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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the existence of asset specificity and the architecture of the hybrid governance structures adopted by horticultural smallholders from the Brazilian region of Serra Fluminense.

This paper uses a negative binomial regression model to analyze 567 transactions carried out by horticultural smallholders from the Brazilian region of Serra Fluminense. Starting from the insights of Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost economics, an indicator is constructed with the goal to capture the degree of intensity of coordination from the adoption of diverse bundles of coordination mechanisms in a governance structure.

The results show that higher levels of human and physical asset specificity affect the intensity of coordination of the transactions in the sample, leading to the adoption of hybrid forms with more complex bundles of coordination mechanisms.

This paper adds to a growing literature that studies the architecture of complex governance structures. However, its empirical conclusions are exploratory.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, quantitative empirical studies that analyze the diversity of hybrid forms in the same industry are relatively rare. This contribution also presents a theoretical discussion that might inform scholars dealing with similar research challenges.

This study aims to explore the extent to which inter-organizational hybrid governance manages the micro design for optimum reverse knowledge transfer in the open innovation context. The authors use two essential facets of micro design in hybrid governance: product adaptation and integration mechanism.

Data for this study were collected from franchisees through structured questionnaires in Indonesia.

Results indicated that product adaptation has a positive relationship with reverse knowledge transfer. This study also found that the formalization strengthens the relationship between product adaptation and reverse knowledge transfer. However, the socialization does not have a moderation effect.

This research estimates the knowledge transfer from the agent’s side only. Therefore, further research is expected to estimate the reverse knowledge transfer in dyads (from agent and principal) to get a detailed understanding of reverse knowledge transfer.

This study offers guidelines to managers, especially in inter-organizational hybrid governance. The authors suggest reverse knowledge transfer as a form to manage the dispersed knowledge from their agents. Governing institutions should change their view that agents have diverse knowledgebase from experience adapting to local conditions and can improve their open innovation through reverse knowledge transfer. From the results, it is found that giving agents the flexibility to adapt products can boost reverse knowledge transfer to support open innovation.

This study provides an understanding of the utilization of external knowledge sourcing in the context of open innovation from agent to principal in hybrid governance through reverse knowledge transfer, which has thus far been empirically under-researched.

Relationship learning is a topic of considerable importance for industrial networks, yet a lack of empirical research on the impact of relationship governance structures on relationship learning remains. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of relationship governance structures on learning in partnerships.

This paper contributes to the closure of the research gap by examining sample data drawn from 42 interviews on the subject of 199 customer‐supplier relationships within the Finnish metal and electronics industries. As a method, the paper applies cluster analysis and analysis of variance mean‐comparison.

The results of this paper show that balanced hybrid governance structures explain learning in partnerships, which suggests that certain combinations of relationship governance mechanisms (price, hierarchical, and social mechanism) produce the best learning outcomes in partnerships. Results suggest that managers should use hybrid relationship governance structures when governing their supplier partnerships.

The paper has some limitations such as limited sample size, cross‐sectional data, and difficulties due to measuring social phenomenon such as learning. Owing to the interview method being applied, research is bound to apply a sample data drawn from companies that operate in the west coast in Finland. These limitations need to be considered when applying the results.

The results encourage managers to use different governance mechanisms simultaneously when managing their company's supply chain partnerships. The result emphasizes the role of active relationship management.

The paper is one of the first to empirically show that relationship learning is best facilitated by using various relationship governance mechanisms simultaneously. Trust needs to be complemented by hierarchical and possibly by price mechanism.

The authors explore the impact of an emerging technology, blockchain technology, on diverse governance mechanisms and sustainable supply chain practices and how its relationships with the linkage of these elements.

The methodology incorporates a literature review and a qualitative empirical analysis of the Electronic Product Environmental Assessment Tool (EPEAT) standards. Expert opinions from various firms and organizations within the electronics sector are assessed. Through a thematic analysis, the relationships are identified and examined.

Data immutability, transparency and traceability capabilities of blockchain technology enhance the relationship between environmental standards and ecological supply chain sustainability practices. Although immature, the blockchain can influence the governance of supply chain sustainability practices. Immaturity of technology, lack of expertise, sharing information and trust have delayed adoption.

There is limited empirical evidence regarding blockchain's impact on governance mechanisms, specifically hybrid public-private mechanisms and sustainable supply chain practices. The study further evaluates how particular blockchain features may exert varying influences on these aspects and different sustainable supply chain traits. As an exploratory study, it proposes new areas for further research, including how blockchain's traceability function can improve sustainability standard adoption. Additionally, there is a call for integrating blockchain with technologies like IoT and sensors which may influence supply chain governance mechanisms, standards and sustainability practices.

Today, the global education market is one of the faster growing sectors, and it has attracted several new actors or what we call educational brokers who are now responsible for shaping national agendas. The newer actors in education are vastly different for the former players in that whereas previous actors engrossed national educational systems through the provision of technical assistance to meet international standards, best practices, and benchmarks, these newer players are for-profit entities that emphasize austerity, leanness, human resource maximization, performance targets, and competition. Therefore, in this new educational landscape, national governments are seen as “clients” who receive “expert” advice from “external consultants” that have an assortment of experiences across different sectors. Education governance is no longer a statist endowed but one that incubates in laborites of best practices resonates with existing case studies and results driven based on Big Date collected. We argue that educational brokers are responsible for the emergence of a hybrid form of education governance that use business and market techniques to reform strategies within the education sector. We conclude by suggesting that collectively educational brokers are using what we call “educational sub-prime mechanisms” – higher interest rates, reduced quality collateral, and less advantageous terms to counterweight higher credit risk – to manage educational portfolios and newer forms of educational risk.

Practitioners often are confused by theories that offer ambiguous prescriptions for designing the institutional forms or governance structures in which business activities are conducted. Unclear prescriptions for organizing tasks within the main governance alternatives leave key design decisions unguided: which tasks to perform in‐house (hierarchy), which to contract to outside agencies (market), and which to perform jointly by economic units within and outside the firm (hybrid)? A popular current theory ‐ transaction cost analysis ‐ suggests that governance structures should be aligned to tasks in a “mainly transaction cost economizing way.” Argues that the importance of transaction costs is overstated, and that observed patterns of firms’ governance structures suggest that firms also account for other theoretical issues ‐ production costs and strategic considerations ‐ in determining efficient boundaries. Begins by illustrating that transaction costs are not always primary. Then discusses the factors that impact production costs and transaction costs, and reviews certain strategic considerations that impact the choice of governance structure for a task. Offers practitioners guidance in choosing governance structures through a contingency analysis that examines the interaction of production costs, transaction costs, and strategic considerations. Illustrates normative implications for designing governance structures through corporate examples that are driven by both cost and strategy considerations.

The antecedents and cost management methods and their effects on the value creation of inter-organization are essential topics of inter-organizational cost management (IOCM) in a hybrid relational perspective. This study aims to develop a synthesis coordinating mechanism theory which combines supply network theory and transaction cost economics. Using this modified theory, a structural model of IOCM and its hypotheses are developed by considering the organic connection among hybrid relational context, capabilities, methods and the effects of IOCM.

The data were collected under convenient sampling using the questionnaire survey method and analyzed using principal component analysis and structural equation modeling.

The results (significant at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05 level) show that there is a positive correlation among the hybrid relational context, capabilities (antecedents), methods and the effects of IOCM. Capabilities (antecedents) and cost management methods are also found to have a positive impact on synergic effect value and on improving collaborative efficiency in IOCM.

The managers of inter-firm networks may use the results of this study to ensure competitive advantages through collaboration with each other and building and retaining a long-term relationship.

This study demonstrates that the coordinating mechanism of IOCM can create the synergic effect value and improve the collaborative efficiency of the inter-organization relationship.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the processes involved in the creation and eventual demise of a market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. The reasons for the failure of this market to take hold as a governance mechanism are considered, and its subsequent effects examined.

The research examines a single case study of the creation of a pilot market for biodiversity offsets in the UK. Data include policy and industry papers, complemented with interviews with biodiversity offset practitioners, regulators and non-government organisations.

The case study demonstrates that a market for biodiversity offsets was piloted with the intent to contribute to the reform of the UK planning regime. However, disagreements about this political project, uncertainties in the knowledge base, and continued entanglements with existing biodiversity meant it was impossible to stabilise the assemblages necessary to support the market, leading to its eventual demise. However, the principles and devices of offsetting have proved more resilient, and have started to combine with the existing arrangements for the governance of nature.

The paper presents a situation where a political project to reform governance arrangements through the creation of a market was not successful, making it of interest to researchers and policymakers alike.

While biodiversity offsetting has been widely discussed from scientific, legal and political perspectives, this paper addresses it as a market, explicitly designed to become a part of a governance regime. It also advances the understanding of the mechanisms by which similar processes of marketisation can fail, and suggests avenues for future research in those contexts.

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the formal and informal governance mechanisms of state-owned enterprises operating in a post-transitional economy of Poland.

The study combines legal analysis of Polish regulations in force, review of literature on the Poland’s institutional legacy, and a statistical analysis, based on a data set of 204 management board members, 180 external supervisory board members, and 114 state officials supervising Polish SOEs in 2011.

Legally designed relationships among the management board, supervisory board, and the state treasury, represented by the minister and ministry officials, constitute the key formal governance mechanisms in Polish SOEs. They are, however, complemented by relationships between SOEs and their stakeholders and distorted by other informal phenomena, including informal noninstitutional behavior, mechanisms grounded in cognitive and normative institutions, and perception of the relationship structure by the actors themselves. As a result, key corporate governance actors differ in their perception of governance influences upon SOEs.

This study contributes to policymaking by helping authorities gain a better understanding of the governance challenges in SOEs.

This paper is one of the first and few empirical studies investigating the issue of formal and informal governance mechanisms in SOEs in post-transitional economies of CEE.

The purpose of this study is to investigate factors that influence the application of governance mechanism in family small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia.

This study used multiple regression analysis to examine the hypothesis. For data collection, questionnaires were distributed to 337 owners and managers of SMEs around 7 districts in Java Island in Indonesia.

The result indicates that uncertainty influences the application of formal governance in family SMEs in Indonesia. Meanwhile, asset specificity has impact on both formal and relational governance in the context of firms. Financial and non-financial objectives did not impact both formal and relational governance.

Though this research was carried out in a particular cultural context, this study was not specifically designed to examine the interaction between cultural variables and family corporate governance variables. In the future, there is need for a study that examines how culture can influence the practice of formal and relational governance in family business.

The study will give guidance to owners or managers of family business in terms of governance mechanism when uncertainty increases. This evidence suggests that family firms need to adopt formal governance within family firms when uncertainty exists.

The research finding indicated that uncertainty influenced the application of formal governance in family SMEs in Indonesia. This research finding suggests that family firms need to adopt formal governance when uncertainty exists. The adoption of formal governance, however, may implicate to some others organizational areas in family firms such as leadership, recruitment and selection and corporate culture.

This study is one of the few on family SMEs, which applied the transaction cost theory. Most of the studies use agency theory for investigating governance mechanism in the family business. This study is one of the few on family SMEs, which applied the transaction cost. This study provides an explanation about a factor that influences a family firm to choose formal and relational governance within the firm.