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This paper aims to gauge the issue of insider trading in Malaysia by assessing some selected statutory provisions under the relevant law and examining the issues of enforcement and prosecution.

The paper analyses relevant legislation pertaining to insider trading.

This paper argues that in order to be an effective regulation, the laws enacted must address the concerns and problems insider trading has given rise to. Contrary to popular impression that insider trading is a settled issue due to the lack of investigation and prosecution cases, the paper unearths a number of findings; first it maintains its contention that the provisions under the Companies Act 1965 are not entirely satisfactory and the latter regulations generally provide more creditable rules with regard to the issue. Further the definition of an insider, the requirement pertaining to the manner the information must be obtained and the enforcement of the law are amongst a number of issues that Malaysia has to address if a more competitive capital market is to be created.

Further research could usefully examine the law in the light of investigation cases by the security commission.

The paper reveals how insider trading legislation applies in business situations.

The insider trading legislation is found out to be far from satisfactory, and this paper attempts to fill in the gaps where there is scarcity of literature on this issue.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effectiveness of insider trading enforcement actions in India and international dimensions.

The research is based on the insider trading regulations and amendments made during the period 1992-2015.

The notable observation of the study is the dearth of insider trading conviction and the paucity of prosecution for insider trading offences in India. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that surveillance and enforcement matter more than the drafting of the relevant statutes and regulations in emerging markets. Whereas, developed countries have a better record of prosecution than emerging markets.

Future research may explore the factors that hinder effective regulation and recommend new methods to increase the impact of Securities and Exchange Board of India insider trading regulation.

The current paper presents guidance for the foreign institutional investors, regulators and market participants on insider trading regulation and prosecution in India.

Using data for actual insider trading cases prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the paper aims to investigate whether insiders trade strategically to avoid detection.

The paper analyzes actual insider trades prior to price sensitive announcements.

It is found that insiders are more likely to trade on high volume days, which indicates an effort to hide their trades. Further, insider trading raises the number of days with abnormally high trading volume only slightly, again indicating that insiders are avoiding attracting attention. No evidence is found that insider trading intensity increases on the insider trading day closest to the announcement day. The hypothesis that index returns for insider trading days and non‐trading days are the same cannot be rejected, which is consistent with insiders avoiding detection. For stocks sold by insiders, returns are higher for insider trading days than for non‐insider trading days. Hence, insiders are selling on days when the market is up, which tends to hide their trading. But for stocks bought by insiders, returns are significantly higher on insider trading days than on non‐insider‐trading days, indicating that in this case insiders may attract unwanted attention.

The research may be useful to those attempting to detect insider trades.

Since 1973, the pharmacy operations division of the Kaiser Permanente Medical Care Program (KPMCP) has used long-term action research programs as the principal method for orchestrating change. This chapter covers the evolution of action research theory within large, complex organizations, with particular attention to health care organizations. Four case examples from KPMCP are discussed in depth and mapped to the recently advanced Roth model of insider action research. This model considers external and internal business context, the perceived need to create new organizational capabilities, as well as insider action research theory and learning mechanisms used in change programs. Issues posed by the Roth model are explored, and new theory is advanced regarding the need for a long-term perspective, the advantages and difficulties posed when managers act as insider action researchers, and the quality of data gathering that takes place during insider action research change programs.

Within the developing exploration of the role of the scholar-practitioner, the situation in which scholar-practitioners engage in the scholarship of practice in their own organizational systems has not received much attention. This chapter adopts the position that scholar-practitioners are not merely practitioners who do research but rather that they integrate scholarship in their practice and generate actionable knowledge, that is, knowledge that is robust for scholars and actionable for practitioners. This chapter explores the phenomenon of scholar-practitioners engaging in the scholarship of practice in their own organizational systems as inside change agents. It discusses how scholar-practitioners engage in inquiry-in-action in first-, second-, and third-person modes of inquiry and practice in the present tense and provides a methodology and methods for such engagement that it be rigorous, reflective, and relevant.

Change of leadership is a big and important incident in the life of a company. As important as it is for the company, it is equally a difficult decision to make for the board of directors. Most of the big companies have a committee dedicated toward laying out a succession plan of the existing chief executive officer (CEO). The big dilemma, however, is whether to appoint someone from within the company and let him or her lead as he or she has been associated with the company and knows the internal dynamics better or to induct some outsider and take advantage of his or her expertise/reputation in the market. The balance appears lopsided when the result of this chapter is perused. Companies on an average seem to reap more benefits if an existing executive is promoted to the office of CEO rather than hiring an outsider. The benefits which are talked here from promoting insiders are indirect ones and do not have a direct bearing with the finances of the company. As shown by the results that insiders are more likely to continue with the company for a longer duration as the CEO as well as not as the CEO which defers the hiring and firing costs (screening candidates, conducting interviews, huge severance packages, golden parachutes, etc., are the costs referred to) for a longer period. Other benefits arising from insider CEOs are upfront awareness about the company’s work culture, production/service capacity, efficiency, strategies followed till date, etc., which gives him or her a head start compared to an outsider.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether director trades provide information to investors about the future prospects of the company they form part of and thus reduce the information asymmetry beyond what is already conveyed in the financial statements.

Director Dealings were dealt with as an investment strategy by looking at past transactions of directors executed between January 2005 and December 2014 on the Malta Stock Exchange (MSE) and evaluating whether there was an increase in returns for investors who copy director trades. The study focused on whether short-term abnormal returns for up to 12 months after the transaction date, being either a buy or a sale, were made by directors in Malta when trading in their own companies.

The results show that in the short-term period of up to 12 months after the transaction date, Maltese directors do transmit information to the market both when they purchase shares in their own companies and also when they sell shares. The interesting fact about the study is that in Malta sale transactions are more valuable to the outsiders than purchase transactions. Apart from this, the results also show that some companies which are listed on the MSE are more indicative as to their future performance than others. It was ultimately concluded that even though there are informational asymmetries between directors in a company and outsiders, an outsider cannot trade solely by following director trades. The implications of the findings are discussed.

This study attempts to determine the level of significance that each insider trade has on the Maltese market, what each director trade conveys to the said market and if these trades are valuable to the outside investors even though such investors do not have knowledge of the grounds upon which the directors trade.

This study investigates the impact of insider-ownership of publicly traded firms on their performance, cost of debt (COD) and cost of equity. We use a sample of 104 non-finance listed companies of Pakistan for the period from 2006 to 2016. Our study is conducted in Pakistan as a developing country in which insider-ownership is dominant, and a weak external corporate governance mechanism increases the payoffs from insider-ownership. We use feasible generalized least square (FGLS) regression methods to examine these hypotheses. Based on agency theory, we find that insider-ownership enhances firm performance. Furthermore, our results show that insider-ownership reduced the COD and equity. Higher ownership decreases the opportunistic behavior of insiders. It also reduces the creditor’s perception of the likelihood of default on loan payments and reduces agency issues among shareholders. The insider will invest in positive NPV projects which will help maximize shareholders’ wealth and minimize the COD. Similarly, the relationship between insider-ownership and cost of equity is significant but negative. Supporting the convergence of interest increase in ownership helps in aligning the goals of managers and stakeholders whereby the insider will focus on value creation by minimizing equity cost.

Managing Executives occupy a pivotal role in the acquisition process. It is virtually inconceivable that major Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) could proceed without their personal sponsorship (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). They are central to the negotiation and signing for such deals and it is these negotiations that raise questions over how the target company should be run post-acquisition, how it should be configured to fit within the newly expanded group and what sort of strategy may be appropriate for the future. Managing Executives embody their firm’s strategies and so are intimately connected with these issues of organisational fit and strategic rational. With negotiations focussed upon the future of their businesses and their personal places in corporate history, these contests can be very dramatic. The high stakes are evident in the substantial levels of acquired Managing Executive departure post-acquisition. Whilst we can observe that many acquired Managing Executives subsequently leave the enlarged firm, little evidence to date answers the question of why they have been retained or replaced?