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This paper aims to reassess the marketing strategy of Britain’s Big Four railway companies during the interwar period to locate railway marketing in the broader context of railway business and the general development of service marketing in Britain.

By a detailed analysis of internal company records, this paper discusses three aspects of railway marketing: the development of marketing departments within the companies, the control of marketing expenditure and the industry-wide marketing alliance. The three areas of railway marketing are examined by way of comparing them with the corresponding situations in other British industries.

It reveals the relatively advanced state of railway companies’ marketing in the contemporary context. Furthermore, a series of re-organisations are interpreted as a response to the inter-modal competition from road traffic.

By characterising railway marketing in the interwar period as part of the industry’s rear-guard battle in the competitive travel market, in which railways were clearly losing out to road traffic, the paper provides a perspective that enables to understand how the “golden age” of railway marketing coincided with the railways’ decline in the passenger business.

In February 1922 the editor of the SA Teachers’ Journal introduced a ‘Country Corner’ column that was to be contributed by a member of the Women Teachers Progressive League (WTPL) under the pen name ‘Tish’. Tish was Phebe Watson, the WTPL secretary (a position she had held since its inauguration in 1915), Women’s Warden at the Teachers College and Mistress of Method in charge of the short course of training for country teachers. This article focuses on representations of the country teacher in the Country Corner column in the interwar years. I argue that Phebe invoked contemporary discourses of youth and femininity to construct the rural teacher as a youthful, responsible, attractive and marriageable woman. Following on from recent research into ways in which city functioned both as a place and representation in education, I also begin to identify discourses of the country and the city in constructions of the teacher and teachers’ work.

The very subject of this roundtable and published symposium suggests that there is something going on, some smoke, here – that there is some distinction that scholars past and present have found it useful to make, legitimately or not, between American institutionalism on the one hand and, say, classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, and Austrian economics in the interwar period. One problem, of course, is that examining how “x” is different from “y” requires a specification of both what constitutes “x” and what constitutes “y.” Put another way, figuring out what constitutes “institutionalism” simultaneously requires defining “not institutionalism,” both in toto and its constituent elements. This is not an easy task when even the question of what it means to be “Keynesian” admits to no small number of (or even consistent) answers. And indeed, one could just as well ask whether “neoclassical” is useful as an historiographic category during this period.¹

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

The purpose of this paper is to examine expert ideas about education for citizenship in 1930s Australia. Drawing on a larger study of adolescence and schooling during the middle decades of the twentieth century, the paper explores the role of international networks and US philanthropy in fostering the spread of new psychological and curriculum ideas that shaped citizenship education, and broader educational changes during the interwar period. A second purpose is to provide historical perspectives on contemporary concerns about the role of schooling in addressing social values and student wellbeing.

The discussion is informed by approaches drawn from Foucauldian genealogy and historical studies of transnationalism. It examines constructions of the good and problem student and the networks of international educational expertise as forms of “travelling ideas”. These transnational exchanges are explored through a close analysis of a defining moment in Australian educational history, the 1937 conference of the New Education Fellowship.

The analysis reveals the ways in which psychological understandings and curriculum reforms shaped education for citizenship in the 1930s and identify in particular the emergent role of psychology in defining what it meant to be a good student and a good future citizen. The paper further finds that Australian education during the interwar years was more cosmopolitan and engaged in international discussions about citizenship and schooling than is usually remembered in the present. Elaborating this is important for building transnational histories of knowledge exchange in Australian education.

The paper shows the value of a relational analysis of school curriculum and psychological understandings for more fully grasping the different dimensions of education for citizenship both in the interwar years and now. It offers fresh perspectives on contemporary educational debates about globalisation and youth identities, as played out in current concerns about social values and schooling.

The Nationalökonomische Gesellschaft (Austrian Economic Association, NOeG) provides a prominent example of the Viennese economic circles and associations that more than academic economics dominated scientific discourse in the interwar years. For the first time this chapter gives a thorough account of its history, from its foundation in 1918 until the demise of its long-time president, Hans Mayer, 1955, based on official documents and archival material. The topics treated include its predecessor and rival, the Gesellschaft österreichischer Volkswirte, its foundation in 1918 soon to be followed by years of inactivity, the relaunch by Mayer and Mises, the survival under the NS-regime and the expulsion of its Jewish members and the slow restoration after 1945. In particular, an attempt is made to provide a list of the papers presented to the NOeG, as complete as possible, for the period 1918–1938.

France's defeat by Germany in 1940 is one of the most shocking events in the annals of military history. Explanations for France's defeat have traditionally focused on battlefield mistakes, an unmotivated population, and even bad luck. Yet, the seeds of France's failure were sown long before her 1940 surrender. The purpose of this paper is to examine the presence of groupthink in the French General Staff during the interwar years with its deleterious effect on France's military preparedness.

Groupthink is used to understand the reasons behind France's decisive defeat at the start of World War II. Historians of the period and primary and secondary works were consulted and analyzed.

Multiple examples of the main eight groupthink symptoms were identified from the documentary evidence. Groupthink present in the French General Staff had an adverse impact on the France's preparations. Groupthink led to the downplaying of important information, the failure to question vital assumptions about German capabilities, and the misapplication of new military technology. This led to inflexibility and the inability to respond to innovative German technology and operational doctrine.

Groupthink is useful in explaining complex historical events – events which often have been attributed to poor leadership, corrupt or incapable politicians, or simply luck. The application of social science theory and methods to well‐documented events, whether “historical” or otherwise has the potential to enrich the understanding of these events and the ways in which they may be studied.

This study also contributes to evidence on groupthink and the application of theory in social science and management to the study of well‐documented historical events.

The interwar period was a time of technological and social change. This paper aims to understand how these changes impacted the marketing communication of mobility through the lenses of safety and of the changing place and role of women in society.

The research is based on a review of over 2,000 posters together with visual and textual material from the contemporary specialist press and company brochures, magazine advertisements and promotional film.

As women’s place in society developed during the interwar period, they became travellers and decision makers in their own right. Companies responded to and influenced these changes by encouraging women to take opportunities previously beyond their reach. However, even within this context, women were seen to retain a priority for safety linked to their more traditional societal roles. This message was set within the context of a wider safety communication dependant on the maturity of the mobility technology. Established modes of transport took a connotative approach whilst the new technologies (cars and airlines) were far more explicit in their claims.

The paper provides an approach to understanding the impact of advertisers’ technologies (new or established) on the style and content of their marketing. As such it can be used in other areas besides those discussed in this paper: for example, in a comparison between traditional car engine technologies and emergent “green” alternatives.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first cross-modal comparison of marketing communications by companies representing the majority of key mobilities. Further, whilst there is considerable discussion on topics such as gender and motoring, other sectors (for example, women airline passengers) have been given scant research attention.

This article on coalmining, a key industry for Britain in the period covered, has three main purposes. First, it updates previous overviews of entrepreneurial performance by surveying recent contributions to old controversies. Second, it provides a new perspective by looking at 1900‐1946 as a whole, instead of separately assessing performance before and after 1914. This view takes account of the fact that frequently the same individual acted as entrepreneur over several decades. It also points to elements of continuity which existed in contrast to marked changes in markets after 1914. The third aim is to identify further work required before a more conclusive assessment of entrepreneurial performance can emerge. Meanwhile however the article tends, while not denying individual cases of poor performance, to concur with previous studies which have concluded that the strikingly poor reputation of entrepreneurs in coal among contemporaries during the interwar years was not generally justified.

This paper aims to examine the development of an iconic corporate brand by the General Post Office (GPO) in Britain in the 1930s by adapting the work of Douglas Holt (2004).

The paper uses a historical approach by developing a historical case study. It combines this historical approach with Holt’s theory and writing on iconic branding and the current literature on corporate identity, corporate branding and corporate communication.

The study argues that the GPO was able to construct an iconic brand in the interwar period (1918-1939) by responding to anxieties in British society generated by social tension and fears of decline. This was facilitated by the establishment of a public relations department, which created “myths” of national identity and imperial unity through telecommunications, and national strength through technology. These myths assuaged social anxieties and enabled the GPO to construct an iconic corporate brand.

This paper provides an important insight into iconic branding. It examines corporate rather than product branding, where research has predominantly focused. It also combines cultural branding theory with historical analysis and provides an adapted approach to Holt’s myth market model (1994, p. 58).