Search results

Common institutional ownership is a phenomenon that has extended throughout the capital markets in recent years and has a significant impact on business strategy decisions. The study intends to investigate the effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization and potential functioning mechanisms.

Using panel data from Chinese-listed companies over the period of 2003–2021, the authors conduct regression models which controlled year-, industry- and regional fixed effects to explore the impact of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization.

This study concludes that corporate over-financialization may be prevented via common institutional ownership. The mechanism test suggests that common institutional ownership inhibits corporate over-financialization by improving internal control quality and enhancing financial flexibility. Besides, heterogeneity analysis shows that the inhibiting effect of common institutional ownership on corporate over-financialization is more pronounced in stability-oriented institutional investors and high financing constraints firms.

This paper makes a valuable contribution to the current studies on effective strategies to prevent enterprises from becoming overly financialized by recognizing common institutional ownership. Furthermore, this paper adds to the research on common institutional ownership’s economic consequences. Finally, this study provides management implications for how to optimize corporate governance structures, curb the financialization of entities in practice and promote the development of the real economy.

The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings management (EM) among listed firms in East African Community (EAC) partner states.

The study used a sample of 71 firms listed in the EAC partner states over 2011–2020. Data were handpicked from the individual firm's audited annual financial reports. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the study used the results of the fixed-effect regression model to test the hypotheses. To test the robustness of the results, the study employed an alternative measure of EM and two additional econometric techniques, including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The empirical findings revealed that female directors improve the board's effectiveness in monitoring managerial roles. Specifically, the results showed a significantly negative relationship between the proportion of women in the corporate board and EM (as measured by discretionary accruals (DAs)). The findings further revealed an inverse relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and EM. Finally, the results further demonstrated that institutional ownership enhances the role of board gender diversity in mitigating EM among listed firms in the EAC.

The findings of this study may be useful to managers, investors and regulators in assessing the role of institutional ownership and women's participation on corporate boards as a strategy for alleviating unethical manipulation of earnings.

The findings of this study contribute to the growing concern on gender inequality, especially the marginalization of women from the paid labor force and decision-making. The findings highlight the importance of having more women in the corporate board since this may help in mitigating corporate fraud. Similarly, the findings highlight the importance of institutional ownership as a corporate governance (CG) tool.

Previous studies have reported mixed empirical results on whether board gender diversity mitigates EM. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper to fill the existing gap by exploring whether institutional ownership moderates the relationship between board gender diversity and EM among listed firms in the EAC.

This paper investigates the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets and explores the potential explanations.

In this paper, the authors use the panel data regressions and the dynamic tests of two-way Granger causality in the panel VAR model to examine the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in Chinese and the USA stock markets.

The authors find that the institutional ownership in the Chinese (the USA) stock market is significantly and positively (negatively) related to idiosyncratic volatility through various tests. This paper indicates that institutional investors in the USA are more prudent and risk-averse, while the Chinese institutional investors are not because of high risk-bearing capacity.

This paper deepens the authors’ understanding on the relationship between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility and in the USA and the Chinese stock markets. This paper explains the opposite relationships between institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility in the stock markets in China and USA.

This study examines the effect of stable institutional investors on firms' product quality failures. Furthermore, the authors investigate the channels through which institutional ownership stability enhances product quality management.

This study uses probit, ordered probit and negative binomial regression frameworks to investigate the research questions. In addition, the authors utilize the three-stage least-squares to address the endogeneity issues.

Using a sample of product recall incidents from 2012 to 2021, the authors find that firms with more stable institutional ownership have a lower probability, frequency and severity of recall incidents and adopt a proactive product recall strategy. Institutional investors with significant and persistent holdings improve quality management by reducing overinvestment and the use of option-linked and relative performance executive compensations. Furthermore, the influence of stable institutional owners on product quality failures is more pronounced in firms with low managerial ability and specialist CEOs. Lastly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that stable holdings by active investors have a more substantial impact on reducing product recalls than passive and other stable institutional holdings.

This study is the first to examine the impact of institutional ownership stability on firms' product recalls. The authors contribute to the literature on the benefits of stable institutional ownership on firm outcomes and the determinants of product quality failures.

This study aims to examine the impact of institutional investors and their classes on the stock return volatility of an emerging market. The paper also determines the moderating role of firm size, crisis and turnover on such relationships.

The study covers nonfinancial companies of the Bombay Stock Exchange-100 index that are listed during the study period. The study uses fixed effects and systematic generalized method of moments estimators to look over the association between institutional investors and firms’ stock return volatility.

The study provides evidence that institutional investors destabilize the Indian stock market. It indicates that institutional investors do not engage in management activities; they earn short-term gains depending on information efficiency. Pressure-insensitive institutional investors have a significant positive relation with stock return volatility, while pressure-sensitive institutional investors do not. The study also reflects that pressure-sensitive institutional investors are underweighted in India, which jointly represents an insignificant nonlinear association between institutional ownership and stocks’ volatility. Furthermore, outcomes reveal that the intersection effect of the crisis, firm size and turnover is positively and significantly related to such relationships.

The outcomes encourage initiatives that keep track of institutional investors in the Indian stock market. To control the destabilizing effect of pressure-insensitive institutional investors, regulators should follow strict regulations on their trading patterns. Moreover, it guides the potential researchers that they should also take into account the impact of other classes of ownership structure or what type of ownership can help in stabilizing or destabilizing the Indian stock market.

Abundant literature studies the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in the Indian context. From the standpoint of making management decisions, the return and volatility of stock returns are both different aspects. However, this study examines the effect of institutional ownership and its groups on the volatility of stock return using the panel data estimator, which was previously not discussed in the literature.

This study aims to examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on financial constraints (FC). Furthermore, the authors investigate the moderating impact of two key ownership variables, insider and institutional ownership, separately and their interacting effect on the CSR-FC relationship.

The study sample consists of 137 nonfinancial Pakistan Stock Exchange listed firms from 2010 to 2019. Firms’ participation in socially responsible activities is measured using a multidimensional financial approach, whereas FC are determined using the WW index. The findings were observed using the dynamic generalized method of moments model.

According to the findings, CSR has a negative impact on FC. In terms of moderating impact, the interactive variable of CSR and insider ownership does not affect FC, implying that when an insider owns a majority of shares, the negative relationship between CSR and FC is weaker. The findings demonstrate the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. In terms of the moderating effect of institutional ownership, CSR and institutional ownership have a significant but positive relationship with FC, implying that when powerful institutional investors are present, the negative relationship between CSR and FC disappears, demonstrating that higher institutional ownership leads to shareholder conflicts. Finally, the interactive variable of insider and institutional ownership has no statistically significant effect on the CSR-FC relationship. This insignificant relationship does not support the substitution or complementarity effect of corporate governance.

The authors measure CSR activities using a multidimensional financial approach; however, in the future, CSR should be measured using qualitative aspects such as content analysis to strengthen the findings. Because the research is limited to a single emerging economy, Pakistan, the generalizability of the findings is limited. In the future, this research could be replicated in other emerging economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The findings of the study will assist regulatory authorities, investors, financial analysts and other stakeholders in better understanding CSR practices in Pakistani firms, as well as the role of CSR and two other important aspects of internal governance mechanisms, namely, insider ownership and institutional ownership, in the CSR-FC relationship.

Few studies in the literature investigate the impact of CSR on FC. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study of its kind in an emerging market to empirically test this relationship and further investigate the role of insider and institutional ownership in this unexplored relationship.

This study aims to investigate whether country governance, regulated industry and firm-level characteristics, namely, ownership structure and firm size, are associated with the likelihood of firms having a politically connected board (PCB). This study also examines whether country governance and concentrated ownership moderates the association between institutional ownership and PCB.

This study uses cross-country analysis using 20 countries and hand-collected PCB data from 574 firms and 1,701 firm-year. This study performs logit regression analyses to examine hypotheses.

The results document that countries’ accountability, industry type and institutional ownership are associated with the likelihood of firms having a PCB. This study also finds that country governance, especially accountability, moderates the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs. The results thus indicate the importance of country governance, especially accountability, in determining institutional investors’ political strategies.

This study provides several implications. First, firms tend to elect PCBs as a non-financial strategy because it arguably delivers additional resources and improves their performance, especially in countries with lower accountability and regulated industries. Meanwhile, investors and management must also hire PCBs cautiously because PCBs are closely related to agency issues. Agency issues reflect on the finding that institutional investors tend to avoid PCBs. However, the relationship between institutional investors and PCBs is closely related to the country-level context, especially accountability. This study also advises policymakers that country governance, especially accountability, is crucial in regulating the relationship between business and politics.

This study uses a relatively large number of new PCB and institutional ownership data collected manually from 20 countries. This study also examines several variables of country governance, such as accountability to PCB decisions that have not been tested before. This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and PCB ownership decisions that were not examined before and uses a cross-country sample. In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first one that examines the role of state governance, especially accountability for the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs.

There is consensus among scholars on how political institutional imprinting interprets the unique management and practice phenomenon of Chinese enterprises. However, little scholarly attention has been given to the different political institutional imprints that shape firms’ internationalization. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how communist and market logic political institutional imprintings influence firms’ initial ownership strategies in outward foreign direct investment.

Based on the propensity score matching difference in difference method and a sample of 464 foreign investments from 2009 to 2020 for 310 Chinese private firms.

The results show that private firms with market logic political institutional imprintings tend to adopt higher ownership and vice versa. As institutional differences increase, private firms with market logic imprintings are more risk-taking and adopt higher ownership, whereas private firms with communist imprintings are more conservative and choose lower ownership. When diplomatic relations are friendlier, private firms with market logic imprintings prefer higher ownership to grasp business opportunities and vice versa.

This study not only identifies the net effect of political institutional imprinting on private firms’ initial ownership strategy but also investigates the different moderating effects of current institutional forces to respond to the call for research on bringing history back into international business research and the fit between imprinting and the environment.

In this research, we explore the adverse impact of foreign ownership on operational security, a critical operational implication of the liability of foreignness (LOF).

The empirical analysis is based on a multi-country dataset from the World Bank Enterprises Survey, which contains detailed firm-level information from over 8,902 firms in 82 emerging market countries. We perform a series of robustness checks to further confirm our findings.

We find that a high ratio of foreign ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of security breaches and higher security costs. Our results also indicate that high levels of host countries’ institutional quality and firms’ local embeddedness can mitigate such vulnerability in operational security.

This study is one of the first to uncover the critical operational implication of the LOF, indicating that a high ratio of foreign ownership exposes firms to operational security challenges.

This study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.

We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.

Green financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.

This study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.