Search results

Firms tend to transfer more knowledge in technology joint ventures compared to contractual technology agreements. Using insights from new institutional economics, this chapter explores to what extent the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer is sensitive to an evolving industry norm of collaboration connected to the logic of open innovation. The chapter examines 1,888 dyad-year observations on firms engaged in technology alliances in the U.S. information technology industry during 1980–1999. Using fixed effects linear models, it analyzes longitudinal changes in the alliance governance association with interfirm knowledge transfer, and how such changes vary in magnitude across bilateral versus multipartner alliances, and across computers, telecommunications equipment, software, and microelectronics subsectors. Increases in industry-level alliance activity during 1980–1999 improved the knowledge transfer performance of contractual technology agreements relative to more hierarchical equity joint ventures. This effect was concentrated in bilateral rather than multipartner alliances, and in the software and microelectronics rather than computers and telecommunications equipment subsectors. Therefore, an evolving industry norm of collaboration may sometimes make more arms-length governance of a technology alliance a credible substitute for equity ownership, which can reduce the costs of interfirm R&D. Overall, the chapter shows that the performance of material practices that constitute innovation ecosystems, such as interfirm technology alliances, may differ over time subject to prevailing institutional norms of open innovation. This finding generates novel implications for the literatures on alliances, open innovation, and innovation ecosystems.

This study examines the determinants of performance of foreign manufacturing subsidiaries in Japan. The study finds that a foreign parent’s size, the subsidiary’s age, and a complicated distribution system influence a subsidiary’s performance. There was little significant change in these determinants over a 20-year period. However, for subsidiaries that survived over the observation period of this study, some determinants changed. We also found that by forming joint ventures with Japanese firms, foreign firms can overcome the obstacle of distribution and circumvent the disadvantage of inexperience. Moreover, the mitigating effects of joint ventures vary, depending on the type of Japanese partner.

Partner firms to the same joint venture experience sharply different stock price reactions. These differences cannot be explained by mechanical factors related to differences in firm size and ownership share in the project, nor are they attributable to different partner roles in the project or differences in investor anticipation of the announcement. We conclude that the stock price reactions reflect a revaluation of non-project assets that is different for each partner. Additionally, we find evidence indicating that investors infer information about agency problems (in the sense of Jensen, 1986) from the joint venture announcements and subsequently, revalue the whole firm – not just the marginal project being announced. Finally, we find that free cash flow is value-enhancing for one type of partner firm after we control for the extent of agency problems.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

This study empirically identifies three strategies for creating shareholder value for firms who venture into Emerging markets (EMs) in search of corporate growth and profitability.

To uncover these value creating strategies, we apply Cluster analysis techniques, analysis of variance as well as survey several qualitative case-studies of firms who have entered EMs worldwide.

Our findings demonstrate how firms can – and do – tap into the potential that EMs offer, despite the inherent riskiness of these markets and/or constraints on corporate resources. Statistically, no single shareholder value creating strategy is more (or less) remunerative than other strategies. Many equally profitable trajectories coexist vis-à-vis corporate growth in EMs.

Our findings are based on stock-markets’ expectations of firm performance; these expectations may not correspond to the actual future firm performance.

The principles we have isolated have a broad appeal because they identify variety of paths that facilitate shareholder value creation via participation in EMs. We expose the inner workings of these trajectories and illustrate particular firm-specific and location-specific combinations associated with profitable EM ventures.

This study seriously challenges the conventional view that value creation is a function of singular positive influences. On the contrary, this study establishes that value creation is multi-dimensional and submits that a more refined way to augment performance is to develop an ability to combine relevant firm-specific and location-specific factors so that they can, if needed, offset the impositions of each other.

In this chapter I would like to recall how I got started on my research on the multinational enterprise (MNE) and outline how my thinking on this important economic institution has evolved through the years.11I thank Sondra Grace of Gracefully Put for editing this manuscript.

In tandem with the drastic increase of IJVs, the academic research regarding various issues about them has also augmented. Myriad of studies examining the antecedents and outcomes of partner/location selection, different control and safeguarding mechanisms, performance, and stability of IJVs have appeared in revered scholarly outlets. A review of the previous research on IJVs reveals that a vast amount of these studies is focused on their formation (e.g., Kogut, 1988) and the advantages of them as governance structures (e.g., Hennart, 1988).

We provide a comprehensive synthesis and extension of the real option (RO) literature on joint ventures (JVs), contributing in three main areas. First, we examine major alternative theoretical perspectives on JVs – learning, bargaining, transaction cost and agency theory – to elaborate how they complement or contradict RO predictions. Second, we compare arguments and variables used to explain different JV stages – initial RO explicitness and equity shares, JV stability, and performance consequences – and highlight research opportunities. Third, we discuss and extend research about behavioral aspects of making RO (JV) investments. Overall, we offer new predictions and suggestions for a better integration within the RO literature, and between RO and related literatures on JVs.