repertoire construction and the technical and artistic aspects of judging and performance in these fields. In addition to supplementing research suggesting that evaluation systems actively shape what they are designed to evaluate, this work highlights how different types of evaluation contribute to different responses in terms of the evaluation itself and the objects of evaluation.

One of the most dramatic controversies over judicial independence in the United States occurred at the state level, in antebellum Kentucky, when two entirely different state high courts remained in operation, each claiming to be the only legitimate tribunal. This chapter describes Kentucky's two-court crisis, but focuses primarily on the constitutional convention of 1849, which followed it. Through the lens of modern scholarship about judicial independence, the lessons that antebellum Kentuckians drew from their own history seem quite counterintuitive. They did not view their project of judicial design as a matter of balancing judicial independence with accountability, a task that many modern scholars of American politics have posited as the central problem of judicial design. Instead, Kentucky's constitutional convention sought to structure an institution that would allow the state's courts to respond to popular sentiment without compromising their independence. Thus, these debates suggest frameworks for understanding judicial independence that do not pit independence against judicial accountability or popular politics, but attempt to discern which forms of politics threaten the independence of courts, and which forms may not.