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In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

The purpose of this paper is to use nearly a century’s worth of gang research to inform us about modern terrorist groups, specifically the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

A case study approach is employed, comparing and contrasting the competing theoretical frameworks of gangs and terrorist organisations to understand group structure, demographics, patterns of behaviour (e.g. territoriality, strategic, and instrumental violence), goals, and membership patterns of ISIS.

The qualitative differences of ISIS make them more comparable to street gangs than other terrorist groups.

ISIS, while being qualitatively different from other terrorist groups, actually has many similarities with street gangs allowing for the adaptation of effective gang prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. This paper highlights how the expansive literature on street gangs is able to inform practical interventions to directly target ISIS and deradicalise potential recruits. By introducing a gang-terror nexus on the crime-terror continuum, this paper provides a useful perspective on the decentralised but dynamic nature of modern era insurgencies. This paper urges similar case studies of terrorist organisations to determine the extent to which they conform to street gang characteristics.

Terrorist groups are often compared to street gangs, yet it has not been until the last few years that gang researchers (Curry, 2011; Decker and Pyrooz, 2011, 2015a, b) have begun to compare and contrast these two deviant group archetypes. The goal of this paper is to use nearly a hundred years of gang research to better equip scholars and practitioners with a broader understanding of terrorism and insurgency in the era of globalisation by presenting a case study of ISIS using a street gang perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to chart the development of the Nepalese telecommunications industry and assess how they may develop in the future.

A country case study approach is adopted. The Nepalese context is outlined before the telecommunications industry is described and the main drivers of its development identified. The paper draws on interviews as well as secondary sources and models the relationship between the main drivers of the industry in Nepal.

Although the Nepalese telecommunications industry has substantially changed since the modernisation process began in early 1980s, large parts of the country remain without access to telecommunication services.

Some data collection problems were encountered, but these were addressed through the use of multiple sources.

The industry's future development will be shaped by the interplay between geography, resources and the CPN (Maoist) insurgency.

Previous studies have tended to focus on one part of the Nepalese telecommunications industry or one specific issue. This paper provides a broad overview of the industry and draws attention to the inter‐relationships that exist between the key drivers of telecommunications diffusion in Nepal.

The Second World War and the cold war led to a revolution in military affairs, but this article seeks to question whether the USA is equipped to respond to future conflicts in an age of global terrorism.

The article considers recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the tactics of terrorist groups, to explore how America's military forces should adapt to future needs, particularly in terms of technology and strategy.

The USA faces a military dilemma. The force numbers and the technology mix needed to cope with terrorist and insurgency warfare are currently insufficient. However, the overall US budget is too high, and defense expenditures are one of the principal causes.

Contributes to the debate on countering global terrorism.

This study determines the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their support providers during three phases: pre-conflict environment, during conflict environment, and the post-conflict (uncertain) environment with the reference to institutional theory in the northwest region of Pakistan where there is ongoing unrest between the authorities and the insurgents.

Using a qualitative approach, a total of 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted, 19 with the owner-managers of small manufacturing firms and 4 from small business support providers in the region.

The authors theorise the changing role of support agencies as differing institutional gaps, while conflict is destructive for SMEs and support agencies; paradoxically the crisis results in stronger relationships between the support providers and SMEs which was weaker in the pre-conflict environment. Such stronger relationship enhanced the cognitive pillar of institutional theory where entrepreneurship is supported by various groups including government agencies and SMEs to alleviate unemployment in the region which is one of the potential reasons of terrorism in the country.

The study may have value for policymakers who need to know more about how small businesses and support providers develop a support network in difficult regions and give a comprehensive framework to other conflictual regions who face similar circumstances.

This research contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, the study reveals the impact of conflict environment on small businesses and support providers where a little research has been undertaken. Second, the study shows the support mechanism in three different intervals pre-conflict, during the conflict and post-conflict and how the Talibanization in the region has a positive impact by strengthening the support structure among small businesses and support providers. Finally, the study contributes to the growing body of literature on entrepreneurship in conflict environments.

The aim of this article is to apply a re‐worked definition of ideology in order to account for cultural and political dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts.

The paper analyzes communiqués, press releases, magazines, pamphlets, speeches, interviews and other communicational media produced by insurgent organizations in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Colombia, particularly in the post‐Cold War, in order to assess the characteristics of their ideological platforms. The extensive use of these primary sources aims at revealing the way the organizations see themselves, and how important ideological warfare is in their overall strategy.

In the post‐Cold War, and even in the early twenty‐first century, armed guerrillas persisted in linking their armed struggle to ideological platforms, though in more flexible versions. Nationalism, fundamentalism and socialism are functional to their tactics and strategies, and have tangible effects at strategic and tactical levels.

Three sample cases have been revised exhaustively, but that methodology impedes the examination of a wider spectrum of post‐Cold War insurgent organizations, which may balance the results here presented. However, the high relevance of the ideological component in contemporary armed conflicts, as shown in the Afghan, Congolese and Colombian cases, demonstrates the need for further academic works on this topic.

Re‐defining ideology, as the paper proposes, turns it into a powerful conceptual tool to be used in academic research, given that precisely the absence of comprehensive categories of analysis has prevented scholars from providing a full picture of the political and cultural dimensions of contemporary armed conflicts.

As economic‐focused researches on armed conflicts have dominated the field since the 1990s, the paper underlines the need for scholars to approach a broader scope in peace studies.

Information and communication in times of war is an area that has been much written about, but one which has not often been treated as a topic in its own right from an information science perspective. The national liberation struggles of the second half of the 20th century offer possibilities for the development of an information and communication model, incorporating data on a range of covert and overt information and communication activities by both sides in the conflict. The model takes account of such activities as scouting, secret communication, propaganda, misinformation campaigns, censorship, intelligence gathering and collating, and other aspects of information‐related activity. It offers a capacity to structure this knowledge, indicates gaps and concentrations in activity, and permits audit and assessment of information‐related activity in the struggle. It is intended to be capable of providing perspectives on information warfare in other contexts, although this aspect is not explored here.

The challenge of sustaining growth seems to be getting steeper and steeper. This Masterclass provides context for two recent books that have valuable insights to offer to company leaders and strategists on how to build resilience and sustain growth in increasingly dynamic and uncertain global competitive markets.

In The Founder’s Mentality: How to Overcome the Predictable Crises of Growth (2016), well-known Bain strategy consultants, Chris Zook and James Allen offer a strategy for consciously embedding “the founder’s mentality” into the culture of young firms as they scale or rediscovering it in mature firms that might be stalling and losing their way. For strategy and innovation guru, Vijay Govindarajan, sustaining growth increasingly requires being able to pursue simultaneously two very different types of activity and mindset – exploiting a legacy business while exploring new business opportunities. He offers a very practical framework for approaching this challenge in The Three Box Solution: A Strategy for Leading Innovation.

The “founder’s mentality” refers to “a collection of specific behaviors and attitudes best exemplified by the traits of great founders that if properly cultivated in the rest of the organization, can lead more reliably to sustainable growth.” Some young firms fail to establish a founder’s mentality from the outset, while many mature founder-led companies come to lose their sense of insurgency and other key founder’s mentality traits over time. “Just about every company, at any stage in its life, can benefit from the attitudes and behaviors that make up the founder’s mentality.”

Govindarajan argues that “asking what assumptions must be true for this idea to be highly profitable” and testing the most critical of these “as early and as inexpensively as possible” is ‘the best way to reveal an ill-conceived project.

The two books, taken together, provide a wealth of insight for leaders seeking to diagnose their firm’s growth problems and looking for potential solutions for reviving innovation and growth.

The aim of this paper is to propose solutions for improving internal controls and transparency to alleviate concerns of international community over alleged linked with terrorist groups.

The authors explore the counter-insurgency theory and political process model to explain the current state of counter-terrorism activities aimed at Islamic NGOs after 9/11.

The authors believe the idea of money flow disruption to be of greater importance than freezing the accounts to suppress terrorism financing.

Islamic NGOs established for philanthropic and humanitarian aid in third world Muslim countries have been accused of being involved in terrorism financing. This revelation is to the disadvantage of the donors who do not channel their donations for such activities. The authors propose risk management framework useful at operational level to detect and prevent welfare activities financing warfare activities.

The proposed risk management framework is to complement various regional and international initiatives championed by Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Financial Action Task Force to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The purpose of this paper is to deliver insight from the concept of destructive entrepreneurship to program design considerations in conflict regions.

This paper discusses and connects destructive entrepreneurship – an important yet largely unexplored question in the entrepreneurship literature – with security policy, related to evolving directions in the counterinsurgency literature and the traditional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) literature.

Counterinsurgency is increasingly the approach used by international and domestic policymakers when dealing with regional conflict, and DDR processes have been used for decades to transition former combatants into civilian life. Three broad considerations are particularly salient (timing/sequencing/phasing, benefits and beneficiaries, and measurement) for DDR programs in the counterinsurgency context.

An incentives-based approach to understanding destructive entrepreneurship can provide useful insights for these two approaches and in particular, how they can be used together.

This paper expands the current scope of understanding of destructive entrepreneurship to the previously unconnected security policy contexts related to counterinsurgency and DDR.