Search results

The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically the fundamental role that information asymmetry plays in the functioning of an efficient capital market as mediator in the relation between corporate disclosures and cost of capital.

By using a sample of 1,260 international non-financial listed companies in the period 2007-2014.

The findings suggest that high-quality financial and social disclosures quality reduce the cost of capital, by decreasing information asymmetry. In other words, the authors find evidence of the mediator role of information asymmetry in the relation between corporate disclosures and the cost of capital. These results are also controlled for differences on accounting standards and other institutional factors.

The central assumption is that the demand for corporate disclosures that reduces the information advantages of some investors (who are more informed) arises from agency conflicts and these information differences in turn, determine the cost of capital. This paper is the first attempt to study, jointly, the effects of decreasing information asymmetries by corporate disclosures on the cost of capital in an international setting. In addition, the authors focussed on both financial and social disclosures, creating empirical proxies whose validity for the analysis has been evidenced.

Contemporary offshore information system development (ISD) outsourcing is becoming even more complex. Outsourcing partner has begun “re-outsourcing” components of their projects to other outsourcing companies to minimize cost and gain efficiencies. This paper aims to explore intra-organizational information asymmetry of re-outsourced offshore ISD outsourcing projects.

An online survey was conducted to get an overall view of information asymmetry between principal and agents (as per the agency theory).

Statistical analysis showed that there are significant differences between the principal and agent on clarity of requirements, common domain knowledge and communication effectiveness constructs, implying an unbalanced relationship between the parties. Moreover, the authors' results showed that these three are significant measurement constructs of information asymmetry.

In this study the authors have only considered three main factors as common domain knowledge, clarity of requirements and communication effectiveness as three measurement constructs of information asymmetry. Therefore, researches are encouraged to test the proposed constructs further to increase its precision.

The authors' analysis indicates significant differences in all three measurement constructs, implying the difficulties to ensure that the agent is performing according to the requirements of the principal. Using the agency theory as theoretical view, this study sheds light on the best contract governing methods which minimize information asymmetry between the multiple partners within ISD outsourcing organizations.

Currently, to the best of the authors' knowledge, no study has undertaken research on intra-organizational information asymmetry in re-outsourced offshore ISD outsourcing projects.

This study endeavours to examine the relationship between information asymmetry and expected stock returns at the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India, with a sample of NIFTY 500 stocks for a period ranging from 1st April 2000 to 31st March 2018, by employing three different proxies of information asymmetry: number of transactions, institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility.

The return differential amongst information-sorted decile portfolios has been assessed to understand the effect of information risk on stock returns by employing (1) traditional measures of performance evaluation like mean, Sharpe,  Treynor and information ratios, (2) regression models like the capital asset pricing (CAPM), Fama and French three-factor, Carhart's four-factor, information-augmented CAPM, information-augmented Fama and French three-factor and information-augmented Carhart's four-factor models and (3) an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model.

The empirical evidence indicated that as information asymmetry associated with portfolio increases, returns also expand to recompense investors for bearing information risk validating the existence of a significant positive relationship between information asymmetry and expected stock returns at the NSE. Amongst the various asset pricing models employed in this study, the information-augmented Fama and French three-factor model turned out to be the best in explaining cross-sectional variations in portfolio returns.

Strong information premium was observed such that high information stocks outperformed low information stocks which have strong inference for investors and portfolio managers, who all continuously look out for investment strategies that can lend hand to beat the market.

Easley and O'Hara (2004) proposed that stocks with more information asymmetry have higher expected returns. Very few studies have examined this relationship between information risk and stock returns that too restricted to the US market only, with a few on other emerging markets. No work has been conducted on the concerned issue in the Indian context. Therefore, it seems to be the first study to explore the relationship between information asymmetry and expected stock returns in the Indian securities market.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the information asymmetry pricing (relation between information asymmetry and expected return) based on environmental uncertainty and accounting conservatism.

The current study applies panel regression method estimator to investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry pricing of 1,309 firm-year observations in Iran for the period 2008–2018.

The result indicated the negative relation between accounting conservation and information asymmetry pricing and documented a positive association between environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry pricing.

In the present study, the weaknesses caused by the ambiguity of capital market efficiency in market performance-based statistical models are compensated and partially covered by quantifying the relationships and implementing models in each quintile. Results obtained from this study will aid policymakers to evaluate disclosure rules and firms to manage their information. The study is based on the corporate accounting and financial literature and examines behavioral changes in information and its effect on information asymmetry pricing that can be applied to investors, managers, standardization committees and legislators.

The risk of accounting information in the context of the capital market environment can be divided into two parts: a part that is ambiguous about the accuracy of this information and another part that is a distribution of information. Unlike other research, information asymmetry pricing has also been addressed with regard to the origin and distribution of information. This study also considers the effect of information asymmetry and market constraints by considering the ability of financial reports to transmit firm information.

Purpose: In reality, financial decisions are made under conditions of asymmetric information that results in either favorable or adverse selection. As far as financial decisions affect growth of the firm, the latter must also be affected by either favorable or adverse selection. Therefore, the core objective of this chapter is to examine the determinants of each financial decision and the effects on growth of the firm under conditions of information asymmetry.

Design/Methodology/Approach: This chapter uses data for the non-financial firms listed in S&P 500. The data cover quarterly periods from 1989 to 2014. The statistical tests include linearity, fixed, and random effects and normality. The generalized method of moments estimation method is employed in order to examine the relative significance and contribution of each financial decision on growth of the firm, respectively. Standard and proposed proxies of information asymmetry are discussed.

Findings: The results conclude that there is a variation in the impact of financial variables on growth of the firm at high and low levels of information asymmetry especially regarding investment and financing decisions. A similar picture emerges in the cases of firm size and industry effects. In addition, corporate dividen d policy has a similar effect on firm growth across all asymmetric levels. These findings prove that information asymmetry plays a vital role in the relationship between corporate financial decisions and growth of the firm. Finally, the results contribute to the vast literature on the estimation of information asymmetry by demonstrating that the classical and standard proxies for information asymmetry are not consistent in terms of the ability to differentiate between favorable or adverse selection (which corresponds to low and high level of information asymmetry).

Originality/Value: This chapter contributes to the related literature in two ways. First, this chapter offers updated empirical evidence on the way that financing, investment, and dividends decisions are made under conditions of favorable and adverse selection. Other related studies deal with each decision separately. Second, the study offers new proxies for measuring information asymmetry in order to reach robust estimates of the effects of financial decisions on growth of the firm under conditions of agency problems.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of independent directors in reducing firms’ information asymmetry. Moreover, the authors enrich this investigation by differentiating the effectiveness of independent directors in an intriguing comparative setting of family vs non-family firms. Family firms are used to represent an interesting environment where controlling insiders (i.e. firms’ founding families) have dominant control over corporate decisions. This study addresses the question of whether controlling-insiders dominate independent directors.

The authors manually collect firms’ founder information to identify family firm status in a sample of S&P 500 firms. Following a large literature in capital market research, the authors proxy information asymmetry by trading volume, bid-ask spread and price volatility. The authors employ multivariate regression with two-stage least square analysis, instrumental variable method, Heckman selection model and Hausman–Taylor model to address the issue of endogenous selection of board of director and family firm status.

The authors find a negative relation between the board independence and information asymmetry, suggesting independent directors are effective in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, the authors find this negative relation is stronger in family firms. These results are robust after controlling for the endogenous issues using various models.

Our results suggest that independent directors in family-controlled firms are more successful in reducing information asymmetry than their counterparts in non-family firms. The authors provide direct evidence to support the existing theoretical arguments from Rediker and Seth (1995) and Anderson and Reeb (2004) that founding families and independent boards might be a powerful combination for aligning the interest of insider and diffused shareholders. The findings ease a prevalent concern that the role of independent directors might be compromised in an environment with controlling shareholders, and advocate regulations promoting board independence for various business practices.

A number of studies concentrate on the practice of corporate disclosure of firm’s performance and governance and how corporate disclosure mitigates information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of independent directors in reducing information asymmetry. The research adds to understanding the incentives of board members and supports recent findings that different types of investors have heterogeneous incentives for corporate disclosure (Srinidhi et al., 2014).

This paper seeks to examine the potential for regulation to reduce information asymmetries between firm insiders and outside investors.

Extensive prior research has established that there are substantial effects of information asymmetry in seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The paper tests for a mitigating effect of regulation on such information asymmetries by examining differences in long‐run operating performance, changes in that performance, and announcement‐period stock returns between unregulated industrial firms and regulated utilities that issue seasoned equity. The authors also segment the samples by firm size, since smaller firms are likely to have greater asymmetries.

Consistent with regulated utility firms having lower levels of information asymmetry, they have superior changes in abnormal operating performance than industrial firms pre‐ to post‐issue and their announcement period returns are significantly less negative. These findings are most pronounced for the smallest firms, firms likely to have the greatest information asymmetries and where regulation could have its greatest effect.

The paper does not examine costs of regulation. Thus, future research could seek to measure the cost/benefit trade‐off of regulation in reducing information asymmetry. Also, future research could examine cross‐sectional differences between different industries and regulated utilities.

Regulation reduces information asymmetry. Thus, regulation or mandated disclosure may be appropriate in industries/markets where information asymmetry is severe.

This paper is the first to compare the operating performance of regulated and unregulated SEO firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether disclosure as required by Islamic Financial Service Board Standard No. 4 (IFSB-4) influences information asymmetry among investors in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries. In addition, the paper investigates whether the influence of IFSB-4 on information asymmetry varies between Islamic and conventional financial institutions.

The paper tests the hypotheses using a sample of firms listed in the GCC over a period of 2000-2013. Ordinary least square regression and fixed-effects estimation techniques are applied to test the hypotheses.

The findings reveal that information asymmetry among investors is lower after the implementation of IFSB-4 than before, indicating that the standard has increased transparency. The results also reveal that information asymmetry after the implementation of IFSB-4 is lower for Islamic than for conventional financial institutions. This suggests that IFAB-4 promotes more transparency for Islamic than conventional institutions.

Owing to data availability, we were unable to use other proxies of information asymmetry, e.g. bid-ask spreads, and the level of disclosure, e.g. self-constructed disclosure index.

The paper concludes that disclosures under IFAB-4 reduce information asymmetry among investors. In this context, this study increases the awareness of standard setters academics investors regulators and many other stakeholders about the economic consequences of disclosure standards in the region.

This study takes a first step to fill evident gaps in the literature by investigating the influences of disclosure standard on information asymmetry in a unique setting that is often ignored by accounting researchers, which helps to widen our knowledge on accounting practices across the globe.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the influence of information and knowledge exchange and sharing between managers and non-executive directors is important in assessing the dynamic processes of accountability in boardrooms. By analysing information/knowledge at multiple levels, invoking the literature on implicit/tacit and explicit information/knowledge, the authors show that information asymmetry is a necessary condition for effective boards. The authors introduce a conceptual model of manager-non-executive director information asymmetry as an outcome of the interpretation of information/knowledge-sharing processes amongst board members. The model provides a more nuanced agenda of the management-board information asymmetry problem to enable a better understanding of the role of different types of information in practice.

The analysis of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation and the resultant conceptual model are based on the following elements: manager-non-executive director information/knowledge, management-board information/knowledge and board dynamics and reciprocal processes converting implicit/tacit into explicit information/knowledge.

The paper provides new insights into the dynamics of information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors (individual level)/between management and boards (group level). The authors characterise this as a two-way process, back-and-forth between managers/executive directors and non-executive directors. The importance of relative/experienced “ignorance” of non-executive directors is revealed, which the authors term the “information asymmetry paradox”.

The authors set out key opportunities for developing a research agenda from the model based on prior research of knowledge conversion processes and how these may be applied in a boardroom setting.

The model may assist directors in better understanding their roles and the division of labour between managers and non-executive directors from an information/knowledge perspective.

The authors apply Ikujiro Nonaka’s knowledge conversion framework to consider the transitioning from individual implicit personal to explicit shared information/knowledge, to understand the subtle processes at play in boardrooms influencing information/knowledge exchange, sharing and creation between managers and non-executive directors.

The purpose of this study is to enhance the comprehensive understanding of the roles of resource investments, explicit contracts and three components of guanxi (i.e. renqing, ganqing and mianzi) in asymmetric research and development (R&D) partnerships. Treating dependence asymmetry as a multidimensional construct, this study examines the moderating effects of these elements on the relationships between resources and information asymmetry and opportunism.

The study was executed by issuing questionnaires to R&D managers participating in R&D projects and collaborations in the Shanghai and Jiangsu provinces via e-mail and face to face surveys. A multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The empirical test generally supported the conceptual model and produced the following findings: first, resources and information asymmetry significantly and positively affect opportunism. Second, the partner’s resource investments can weaken the effect of resources and information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Third, explicit contracts can reduce the impact of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism. Fourth, renqing and ganqing but not mianzi can weaken the influence of information asymmetry on the partner’s opportunism.

This study provides a comprehensive and clear understanding of how opportunism can be curbed by jointly considering resource investments, explicit contracts and guanxi in asymmetric R&D cooperative relationships. Moreover, dependence asymmetry and guanxi are measured as a multidimensional construct and reveal their underlying structure, which expands previous understandings of risk management in R&D collaborations.