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The authors consider a dynamic emission-reduction technology investment decision-making problem for an emission-dependent dyadic supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer under subsidy policy for carbon emission reduction. The consumers are assumed to prefer to low-carbon products and formulate a supply chain optimal control problem.

The authors adopt differential game to analyze investment strategies of cost subsidy coefficient with respect to vertical incentive of a manufacturer and a retailer. A comparison analysis under four different decision-making situations, including decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, maximizing social welfare, is obtained.

The results show that the economic benefit and environmental pressure have a win–win performance in centralized decision-making. In four different game models, equilibrium strategies, profits and social welfare show changing diversity and have a consistent development trend as time goes on.

The authors estimate the demand function is a linear function in this paper. According to the consumers’ preference to low-carbon products, consumer’s awareness meets the law of diminishing marginal utility like advertising goodwill accumulation. The carbon-sensitive coefficient might be a quadratic expression, which will complicate the problem and be consistent with reality.

It captures that there is a necessity to strengthen cooperation and exchange of carbon emission technology among the enterprises by simulation of different decision-makings when government granted cost subsidy.

The results provide significant guidelines for the supply chain to make decision-makings of emission-reduction technology investment and relevant government departments to determine emission subsidies costs.

An endogenous subsidies coefficient is produced by the social welfare function. Distinguished from previous study, it also considered the influences of carbon emission trade policy and consumer preference.

The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the amount of profits gained from musharakah mutanaqisah model using coupon rate of 4.5 per cent, price at par and tenure of five years was greater than using ijarah principle where the price is at a discount. Also to compute and compare the profits obtained from sukuk investment in ijarah and musharakah mutanaqisah for 3.5 per cent coupon rate and price at par for a sukuk with tenure of 12.5, 15, 17.5 and 19 years.

In total, two models were used to calculate profit. These models are based on ijarah and musharakah mutanaqisah principles. Formulas are derived from ijarah and musharakah and mutanaqisah principles used in sukuk.

Sukuk investment using ijarah principle is found to be a better investment alternative than musharakah mutanaqisah principle, regardless of the number of years of the sukuk, as long as it is a long‐term tenure. However, for short‐term tenure, the latter is preferred based on the amount of profits generated.

The formulas and results shown in this research are just one of the mathematical approaches that can be used for decision making in sukuk investment. There are other approaches which may deemed to be more effective in decision making. This research was applied only to ijarah and musharakah mutanaqisah types of investment.

The results in the research will assist in making a quick decision on what type of sukuk investment for the investors and issuers and which will be suitable given the amount of financial resources and duration of the investment period.

Many researchers have attempted to study the implications of using mathematical formulas to guide decision making on the choice of sukuk investment and this research has, to a certain extent, concurred with and complemented the works of past researchers. Additionally it will create awareness and provide more information to potential investors on better sukuk investment alternative principles from a mathematical point of view.

This paper aims to investigate how user expectations affect value-added service (VAS) investment and pricing decisions of two-sided platforms. It draws on the information asymmetry theory and offers suggestions on how platform operators can manage user expectations.

According to the game theory, this study considers three user expectations (responsive, passive and wary). By framing the Hotelling duopoly model and comparing the VAS investment, price and platform profits, the optimal platform decision is analyzed and discussed.

The conclusions demonstrate that the monopolistic two-sided platform obtains more profits from the informed users with responsive expectations than uninformed users with passive or wary expectations. The marginal investment cost and cross-network externalities are two key factors that determine the platform's VAS investment and pricing strategies of passive or wary users. Furthermore, considering the expectation preferences, i.e. the uniformed users hold wary expectations with more information and hold passive expectations with less or no information, the results suggest that the proportion of wary users to all uninformed users increases the platform's VAS investment, profits and the price of informed users, and increase (decrease) the price of uninformed users when the cross-network externalities of informed users are relatively small (larger).

These results can provide insightful enlightenment into how platform operators utilize bilateral users' expectations and information level to guide their VAS investment and pricing decisions.

This paper is one of the first to explore the impact of three user expectations and the heterogeneity of preferences in informing users' passive or wary expectations, based on different levels of information on the decision-making of two-sided platforms regarding VAS.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of private investor's fair preference on the governmental compensation mechanism based on the uncertainty of income for the public-private-partnership (PPP) project.

Based on the governmental dilemma for the compensation of PPP project, a generalized compensation contract is designed by the combination of compensation before the event and compensation after the event. Then the private investor's claimed concession profit is taken as its fair reference point according to the idea of the BO model, and its fair utility function is established by improving the FS model. Thus the master-slave counter measure game is applied to conduct the behavior modeling for the governmental compensation contract design.

By analyzing the model given in this paper, some conclusions are obtained. First, the governmental optimal compensation contract is fair incentive for the private investor. Second, the private fair preference is not intuitively positive or negative related to the social efficiency of compensation. Only under some given conditions, the correlation will show the consistent effect. Third, the private fair behavior’s impact on the efficiency of compensation will become lower and lower as the social cost of compensation reduces. Fourth, the governmental effective compensation scheme should be carried out based on the different comparison scene of the private claimed portfolio profit and the expected revenue for the project.

This study analyzes the effects of private investor's fair preference on the validity of governmental generalized compensation contract of the PPP project for the first time; and the governmental generalized compensation contract designed in this study is a pioneering and exploratory attempt.

This paper presents, both diagrammatically and algebraically, a two‐sector model that exemplifies and shares some of the basic characteristics to be found in the work of Kalecki, Joan Robinson, Kaldor and, in general, the “Post‐Keynesian” school of writers.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.

The Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.

The results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.

The research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

This study analyzes supplier development investment decisions under a triadic setting (two buyers and a common supplier). In a triadic setting, the supplier development investment decision of one buyer can have a spillover effect of the benefits on other buyer. Therefore, it is utmost important for the investing buyer to understand the impact of benefit spillover on other competing buyers'. Therefore, one of the purposes of this study to analyze the supplier development investment decision of buyers under two scenarios. First, under cooperative development structure where both buyers jointly invest in supplier and share equal benefits. Second, non-cooperative investment structure where both buyers individually invest in supplier development and share unequal benefits.

In order to assess the impact of supplier development investment decisions on the profitability of buyers and the common supplier, the authors used game-theoretic approach. The authors design a Stackelberg leader-follower game where the supplier acts as Stackelberg leader and buyers follow the supplier's pricing decision to maximize their profit level. Additionally, both buyers decide either to cooperate or non-cooperate while investing in supplier development.

The results show that the cooperative investment is always an optimal strategy for buyers and supplier. Interestingly, the efficient buyer's share of investment level is lower under non-cooperative investment structure and he is better-off due to its capability of taking advantage from the other buyer's investment. However, the inefficient buyer, on the other hand, is worse-off under non-cooperative investment. Furthermore, comparative analysis between the two shows that initially, the buyer who extracts more profit because of the other buyers' development investment tends to prefer the non-cooperative development investment set up. However, after a certain point, the same buyer is better-off under cooperative development investment through cooperation, and sharing equal benefit of the supplier's development, as the supplier in turn, starts charging a higher wholesale price under non-cooperative investment case.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, extant literature on supplier development has mostly focused on. One supplier-one buyer; thus, the learning spillover effect has almost been unexplored. In real-life, different buyers often purchase from the shared supplier. Therefore, it is important to analyze the spillover of supplier development benefits due to investment of one buyer on other buyer and deriving the condition under which buyers would be incentivized to invest jointly or individually.

Josef Alois Schumpeter indicated in his monumental work that economic science, if it is to be a science, must be bereft of all shades of value judgements. He defined “scientific economics” to mean “the sum total of the historical, statistical and theoretical techniques, together with the results they produce”. The impingement of all shades of value judgements was to be considered outside the pale of economic theory, because, as Schumpeter claimed, such judgements leave economic analysis unaffected. Notwithstanding this claim, the statement could not be sustained in the body of Schumpeter's work.

The purpose of this paper is is to identify the main determinants of insurance profitability on life and non-life segments to obtain which variables affect in each market of the Ecuadorian insurance sector.

The authors use a large panel data set with financial information from 2001 to 2017 and estimate the determinants through a panel corrected standard errors regression.

The authors found that net premiums, technical reserves, capital ratio and score efficiency are micro-determinants in the life insurance sector, whereas in the non-life sector, the micro-determinants include also claim level and liquidity ratio; moreover, the authors found that HHI is a determinant of profitability only in the life insurance. Among the macro determinants set, the authors found that the interest rate has also a significant impact both in the life and non-life insurance.

The authors analyze a dollarized emerging country, which is the first time in this kind of studies. The authors also include the structure-conduct-performance and relative market power paradigm as well as the ES hypothesis, calculated through the data envelopment analysis, as determinants of insurance profitability. Finally, this is the first research to examine the determinants of profitability in Latin American and Caribbean insurers.