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The main purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of how managerial methods can be used during the change process to direct employees' attitudes positively towards change. This study also aims to provide considerable implications for the homeland security managers suitable for the applications on the area of homeland security. Paying requisite attention to the attitudes of employees towards change and careful selection of change management methods is considered critical for determining the ultimate success.

The data used in this study were obtained by the questionnaire survey method, analyzed by using a statistics software program, and main findings of the study were evaluated. The last section of this study has a discussion and a conclusion which includes specific evaluations and recommendations regarding the homeland security organizations and their practices in Turkey. Due to the large data set available, only the main findings are presented in this paper.

Findings suggest that the methods used, such as informing the employees about what is going on regarding change, consulting them and maintaining participation of the employees to the change process, have a positive impact on the attitudes of security managers towards change. This means that if an organization complies with the advice of the change literature asserting that the employees should be informed of, consulted and participate in the change from the outset of the process, the employees would probably commit themselves to change rather than resisting it.

The topic of this study is believed to be of vital importance in the area of homeland security organizations of Turkey and other countries in the context of change management for the sake of success in change initiatives. It is hoped that this study will make contributions to the existent literature in that it combines two disciplines, namely, change management and homeland security management, in just one case study. This combination would add considerable insights into the success and/or failure of the change initiatives launched in the organizations of homeland security generally and in Turkey specifically.

Following the disasters of 9/11/01 the U.S. government has embarked on what is intended to be a comprehensive response to the hazard of further terrorist attacks on Americans at home and abroad. This paper addresses the homeland component of the response and asserts that both the general approach and the measures being deployed are neither comprehensive nor well-balanced. The broad goal of security is losing ground to the narrower objective of defense; mitigation strategies are being overshadowed by preparedness and response alternatives; expert systems are preferred over grass-roots bottom-up ones; and possibilities for reducing human vulnerability are being ignored in favor of programs that aim to reduce risks or lessen the vulnerability of built structures and infrastructures. Preferences for the use of sophisticated technologies that are intended to quarantine terrorism and minimize its consequences far outnumber efforts to engage with the messier realm of ideas and behaviors related to terrorism. Yet it is the latter that shape the public interpretation of terrorism risks, structure patterns of exposure and affect the coping capabilities of threatened communities. Without substantial changes to policy that take account of these deficiencies, Americans are likely to find themselves little better prepared to confront the challenges of future terrorist attacks on targets in U.S. territory and the nation’s ability to address other kinds of hazards may be seriously compromised.

Survey findings from Florida reveal that larger, higher risk communities perceive greater budgetary trade-offs, a view that supports in part the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s recently implemented strategy in distributing its grants. Per expectations, city managers with graduate education saw higher levels of readiness and lower threat risk than fire chiefs. Consistent with prior research, cities were reprogramming and using existing funds rather than new levies for homeland security initiatives. This finding was buttressed by results that recently enacted property tax limits and cuts in federal aid were seen as the greatest challenges to increased funding. Contrary to mainstream public administration writing, our respondents stated that restrained funding rather than intergovernmental coordination was the biggest issue they faced in meeting homeland security needs. Overall, our respondents saw a low risk of terror threat, a perception that may represent an accurate read of the operating environment or an implicit belief that higher levels of government will provide significant assistance in the event of a major terrorist attack or other conflagration.

Cyber threats present constantly evolving and unique challenges to national security professionals at all levels of government. Public and private sector entities also face a constant stream of cyberattacks through varied methods by actors with myriad motivations. These threats are not expected to diminish in the near future. As a result, homeland security and national security professionals at all levels of government must understand the unique motivations and capabilities of malicious cyber actors in order to better protect against and respond to cyberattacks. This chapter outlines the most common cyberattacks; explains the motivations behind these attacks; and describes the federal, state, and local efforts to address these threats.

This chapter examines lessons for response gleaned from 70 years of research on human and organizational behavior. These lessons for response are examined in the context of the current homeland security policy environment for national preparedness. This chapter also focuses on implementation steps for current preparedness guidance by law enforcement agencies. It joins research knowledge and policy to inform law enforcement planners in the development of local strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level response plans.

The purpose of this study is to find out whether efforts to improve the information security of government agencies and homeland information security have paid off and also different incentives (internal/external) impact s on the improvement of information security of the government agencies?

This study examines the information security status of 24 federal agencies in the USA over the period 2002 through 2007 using latent growth modeling. The information security status of these agencies was tracked with the grades revealed in the Federal Computer Security Report Cards. In addition, the number of employees (internal threat incentives) and budgets incentives of federal agencies were gathered from the agencies and other governmental websites for the same period of time.

Results indicated that high critical‐information agencies even though they have an overall low performance in information security, they are performing better than the low critical‐information agencies regarding solving external threats. Results also revealed that whereas agencies have generally paid more attention to information security over the years, their performances are more pertinent to change in budget incentives than other incentives.

The outcomes reported are confined to the data presented by the Federal Computer Security Report Cards. Another limitation is the number of employees that counts the total number of employees in the agencies whether they are related to the systems of the agencies or not. Finally, using a time‐lag analysis of budget to predict the current security score would be more straightforward, but this could not be applied in this study due to the insufficient sample size, as “the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform” no longer released the report cards after 2007.

The results should be of interest for the federal agencies that are included in this study, as well as for the organizations that are responsible for the information security of government agencies at different levels. Policy makers, IT managers, software developers and security specialists can also use the outcomes reported in this study for the better decision making that can enhance the information security in the public sector. The theoretical and methodological framework used in this study may also contribute to the current literature of homeland information security incentives and be helpful for future studies on its critical success factors.

This study examines fundamental issues that have not yet to be established. To our knowledge, this is the first study that assesses different incentives that have an effect on the Federal agencies' information security performance because of the lack of data in this domain. Also, the statistical techniques used to test the research propositions fit the objective of the study. Not only this, but the results found in this research assure the importance of one of the incentives that has been identified in the literature as a crucial element that affects the information security performance of the organizations.

In this chapter, I suggest three conceptual tools developed by William R. Freudenburg and colleagues that characterize the failure of institutions to carry out their duties – recreancy, atrophy of vigilance, and bureaucratic slippage – are of use beyond environmental sociology in the framing of the September 11, 2001 disaster. Using testimony and findings from primary materials such as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry hearings and report (2002, 2004a, 2004b) and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) alongside insider accounts, I discuss how Freudenburg’s tools have the potential to theorize institutional failures that occur in national security decision making. I also suggest these tools may be of particular interest to the U.S. intelligence community in its own investigation of various types of risk and failures.

The system of critical infrastructure in the United States is vast in size and geographic layout. These two factors along with the American system of Federalism impose great challenges in protecting these systems. Much of the physical protection of these assets is left to state and local governments making protection more difficult is that a large number of these critical infrastructures are owned by multinational corporations. It is through a complex coordinated effort spanning across all three levels of government that these systems are kept secure in the United States.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is the focal point of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a radical reformulation of policies governing government intelligence activities within US borders. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, long-standing informational norms for the production, use, and circulation of domestic intelligence records containing personal information are being replaced with far less restrictive norms, altering a status quo that had been in effect since mid-1970s. Although the NSI represents an unprecedented expansion of human resources dedicated to the collection and production of domestic intelligence, it is not well known in privacy advocacy community. This chapter considers these and other terms in the context of relevant US law and policy, including the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, Executive Order 12333, and 28 CFR Part 23. In addition to describing the federal (ISE-SAR) standard, the chapter examines the critical role of guidance in the logic of suspicious activity report (SAR) production, and the problematic role finished ISE-SARs seem to play in the matrix of federal and state-level watch lists. The program, if not properly regulated, could pose a considerable threat to personal privacy and the life chances and self-determination of all US persons. The chapter considers this threat in terms of Nissenbaum's (2010) “contextual integrity,” a theory of context-relative informational norms.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze scholarly discussions and findings regarding collaborative emergency management (CEM). Several aspects such as leadership, decision making, intergovernmental and interorganizational relations, technology applications in CEM have been investigated.

Literature review was conducted using three popular search data bases, Academic Search Premier, Academic OneFile, and Info Track OneFile using the following keywords: CEM, collaborative and emergency and management, collaborative networks, emergency networks, emergency network, interorganizational networks, Interorganizational and networks, intergovernmental and networks, and National Emergency Management Network (NEMN).

The paper emphasizes that high expectations of public and stakeholders in emergency and disaster management require effective use of resources by collaborative networks.

Emergency and disaster managers should be able to adopt their organization culture, structure and processes to the collaborative nature of emergency management.

The paper focuses on a very important subject in emergency and disaster management using NEMN as example.