Search results

The Japanese economy experienced prosperity during the bubble economy and has suffered from a prolonged recession since the bubble economy collapsed. This paper examines how the interest-bearing debt burden, structural change, and instability of confidence affect dynamic systems. Moreover, it examines these factors in the Japanese economy by applying a recursive vector autoregression analysis. This paper emphasizes the interest-bearing debt burden, the economic structure resulting from the instability of confidence, and the instability of confidence resulting from debt burden play important roles in the instability of the economy. As a result, Japan’s economy was determined to be relatively stable from 1980 to 1996, but was unstable, thereafter.

Scrutinises legal, ethical and efficiency standards for and against insider trading. The main arguments supporting insider trading are that it promotes economic efficiency and enterprise. The primary argument against insider trading is that it can be a breach of fiduciary duty; the other arguments of asymmetrical information, in‐principle unequal access to information, and misappropriation seem relatively difficult to accept. On balance, it seems that insider trading may possibly be organised in firms so long as policies are transparent, shareholders accept the practice and certain measures are taken to reduce the incidence of free riders. However, the current state of knowledge on the subject makes it very difficult to come to unequivocal conclusions about whether aspects of it should be illegal or not. Much more theoretical and empirical work is needed on the ethical and social foundations of capitalism, insider trading in general, potential conflict of interest between innovators and shareholders, free riders, possible lack of confidence in the market, and in what ways illegality changes the behaviour of agents.

This study estimates the effects of political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty on business confidence. Moreover, it also examines business confidence as a transmission channel of political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty to investment.

The study addresses the Brazilian case from May 2004 to December 2017. Brazil experienced situations of political instability and public distrust in government and its policies, which reflected on the economic environment. The study uses two business confidence indicators that capture entrepreneurs' sentiment in relation to their business and the economy. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares and generalized method of moments.

The estimates reveal that increases in both political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty reduce business confidence. The findings also indicate that business confidence acts as a transmission mechanism, i.e. uncertainties affect investments through business confidence.

The findings point to the following practical implications related to the existence of uncertainties in the Brazilian economy: different institutional difficulties and government indecisions have blurred the political scene and caused political uncertainties. In addition, the same aspects that blurred the political scene also caused uncertainties in relation to economic policy that undermined business confidence, and affected investment.

There is a vast literature on business confidence, as well as studies addressing the relationship between business confidence and investment. This study differs from other studies as follows: in addition to the political uncertainty, it also analyzes the effect of economic policy uncertainty on business confidence; it uses different measures to capture political instability, and it analyzes whether business confidence acts as a transmission channel of both uncertainties to investments.

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

Already suffering reputational damage from the global financial crisis, banks face a further loss of trust due to their poor money laundering (ML) compliance practices. As confidence-driven institutions, the loss of reputation stemming from inadequate compliance with regulations and policies labels banks as facilitators of crime and destroys public trust both in the bank itself, peer banks and the wider banking system. Considering the links between financial stability and adverse publicity about banks, this paper aims to critically examine the implications of ML-specific bank information on financial stability.

This paper adopts a content analysis and a theoretical discussion by critically evaluating the role of bank compliance information on stability with references to recent case studies.

This paper establishes that availability of information regarding a bank involved in or facilitating ML might pose a threat to financial stability if bank counterparties cut their ties with the bank in question and when bank stakeholders show a strong and sudden negative reaction to adverse publicity. Though recent ML scandals have not caused immediate instability, general loss of confidence associated with reputational risk have had a destabilising effect on affected banks’ capital and liquidity.

There has been surprisingly little discussion to date on the impact of publicly available bank information on financial stability and public confidence within the ML compliance framework. This paper approaches the issue of publicly available banking compliance information solely through the prism of public confidence and reputational risk and its impact on macro-stability by examining recent ML scandals.

The purpose of this study tests whether political instability influence financial decision-making behavior of Tunisian-listed firms, in particular dividend payout policy.

This paper uses dividend payout decisions announced over the period 2008–2015 by nonfinancial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. A logistic regression is applied to analyze the relationship between political instability and dividend payout decision “changes. These latter are: past non-payers” dividend initiation, past payers' dividend termination, dividend payout “increasing and dividend payout” decreasing. Political instability variables used are as follows: number of changes in government head and dummy variables indicating the changes of ruling party and election year.

This study shows that government head changes are positively related to dividend initiation decisions while changes in ruling party are negatively related to termination dividend decisions except for family controlled ones. These firms are more likely to stop dividend on period of ruling party changes. Moreover, firms become unwilling to increase dividend payment on the period of political instability (changes in ruling party and government head and elections) and become willing to decrease dividend payment only when the government head changes.

The empirical findings contribute to the current debate on the signaling power of dividend policy in emerging market where raising equity capital is difficult and controlling shareholders prefer reinvest benefit to pay dividends. In addition, this study has important implications for regulators and governments struggling to design policies to improve investors' confidence and boost market activity. Indeed, investors may use corporate payout as a signal for better governance.

To the author' best knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate and to compare the effect of three political instability sources; government head changes, changes in ruling party and elections, on dividend payout decision changes. This paper provides evidence that firms facing political unstable environment seek to achieve two goals when they make dividend policy: reducing financial distress probability and attracting minority owners.

This chapter considers financial instability as a phenomenon endogenous to the functioning of capitalism. Consequently, it seeks to identify the main sources and different forms of the latter in financialised capitalism. According to Keynes, capital assets prices are conceived as the expression of financial conventions. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the returns expected by company directors, bankers, holders of equity titles, risk-takers and, in contrast, risk-averse holders of debt securities. Minsky enriches the analysis by attributing a decisive role to the leverage effect, at the origin of an accumulation of financial weaknesses in the balance sheets of non-financial agents during the expansion phases preceding financial crises. Regulation theory leads to the introduction of a distinction between the financial accelerator and the leverage effect. The first establishes a procyclical relationship at the macroeconomic level between the price of capital assets and the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the second acts at the microeconomic level through shareholder corporate governance, which determines the institutional conditions inciting firm directors to integrate shareholder expectations into their return forecasts. The empirical analysis identifies three forms of financial instability in financialised capitalism: the long-term financial cycle governed by the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the business cycle governed by the impact of stock prices on investment; and the short-term or even very short-term expected return revisions of financial actors. Its originality is to show that these three forms of instability acquire different characteristics depending on the national economy considered.

Based on a survey study of 138 software buyers in Turkey, this study examines conditional indirect effects of requirements uncertainty on supplier opportunism where buyer dependence, a proxy for relation-specific investments, undertakes a mediator role. The authors consider a two-level moderation effect of trust and contract in buyer–supplier relationships throughout the software project lifecycle.

A survey-based empirical study was conducted, and conditional process analyses were run using PROCESS macro in SPSS. The present study tests a two-stage moderated mediation model in which competence-based trust with a detailed contract setting moderates the mediational path from requirements uncertainty to buyer dependence.

The data obtained from the buyer side in the Turkish software industry showed that a relationship in which the buyer is structurally dependent begins at a high level of trust. On the other hand, the authors found that contractual rigidity fosters supplier opportunism ex-post in evolving process of the relationship.

This study contributes to project management literature by testing a two-level moderation effect of governance and the mediator role of buyer dependence in the relationship between requirements uncertainty and supplier opportunism. Moving differently from the previous studies, this study integrates contributions of both economic perspectives, such as resource dependence theory and transaction cost analysis, and relational perspectives into the information processing view.