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The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether and to what extent households living in southern Europe, i.e. Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, experience similar conditions of financial vulnerability, considering that in comparative research these countries are often grouped together because of the substantial instability of their economies and the similarity of social and welfare model.

The authors use data from Household Finance and Consumption Survey, a quite novel data set that covers the whole balance sheet of a sample of households. The authors compute four indicators of debt burden and in order to study households’ risk of default the authors apply two-part model, which is a valuable alternative to the application of conventional regression models with zero-inflated data.

Analysis reveals that the burden of debts and the risk of default are very different among the four countries, in particular Spain and Portugal have the highest proportion of financially vulnerable households.

The study is one a few that have directly compared objectives indicators of households’ financial vulnerability in all Southern European countries. Moreover, the authors employ a two-part model, a valuable alternative to the application of conventional logit or linear regression models. In the first part of the model the authors estimate the probability that households suffer financial vulnerability; in the second part, the authors estimate households’ level of vulnerability only for vulnerable families.

Debt burdens have risen for US households over the last several decades. As a result, several studies have investigated potential ethnic and gender differences in these debt burdens, along with the risks they pose. However, such estimations can be biased without correctly controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity, and standard methods to deal with this, such as fixed effects, remove any time-invariant variables from the analysis. In this paper, I use the Hausman–Taylor (HT) estimator to estimate the relationship between these time-invariant demographics and debt burdens, allowing for potential correlation between some variables and the unobserved heterogeneity. I also consider some guidelines in determining the appropriateness of the HT estimation, both in terms of exogeneity assumptions as well as potential problems due to weak instruments. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, the resulting estimates differ substantially from those of a typical random effects GLS estimator. In particular, the HT results find that after controlling for other variables, women are more likely to take on debt, especially nonhousing debt, but those who do take on debt tend to take on a lower amount than their male counterparts. No differences are found for black or Hispanic individuals with regard to the amount of debt, though black individuals are found to be slightly less likely to have debt.

This paper aims to study the financial vulnerability of the Spanish households derived from their primary residence mortgage debt payments. This paper shown as the economic and financial crisis triggered after the burst of the housing bubble brought an unemployment shock and a fall in the disposable family income, which alarmingly aggravated the financial vulnerability of the mortgaged households. Consequently, the number of financially vulnerable households almost doubled.

Econometric model of discrete election.

The most vulnerable households – and therefore those with a higher risk of mortgage payment default – are those whose family head is a married and self-employed female. In contrast, in social housing the mortgaged households have been less vulnerable in the context of economic and financial crisis and unlike what would have been initially expected, higher education levels have not acted as a protective factor against households’ financial vulnerability.

There is a great need to understand how the financial health of the mortgaged families that bought their primary residence has deteriorated in a context of significant changes in macroeconomic conditions. This need is specially pressing in a country such as Spain which is one of the OECD’s countries with a higher rate of household property and which shows a sector of highly mortgaged households.

In this paper, the authors investigate whether coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) impacts household finances, like household debt repayments in the UK.

This paper employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that nests neural networks and uses Mixed Data Sampling (MIDAS) techniques. The authors use data information related to COVID-19, financial markets and household finances.

The authors' results show that household debt repayments' response to the first principal component of COVID-19 shocks is negative, albeit of low magnitude. However, when the authors employ specific COVID-19-related data like vaccines and tests the responses are positive, insinuating the underlying dynamic complexities. Overall, confirmed deaths and hospitalisations negatively affect household debt repayments. The authors also report low persistence in household debt repayments. Generalised impulse response functions (IRFs) confirm the main results. As draconian measures, the lockdowns are eased and the COVID-19 shocks are diminishing, and household financial data converge to the levels prior to the pandemic albeit with some lags.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of the pandemic on household debt repayments. The authors' findings show that policy response in the future should prioritise innovation of new vaccines and testing.

The article provides a comparative critique of the financial underpinnings of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent wave of financial crises. The collapse of the financial systems in many developing nations, the bankruptcies in the Anglo-Saxon corporate sectors and a threat of more sovereign defaults on behalf of emerging markets suggest that the current wave of global financial fragility and recession rivals that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper examines key elements that account for the crisis-prone nature of global capitalism: the political discipline of neo-liberalism, debt-driven expansion of the privatised financial markets, and the profound disarticulation of the financial and real economies. These factors suggests that the risk of a global depression is by no means hypothetical, and unless effective and collaborative efforts are made to tame the inherently unstable regime of global finance, even major world economies are faced with a prolonged period of financial turbulence and economic stagnation. The paper concludes by pondering the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in the transnational political consensus that can prevent a global repetition of the 1930s. While the increased awareness of financial instability and crisis may indeed prompt some ad hoc adjustments in national and foreign economic policies of major capitalist powers, in the long run these measures will be insufficient to prevent a major financial and economic disaster.

In 1975, private and social housing production in Chile started to become increasingly privatized, in parallel with capital switching into the secondary circuit due to severe deindustrialization of the country. Since then, housing demand has largely drawn on state housing subsidies aimed at middle- to low-income demand, but more recently, a growing financialized mortgage market has increased demand even further, enlarging the mortgage debt burden on Chilean households. Private housing producers achieve higher profits by increasing sales prices, whilst production costs are kept relatively stable by purchasing and developing the cheapest land available, both on the fringes and within the inner sectors of the main metropolitan areas, as a form of accumulation by dispossession in hitherto underexploited, non-commodified land. However, low purchase prices of land create housing unaffordability for numbers of original owner-residents who sell land to redevelopers but cannot then afford replacement accommodation given the soaring housing prices in the main metropolises. It is for this reason that some central areas become gentrified. Focusing on the case of high-rise redevelopment of inner-city areas in Santiago, Chile, this paper addresses the extent to which demand and private developers’ profits increase alongside the risks of a generalized growing level of household debt and the displacement of low-income communities from inner areas. The continuous expansion of the extremely privatized housing market of Santiago responds to the needs of capital expansion rather than to the people’s needs.

The precise relationships between neoliberalization, financialization, and rising risk are still being debated in the literature. This paper examines, and challenges, the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) developed by Hyman Minsky and his adherents. In this perspective, the level of financial risk builds over time as participants orient their behavior in relation to assessments of past levels of risk performance, leading them to overly optimistic valuation estimates and increasingly risky behavior with each subsequent cycle. However, there are problems with this approach, and many questions remain, including how participants modify their exposure to risk over time, how risk is scaled, and who benefits from changes in exposure to risk. This paper examines such questions and proposes an alternate perspective on financial instability and risk, in light of the history of risk management within Canada’s housing finance sector. The rise of financialization in Canada has been accompanied by shifts in the sectoral and scalar locus of risk within the housing sector, from the federal state, to lower levels of government, third-sector organizations, and finally, private households. In each case, the transfer of risk has occurred as participants in each stage sought to reduce their own risk exposure in light of realistic and even pessimistic (not optimistic) expectations deriving from past exposure, contradicting basic assumptions of Minsky’s FIH. This is the process that has driven the neoliberalization of housing finance in Canada, characterized by the socialization of lender risk while households increasingly take on the financial and social risks relating to shelter.

The purpose of this paper is to establish the profile of mortgage‐holding households in terms of their demographic, socioeconomic, and financial characteristics and assess the current state of knowledge concerning mortgage products in Australia.

Logit models predict owner‐occupied, investor mortgages, and mortgage understanding. Factors include financial literacy, gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, education, family structure, household income, savings, and debt. Understanding is knowledge of mortgage rates, fees and charges, and familiarity with mortgage terms.

Middle‐aged and couples with children have an increased likelihood of an owner‐occupied mortgage, while being from a non‐English speaking background, a small business owner, or a skilled tradesman increases the likelihood of an investor mortgage. Understanding is generally poorer for females, rural/regional households and the young, and better for professionals, the university‐educated, and small business owners and skilled tradesmen.

The cross‐section of households is from a period when mortgage rates were stable and housing prices strong.

No more than 40 per cent of mortgage‐holding households have an understanding of any key mortgage terms, only 35 per cent understand the main disadvantage of fixed over variable rates during falls in interest rates, and just 15 per cent understand the fees and charges on their own mortgage. There is a need for financial literacy programmes to continue and expand.

This is the first Australian study to model the demand and understanding of mortgage products using household level data.

Although credit plays a crucial role in modern society, the increased availability of credit is partly responsible for higher levels of debt burden and household over-indebtedness. However, despite the serious consequences of over-indebtedness on household welfare our understanding of the factors that determine over-indebtedness and the link between over-indebtedness and poverty is limited. The purpose of this paper is therefore to identify drivers of over-indebtedness at an individual level and its link with poverty.

The authors analysed the determinants of over-indebtedness and its links with poverty employing a binary logistic regression model using data on 51,359 individuals from 11 economies in the Southern Africa Development Community.

The results suggest that over-indebtedness is driven by, among others, lack of credit literacy, cross-borrowing and income. The results also suggest that over-indebtedness is likely to impoverish the indebted.

Policies that encourage access to financial services such as credit should be designed such that increased financial inclusion does not aggravate poverty and inequality.

The authors used a unique financial inclusion survey that reports data on financial inclusion and poverty measures to identify the determinants of over-indebtedness and its link with poverty.