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Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet “political risk” is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price – in terms of an investor’s required share of equity – that increases in the level of radical innovation. Financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure will endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations, while the most radical innovations (for whom the price of failure tolerance is too high) can only be started by investors who are not failure tolerant. Since policies to stimulate innovation must often be set before specific investments in innovative projects are made, this creates a trade-off between a policy that encourages experimentation ex post and the one that funds experimental projects ex ante. In equilibrium, it is possible that all competing financiers choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects in the economy. The impact of different innovation policies can help to explain who finances radical innovations, and when and where radical innovation occurs.

This research examines stock traders' disposition effects and contrarian/momentum behavior in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). Specifically, we first investigate disposition effects across all trader types and then examine the relationships between disposition effects, trader types, and order characteristics. Next, we explore contrarian and/or momentum behavior and analyze the relationships among the contrarian/momentum behavior, investor type, and order characteristics. Finally, the links among trader types, order characteristics, and investment performance are detected. This chapter yields the following findings. (1) Individual investors exhibit the strongest disposition effects compared to other investors. (2) Foreign investors, investment trusts, and individual investors tend to use large orders to sell loser stocks. (3) Investment trusts are inclined to be momentum traders, while individual investors tend to perform contrarian strategies. (4) Institutional aggressive and large orders perform better than individuals' orders. (5) The performance of foreign investors' selling decisions is better than that of retail investors.

In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

This chapter describes the evolution of the Brazilian investment fund industry and the impact of domestic and international crises on investors, managers and the main types of funds offered in Brazil. In particular, it explores the effect of the subprime crisis and shows that the first wave of this crisis had very little impact, but the second wave with the collapse of Lehman Brothers did have a major impact on risk, returns and flows of the mutual fund industry in Brazil.

Purpose – The global surge in institutional investors in the past decade or so has aroused interest in the role institutions play, or should play, in regard to the monitoring of the company financial performance. This study explores the nature of the relationship that exists between institutional ownership, corporate governance, and company financial performance.

Methodology/approach – Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique on 391 company-year observations between 2005 and 2010 to examine the nature of the relationship that exists between firm performance (PER) and ownership variables, and test whether this relationship is significant.

Findings – Our evidence provides support for the view that top five institutional shareholders take a longer-term view and are more involved with governance suggesting that the size of shareholdings has an effect when it comes to monitoring managerial decisions.

Research limitations/implications – Due to the small sample size, caution should be exercised when interpreting the results of this study. Also, it is to be noted that this study is based on a small country with an open capital market where there is high proportion of institutional ownership.

Practical implications – The results provide useful insights into the role different types of institutional investors play in terms of enhancing both governance and firm performance. Our analyses suggest that in mitigating principal-agent conflicts, size of ownership has an influence.

Originality/value of chapter – Our study adds to the literature by focusing on the role institutional investors’ play in New Zealand. Our study adds to the theory by showing that ownership type is important for mitigating agency conflicts.

In this study we investigated the effects of news reports on acquirer short-term performance. Our focus was on the extent to which key deal characteristics – the type of deal, during a merger wave or not or the presence of a significant premium – are made explicit. Moreover, we looked for the effect of the assessment of the deal characteristics by different key informants: board members, top management team members, and analysts. Configurations derived using the set-theoretic approach suggest that media-transmitted signals form complex interrelations among content and informant. We found that investors react positively to deals that are surrounded by unequivocal signals of synergy potential: they contain explicitly stated deal characteristics as well as deal endorsements from the boards and/or top management of acquirer and target companies. Analysts’ assessments of the deals seem to bear little influence on investor reaction. Meanwhile, investors react negatively to deals with low or absent media coverage as well as deals surrounded by signals of ambiguous synergy potential.

Earnings management is a common term in the academic community and is likely understood by managers and professional investors, but how the large community of non-professional investors interprets this term is less clear. We examine non-professional investors’ attitudes toward earnings management and their resulting investing behaviors using a 2 × 2 mixed design. We manipulate investor role (prospective vs current) between participants and the method of earnings management within participants. We believe that different investment goals (prevention vs promotion) between current and prospective investors should lead to different investing behaviors. Consistent with our expectations, we find that current investors are more likely to maintain an equity than prospective investors are to invest in the same opportunity. Further, the consistent link between investors’ attitudes and actual investment behavior is only present for prospective investors. The prevention goal drives the current investors to maintain their investment, while the prospective investors remain more objective and focus on a goal of promotion. Importantly, prior research examining investor attitude toward earnings management has failed to link investors’ attitudes with actual investing decisions; our study attempts to fill this void by examining attitudes toward earnings management as well as subsequent investment behavior.

Nonfinancial information is becoming more readily available to investors, and thus, relative to annual financial reports, is having an increasing influence on investors' stock pricing decisions. Using Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model, we examine how task familiarity (high, medium, and low) influences nonprofessional investor stock price decisions when these investors are presented with a stream of both positive and negative nonfinancial news. We find that task familiarity negatively correlates with reaction size for both positive and negative information, which creates arbitrage opportunities for those with more task familiarity. However, we find that assurance mitigates this effect, leveling the playing field for less task-familiar investors in most cases. These findings are important as the volume and variety of information types increase, and as more nonfinancial information enters the marketplace in discrete sound bites (e.g., social media, press releases, daily reports). Findings suggest that assurance is one way to lessen the biases exhibited by investors with less task familiarity. These results enhance our understanding of nonprofessional investor behavior through the lens of belief revision.