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At the level of a cognitive schema, a business model is a mental map of a firm’s value-creating, value-delivering, and value-capturing activities and the linkages between them. An important question in the study of business models as cognitive schemas is whether and how schemas differ across industry actors and whether the differences are connected to the variation observed in actual business models in the industry. This chapter examines, in particular, the ways in which business model schemas of industry insiders differ from those of industry outsiders. Using data from interviews with chief executive officers (CEOs) of 30 legal-tech firms, we graphically construct and analyze the CEOs’ schemas of important causal interdependencies between their firms’ activities. The analysis shows systematic differences between insiders and outsider CEOs’ schemas. We theorize that these differences underlie insider and outsider CEOs’ distinct approaches to opportunity recognition, expertise perception, and value framing, and have consequences for actual business model evolution in the industry.

The purpose of this paper is to use the dynamic capabilities framework to explain the effect of board networks, as a source of intellectual capital, on firm performance. The authors propose that the influence of board interlocks depends on their ability to contribute to strategic decision making. As a result, their effect is subject to the business context in which they occur and the different role of the interconnected directors involved.

The authors use social network analysis to make board connections and to calculate centrality measures. The authors also identify busy boards to analyze whether their effect differs from centrality. The authors estimate the theoretical model using the Generalized Method of Moments in order to take advantage of the panel database.

For a sample of Spanish firms from 1999 to 2015, the results show there is no direct significant effect of directors’ networks on firm performance. However, the authors find a positive and significant influence of intra-industry board connections, particularly when they are established among outsiders.

The Spanish context of the study can limit the generalization of the papers’ results.

The results can be useful both for practitioners – since they can serve as a guide for companies to reformulate their boards in search of the optimal structure-, and when implementing good governance codes – establishing limits for director interlocking.

This study helps to offer a better understanding of how directors’ networks can add value to the firm depending on the kind of resources they provide (context) and the role of the director who is connected.

In this paper, we reflect on an expanding literature that links theories of cognition and business models. Managers hold in their mind perceptual constructs or schemas of the business model. These guide the process of distinguishing between options and making choices. Those familiar with business model development will easily recognise that the perceptual construct provides only a summary of the business model, and that a more complex conceptualisation of how business model elements interact is needed. The business model is then much more than a visualisation. It is a schematic model of theorised interaction that is created, shaped, and shared over time. The underlying processes of this creation, shaping, and sharing are cognitive activities taking place at individual, organisational, and inter-organisational levels. Theories of managerial and organisational cognition are thus critical to understanding the acts of business modelling and business model innovation. Here we suggest some of the ways that business model and cognition literatures can be connected, present existing literature, and reflect on future avenues of research to explore the cognitive foundations of business modelling.

This paper aims to investigate the relative importance of audit-team and audit-firm attributes in perceptions of audit quality by two groups of users of audit services: audit committee chairs/members (“insiders”) and financial analysts/fund managers (“outsiders”).

Using a survey questionnaire, data are gathered from 39 audit committee chairs/members and 42 financial analysts/fund managers and analysed using adaptive conjoint analysis.

The findings reveal that both groups perceive audit-team attributes as relatively more important than audit-firm attributes. This is consistent with expectations for “insiders”, but inconsistent with expectations for “outsiders”. Differences are also found in the internal ratings of some of the attributes, with “insiders” and “outsiders” placing different relative importance on some attributes.

The usual set of limitations that are present in a survey method also apply in this study, i.e. surveys rely on reports of behaviours rather than observations and are therefore susceptible to measurement error. A further limitation is that, in using adaptive conjoint analysis, the number of attributes that may be included in the survey is restricted and, consequently, the attributes selected may not be comprehensive or fully representative.

The study extends the scope of prior studies by examining the relative importance of audit-team and audit-firm attributes in perceptions of audit quality. In using conjoint analysis, the study makes a unique and innovative contribution by providing direct evidence on the relative importance of attributes in perceptions of audit quality for different users of audit services. The findings have implications for regulators and the accounting profession concerned with improving confidence in corporates and for audit firms in monitoring and promoting the quality of their audit services.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the monitoring effectiveness of insider-dominated boards and outsider-dominated boards on different types of CEOs.

To test whether boards monitor inside CEOs and outside CEOs differently and to compare the sizes of the effects across board types, the paper relates CEO resignations to performance measure. The paper tests the hypotheses using logit models to estimate the probability of a CEO change.

It is widely believed that only an outsider-dominated board can provide effective management oversight. The paper finds evidence supporting this view after categorized CEOs based on their affiliation with their firms upon hire. However, the paper also documents that after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), an insider-dominated board is just as effective as an outsider board in monitoring if the CEO was initially hired from outside of the firm. This suggests that there is no difference between insider and outsider board monitoring of outside CEOs. Therefore, after SOX, as far as board monitoring is concerned, what matters is the independence between the CEO and the firm rather than the board structure itself.

If effective board monitoring is the reason of the revised listing standards approved by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2003 to require companies listed on NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board that is composed of a majority of independent (or outsider) directors, the paper has provided more flexibility and choices to the listed firms. For example, firms that will be better off with insider boards can choose to hire outside CEOs because monitoring effects on outside CEOs are the same regardless of board types after SOX.

The results of this paper have interesting implication. First, the paper has shown that an outsider-dominated board is still a better monitor even after categorized CEOs based on their affiliation with their firms upon hire. Second, if effective board monitoring is the reason of the revised listing standards approved by SEC in 2003 to require companies listed on NYSE or Nasdaq to have a board that is composed of a majority of independent (or outsider) directors, the paper has provided more flexibility and choices to the listed firms. For example, firms that will be better off with insider boards can choose to hire outside CEOs because monitoring effects on outside CEOs are the same regardless of board types after SOX.

Managing Executives occupy a pivotal role in the acquisition process. It is virtually inconceivable that major Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) could proceed without their personal sponsorship (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). They are central to the negotiation and signing for such deals and it is these negotiations that raise questions over how the target company should be run post-acquisition, how it should be configured to fit within the newly expanded group and what sort of strategy may be appropriate for the future. Managing Executives embody their firm’s strategies and so are intimately connected with these issues of organisational fit and strategic rational. With negotiations focussed upon the future of their businesses and their personal places in corporate history, these contests can be very dramatic. The high stakes are evident in the substantial levels of acquired Managing Executive departure post-acquisition. Whilst we can observe that many acquired Managing Executives subsequently leave the enlarged firm, little evidence to date answers the question of why they have been retained or replaced?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether proxy statement performance graph disclosures are influenced by the firm's governance structure and management concerns about relative performance.

Logistic regression is used to test whether the level of performance graph disclosure decreases with lower relative performance and higher insider director membership on the compensation committee of the board. Also, Z and t‐statistics test whether bias in the selected peer group benchmark is related to insider membership on the committee.

The empirical results suggest that reporting discretion was exercised for management's benefit. The amount of explicit disclosure on cumulative returns in the performance graph decreases as relative performance declines and decreases when insider directors serve on the compensation committee. Moreover, the presence of insider directors on the compensation committee is associated with a biased choice of peer group benchmark return.

The sample for the study consists of 141 large firms. Future research could examine a larger group of firms that vary in size or other disclosures.

These findings support recent actions taken to improve corporate governance. Further public policy steps could be taken. For example, the SEC could require firms to include an explanation for appointing insiders to the compensation committee.

The results are consistent with managers using discretion over information disclosures and suggest that compensation committees with insider members play a less active role in providing information that is helpful to shareholders.

Purpose – This study examines whether a firm’s investment efficiency is impacted by having an outside director who experiences investment efficiency at one of his/her other board seats.

Methodology – Archival data is used to examine the research question.

Findings – The results indicate that firms have higher levels of investment efficiency when they have an outside director who also sits on the board of another firm that has high investment efficiency. The result is most prevalent for the subsample of firms with a powerful CEO or with low information quality.

Implications – An implication of this finding is that boards may look to the investment-related experiences that a director has through his/her other board service when deciding to add a new director. Moreover, the results imply that firms will know to look for these informed directors when they have information problems or a powerful CEO.

Originality/Value – Investments require a firm to determine how it will allocate resources. Such important decisions require management to obtain the approval of the board of directors. This paper reveals that the investment-related experience that the directors obtain from their other board service is associated with efficient investment outcomes at the home firm.

Because we lack a usable definition of the concept of style to inform research on the creative industries, this chapter takes a first step toward developing a style-based perspective on them. The use of style in disciplines where the study of creative industries occupies a notable position (sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, and management) is compared and contrasted with a series of related concepts (status, fashion, trend, genre, movement, and category). Style is defined as a durable, recognizable pattern of aesthetic choices. Propositions that relate style to an organization’s creative performance are formulated for two types of audience: insiders and outsiders.