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This study aims to investigate the effects and implications of overconfidence in a competitive game involving multiple newsvendors. This study explores how overconfidence influences system coordination, optimal stocking strategies and competition among newsvendors in the context of the well-known newsvendor stocking problem.

The study applies robust optimization theory and the absolute regret minimization criterion to analyze the competitive game of overconfident newsvendors. This study considers the asymmetric information held by newsvendors regarding market demand and obtains a closed-form solution for the competing game. The effects of overconfidence on system coordination and optimal stocking strategies are examined.

The results of the study indicate that overconfidence can act as a positive force in reducing the effects of overstocking caused by competition and asymmetric information among newsvendors. The analysis reveals that there exists an optimal level of overconfidence that coordinates the ordering system of multiple overconfident newsvendors, leading to first-best outcomes under certain conditions. Additionally, numerical examples confirm the obtained results. Furthermore, considering newsvendors' expected profit, the study finds that a higher degree of overconfidence does not necessarily result in lower actual expected profit.

Despite the significant contributions of this study to theoretical and managerial insights, this study does have certain limitations. First, in the establishment of the belief demand function, the substitution ratio, which quantifies the transfer, is assumed to be an exogenous variable. However, in reality, this is often influenced by factors such as the price of goods and the distance between stores. Therefore, one direction worth studying in the future is to explore the uncertainty associated with the demand substitution ratio and integrate that as an endogenous variable into the optimization model. Second, this study does not address the type of product and solely focuses on quantitatively analyzing the effect of salvage value on the optimal stocking strategy. Future studies can explore the effect of degree of perishability and selling period of the product on the stocking. Third, the focus of uncertainty in this study revolves around market demand, and the implications of this uncertainty are significant. A recent study (Rahbari et al., 2023) addressed an innovative robust optimization problem related to canned foods during pandemic crises. The recent study's findings highlighted the effectiveness of expanding canned food exports to neighboring countries with economic justification as the best strategy for companies amidst the disruptions caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Incorporating the issue of disruptions into the authors' research would be interesting and challenging.

From a managerial perspective, the authors' study provides a research paradigm for game-theoretic inventory problems in scenarios where the market demand distribution is unknown. While most inventory problems are analyzed and solved based on expectation-based optimization criteria, which rely on an accurate distribution of market demand, obtaining this information in practice can often be challenging or expensive for decision-makers. Consequently, a discrepancy arises between real-world observations and theoretical identifications. This study aimed to complement previous research and address the inconsistency between observations and theoretical identification.

The authors' research contributes to the existing understanding of overconfidence and assists individuals in making appropriate stocking strategies based on the individuals' level of overconfidence. Diverging significantly from the traditional view of overconfidence as a negative bias, the authors' results show the view's potential positive impact within a competitive environment, resulting in greater actual expected profits for newsvendors.

This study contributes to the existing literature by examining the effects of overconfidence in a competitive game of newsvendors. This study extends the analysis of the well-known newsvendor stocking problem by incorporating overconfidence and considering the implications for system coordination and competition. The application of robust optimization theory and the absolute regret minimization criterion provides a novel approach to studying overconfidence in this context.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

We explore the driving forces behind the channel choices of the manufacturer and the platform by considering asymmetric selling cost and demand information.

This paper develops game-theoretical models to study different channel strategies for an E-commerce supply chain, in which a manufacturer distributes products through a platform that may operate in either the marketplace channel or the reseller channel.

Three primary models are built and analyzed. The comparison results show that the platform would share demand information in the reseller channel only if the service cost performance is relatively high. Besides, with an increasing selling cost, the equilibrium channel might shift from the marketplace to the reseller. With increasing information accuracy, the manufacturer tends to select the marketplace channel, while the platform tends to select the reseller channel if the service cost performance is low and tends to select the marketplace channel otherwise.

All these results have been numerically verified in the experiments. At last, we also resort to numerical study and find that as the service cost performance increases, the equilibrium channel may shift from the reseller channel to the marketplace channel. These results provide managerial guidance to online platforms and manufacturers regarding strategic decisions on channel management.

Although prior research has paid extensive attention to the driving forces behind the online channel choice between marketplace and reseller, there is at present few study considering the case where a manufacturer selling through an online platform faces a demand information disadvantage in the reseller channel and sales inefficiency in the marketplace channel. To fill this research gap, our work illustrates the interaction between demand information asymmetry and selling cost asymmetry to identify the equilibrium channel strategy and provides useful managerial guidelines for both online platforms and manufacturers.

This paper studies the optimal decision-making and coordination problem of a dual-channel fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain. The purpose is to analyze the impact of information sharing on optimal decisions and propose a coordination mechanism to encourage supply chain members to share information.

The two-echelon dual-channel FAP supply chain includes a manufacturer and a retailer. By using the Stackelberg game theory and the backward induction method, the optimal decisions are obtained under information symmetry and asymmetry and the coordination contract is designed.

The results show that supply chain members should comprehensively evaluate the specific situation of product attributes, coefficient of freshness-keeping cost and network operating costs to make decisions. Asymmetric information can exacerbate the deviation of optimal decisions among supply chain members and information sharing is always beneficial to manufacturers but not to retailers. The improved revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism.

The conclusions can provide theoretical guidance for supply chain managers to deal with information asymmetry and improve the competitiveness of the supply chain.

This paper combines the three characteristics that are most closely related to the reality of supply chains, including horizontal and vertical competition of different channels, the perishable characteristics of FAPs and the uncertainty generated by asymmetric demand information.

This paper aims to study the role of absorptive capacities in coopetitive alliances that involve leakages of sensitive private knowledge regarding firms’ production processes.

This paper uses a game theoretic approach to model a differentiated product market in which two firms asymmetrically informed about the economic value of a business opportunity must cooperate to exploit this opportunity. Under coopetition, firms gain access to their partners’ core knowledge as the result of inevitable leakages of information. Firms differ in their absorptive capacities, which affects their abilities to leverage this new knowledge outside the collaborative activity.

Firms with superior absorptive capacities are more likely to devise alliances whose purpose is to gain access to their partners’ core knowledge. This opportunistic behaviour does not disappear even if firms compensate their partners for the damages caused by this deceptive business practice. This paper also finds that a highly specialised product safeguards firms with limited absorptive capacities against these opportunistic behaviours.

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the role that absorptive capacities and product specialisation play in influencing the emergence of opportunistic behaviours in coopetitive alliances. The theoretical analysis underscores the extent to which the risk of opportunism associated with the exploitation of a partner’s specific core knowledge outside the scope of the cooperative activity affects not only the nature and intensity of market competition but also the incentives to pursue coopetitive alliances.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

Trust is the glue that holds cooperative relationships together and often exists in an asymmetric manner. The purpose of this study is to explore how to mitigate the issue of losses or increased transaction costs caused by opportunistic behavior in a soft environment where trust asymmetry is quite common and difficult to avoid.

This study focuses on examining asymmetric trust between the government and the private sector in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Drawing upon both project realities and relevant literature, the primary conditional variables influencing asymmetric trust are identified. These variables encompass power perception asymmetry, information asymmetry, interaction behavior, risk perception differences and government-side control. Subsequently, through the use of a survey questionnaire, binary-matched data from both the government and the private sector are collected. The study employs fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to conduct a configurational analysis, aiming to investigate the causal pathways that trigger asymmetric trust.

No single conditional variable is a necessary condition for the emergence of trust asymmetry. The pathways leading to a high degree of trust asymmetry can be categorized into two types: those dominated by power perception and those involving a combination of multiple factors. Differences in power perception play a crucial role in the occurrence of high trust asymmetry, yet the influence of other conditional variables in triggering trust asymmetry should not be overlooked.

The findings can contribute to advancing the study of trust relationships in the field of Chinese PPP projects. Furthermore, they hold practical value in facilitating the enhancement of trust relationships between the government and the private sector.

The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The manufacturer must know how to handle itself in this business. The study aims to examine the B2B channel decision-making with different product qualities in a non-cooperative supply chain.

The authors develop a B2B Manufacturer-Stackelberg game as an analytical framework, combining asymmetric preference of purchase channels choice by the consumers, a continuous quality setting of the manufacturer and differential channel structure to study the manufacturer’s product strategy and channel optimisation. By horizontal comparisons across four channel structures, product variety can be classified into the differential quality-level zone through exogenous quality intervention, and the preference of manufacturers in each quality-level zone within the structures can be ranked.

Theoretically and practically, the hybrid-channel structure should be completely neglected when the direct channel dominates the retail channel. In contrast, dual-channel structures dominate single channels irrespective of the channel power, and channel preferences between high-quality and low-quality zones are stable, whereas the preference in medium-quality zone is unstable. In addition, the supply chain system cannot achieve global Pareto improvement without any additional coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer.

The extended results by numerical examples suggest that the bigger the area of the medium-quality zone, the more significant the product variety of the manufacturer.

Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

As the quality of the environment decreases, enterprises and consumers' awareness of environmental protection is constantly improving. More and more enterprises begin to increase their investment in carbon emission reduction and attract environmentally friendly consumers to buy low-carbon products through advertising. The purpose of this paper is to utilize a realistic differential game model to provide dynamic carbon emission reduction strategies, advertising strategies and cooperation methods for complex supply chain members from a long-term perspective.

This paper uses the extend Vidale-Wolfe model (V-W model) to discuss the dynamic joint emission reduction strategy in the supply chain.

(1) When consumers' awareness of environmental protection increases, on the whole, carbon emission reduction and profit of products show an upward trend. (2) From a long-term perspective, the manufacturer's advertising subsidy to one of the retailers is the best choice. If the strength of the two retailers is unbalanced, the manufacturer will choose to cooperate with the dominant retailer. (3) Advertising, as a marketing means for retailers to promote low-carbon products, can alleviate the adverse effects of prisoner's dilemma in a semi-cooperative state, but it cannot achieve the Pareto optimization result.

This paper focuses on the analysis of the situation that when the manufacturer is the leader and thinks that consumers are active advocates of low-carbon products.

The results of this paper can provide theoretical basis for the joint emission strategy of supply chain members in low-carbon environment.