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The purpose of this paper is to examine the degree of integration of emerging markets with the world market and amongst them. Further, the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) on and structural breaks in the degree of integration are explored. The paper, additionally, analyses the behaviour of the level and the rate of change of the degree of integration around the period of the GFC.

The paper relies on the R² from a single factor world and the incremental R² from a two-factor world and emerging market models as proxies for the global and emerging markets degree of integration, respectively. Relying on the Quandt test for unknown structural breakdates, the paper examines structural breaks in the degree of integration.

The degree of global integration of emerging markets exceeds their degree of integration with themselves, particularly in the recent period. Additionally, the GFC is a significant driver of the recent increase in world market integration. We observe significant structural shifts in both the degree of the world and emerging markets integration measures. The breaks in the world market integration largely coincide with the GFC, whereas that of the emerging market integration is dispersed. Also, the level of the world market degree of integration has reversed recently, although, the degree of world market integration remains above pre-crisis point.

There exist high country-specific components in emerging market returns that are not accounted for by the world and emerging market factors despite the recent increase in global integration. Thusly, portfolios that diversify across emerging markets appear to have a high diversification potential. Additionally, substantial diversification gains may be realised with the inclusion of emerging market assets in global portfolios.

The paper shows that the emerging markets respond similarly to common global, although, diversely to emerging markets events. Additionally, evidence of the impacts of the GFC on the degree of global integration of emerging markets is presented.

Office markets and particularly international financial centres over the past decade have experienced rapid financialisation, developments and indeed changes in the post-global financial crisis (GFC) landscape. Importantly, the volume and types of international capital flows have witnessed more foreign actors and vehicles entering into the investment landscape with the concentration of investment intensifying within key financial centres. This paper examines the interaction of international real estate capital flows in the London, New York and Tokyo office markets between 2007 and 2017.

Using Real Capital Analytics (RCA) data comprising over 5,700 office property transactions equating to $563bn between 2007 and 2017, the direct global capital flows into the London, New York and Tokyo office markets are assessed using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. Further, Granger causality tests are examined to analyse the short-run interaction of international real estate capital flows into these three major office markets.

By assessing the relativity of internal to external investments in these three central business district (CBD) office markets, differences in market dynamics are highlighted. The London office market is shown to be highly dependent on international flows and the USA, the foremost source of cross-border investment on the global stage. The cointegration and causality analysis indicate that cross-border real estate investment flows in these markets (and financial centres) show both long- and short-run relationships and suggest that the London office market remains more distinct and the most reliant on international capital flows with a wider geographical spread of investment activities and investor types. In the case of New York and Tokyo, these markets appear to be driven by more domestic investment activity and capital seemingly due to subtle factors pertaining to investor home bias, risk aversion and diversification strategies between the markets in the aftermath of the GFC.

Given the importance of the CBD offices in London, New York and Tokyo as an asset class for institutional investors, this paper provides some insights as to their level of connection and the interaction of the international capital flows into these three major cities.

Nations are currently facing two big movements: globalization of the market and need for increasing competitiveness. Liberalization and deregulation in international trade, finance and investment have drastically reduced global transaction costs and advanced the integration of global markets. But they have simultaneously restricted a range of domestic economic policy options. Despite so, national competitiveness has to be continuously cultivated, so that a nation can fully make use of comparative advantages in the global market. Then, strongly embedded in socio‐economic conditions, national competitiveness requires highly efficient and effective systems of production that match both domestic socio‐economic and global market conditions. Globalization of the market and developing national competitiveness are basically contradictory: globalization compels the development of mechanisms to generate allocative‐efficiency, while national competitiveness requires the development of systems that strengthen national capability and optimize X‐efficiency embedded in socio‐economic conditions. Coping with the two contradictory trends requires the open and flexible adaptation of existing systems to global market conditions, resulting in path dependent globalization. Recent financial deregulation in Japan is a good example, that shows a painful process of path dependent globalization, maintaining national competitiveness while openly and flexibly transferring socio‐economic conditions to suit to new global conditions.

This study aims to estimate the time–frequency connectedness among global financial markets. It draws a comparison between the full sample and the sample during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The study uses the connectedness framework of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) and Barunik and Krehlik (2018), both of which consider time and frequency connectedness and show that spillover is specific to not only the time domain but also the frequency (short- and long-run) domain. The analysis also includes pairwise connectedness by making use of network analysis. Daily data on the MSCI World Index, Barclays Bloomberg Global Treasury Index, Oil future, Gold future, Dow Jones World Islamic Index and Bitcoin have been used over the period from May 01, 2013 to July 31, 2020.

This study finds that cryptocurrency, bond and gold are hedges against both conventional stocks and Islamic stocks on average; however, these are not “safe havens” during an economic crisis, i.e. COVID-19. External shocks, such as COVID-19, strengthen the return connectedness among all six financial markets.

For investors, the study provides important insights that during external shocks such as COVID-19, there is a spillover effect, and investors are unable to hedge risk between conventional stocks and Islamic stocks. These so-called safe haven investment alternatives suffer from the similar negative impact of systemic financial risk. However, during an external shock such as COVID-19, cryptocurrencies, bonds and gold can be used to hedge risk against conventional stocks, Islamic stocks and oil. Moreover, the findings imply that by engaging in momentum trading, active investors can gain short-run benefits before the market processes any new information.

The study contributes to the emergent literature investigating the connectedness among financial markets during the COVID-19 pandemic. It provides evidence that the return connectedness among six global financial markets, namely, conventional stocks, Islamic stocks, bond, oil, gold and cryptocurrency, is extremely strong. From a methodological standpoint, this study finds that COVID-19 pandemic shock has a significant short-run impact on the connectedness among financial markets.

The authors examine network features such as connectivity, centrality, adjacency matrices, closeness and betweenness measures through a variety of indicators. The results of the study indicate that over time there is a tendency for markets to integrate and segment due to various factors such as pandemics, financial crises, global trade relations and international investments.

This paper employs a visualized network technique to study the dynamics of integration and comovements in global equity markets of emerging economies. Daily closing prices of stock market indices of 24 countries from January 2013 to July 2020 are used to construct a minimum spanning tree network (MSTN) and graph network (GN).

The authors identify India and China as global power hubs and clusters among the emerging economies. India and Bangladesh serve as bridging countries connecting to various other clusters. Bosnia serves as a center in the European region owing to Bosnia's trade relations with neighboring countries. Although Brazil has witnessed the worst recession in the early years of the decade, Brazil has risen to be a central cluster among the Latin American countries. Finally, the authors find that African countries tend to form links with the rest of the world rather than with economies within the Africa continent.

This is the pioneering study that uses network models such as MSTN and GN supplemented with measures of centrality and connectivity to study financial market integration in emerging countries. Against this backdrop, this paper aims to work on a network visualization strategy to examine global stock market integration. The authors also try to use graphs and the spanning trees instead of the correlation models to understand the association between the markets, avoiding the downsides of the existing models. The authors' approach tries to visualize the network integration to examine the interconnectedness in the global stock market.

This chapter investigates the impact of the euro crisis on Asia’s short-term economic outlook. This chapter tries to answer this question by examining both the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission. More specifically, it looks at the effect of euro crisis on Asian exports and growth, contagion from EU financial markets to Asian financial markets, and influence of EU bank lending on credit growth in Asia. The chapter also touches upon Asia’s policy space to assess how well the region is positioned to weather another major external shock. This chapter finds that the impact of euro crisis on developing Asia points to a sizable but manageable short-term impact. Furthermore, our analysis points to a significant effect on the region’s financial systems, especially its banking sector. This chapter informs policymakers of the impact of the euro crisis and advice to continue to keep a close eye on eurozone developments and their ramifications for their economies.

Financial globalization and global imbalances are two facets of the same phenomenon, which has resulted in the worst global economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the complex interaction of several mutually reinforcing trends and factors – the global monetary easing of 2001‐2004, financial innovation, regulatory failure, in particular in the USA and the UK, US fiscal indiscipline and Chinese currency manipulation – that contributed to the global financial crisis. The key to a return to global financial buoyancy will be the coordinated resolution of the global imbalances over the medium term, as well as the establishment of a strong global financial regulatory framework focusing on both macro‐ and micro‐financial risks.

In the paper, the author analyzes the role of the interaction of financial innovation, regulatory and global imbalances in the creation of the real estate bubble, shadow banking and the eventual collpase of what the author dubbed the Banking 2.0 structure (1980s).

The main findings are that these factors contributed to a flattening of the yield curve in 2004‐2006 despite the tightening of monetary policy and growing US fiscal deficits. Moreover, while the US dollar is on a long‐term weakening trend, the lack of alternatives means that it will maintain its role as a reserve currency.

This paper focuses on the role of the global imbalances in triggering the financial crisis and shaping the role of the dollar in the post‐crisis world.