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On Inauguration Day 2017, Milo Yiannopoulos gave a talk sponsored by the University of Washington College Republicans entitled “Cyberbullying Isn’t Real.” This chapter is based on participant-observation conducted in the crowd outside the venue that night and analyzes the violence that occurs when the blurring of the boundaries between “free” and “hate” speech is enacted on the ground. This ethnographic examination rethinks relationships between law, bodies, and infrastructure as it considers debates over free speech on college campuses from the perspectives of legal and public policy, as well as those who supported and protested Yiannopoulos’s right to speak at the University of Washington. First, this analysis uses ethnographic research to critique the absolutist free speech argument presented by the legal scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman. Second, this essay uses the theoretical work of Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed to make claims concerning relationships between speech, vulnerability, and violence. In so doing, this chapter argues that debates over free speech rights on college campuses need to be situated by processes of neoliberalization in higher education and reconsidered in light of the ways in which an absolutist position disproportionately protects certain people at the expense of certain others.

Purpose – This chapter explores the topic of free speech protections and social media use in academia through an examination of the current legal landscape as it applies to various stakeholders on university campuses in the United States. The authors focus this examination primarily on public universities. Methodology/Approach – Legal research methods were utilized, including an analysis of relevant United States federal and state laws, case law, and secondary sources such as law reviews. Non-legal sources, such as academic journals, were also reviewed, with particular emphasis on topics such as university policies, tenure protections, academic freedom, as well as current events. Findings – The law regarding personal social media communications in a university setting is a series of complex and interconnected legal questions. Courts are still flushing out how free speech protections, personal social media use, and other relevant legal protections (e.g., employment law) may interface in a university-related case. Outcomes of cases are highly fact driven, and legal precedent is still being established. Originality/Value – This chapter offers a comprehensive examination of the topic of free speech and social media use in United States academia by (1) examining legal protections as applied to various stakeholders on a college campus and (2) analyzing the current legal landscape of social media cases involving universities.

In this article, I trace the slow evolution of the contemporary idea of “academic freedom” through two court cases of the early twentieth century. Unfortunately for academics, this history does not end with a ringing endorsement of the right of academics to speak freely without being afraid of losing their teaching jobs. Rather, the courts have tended to agree that while faculty do have freedom of speech under the first amendment, they do not necessarily have the right to keep their jobs no matter what they say. This chapter illustrates the court’s early validation of punishing the “free speech” of employees if it promotes a “bad tendency” in Patterson v. Colorado in 1907 and concludes with Oliver Wendell Holmes’ ruling in 1919 that introduces the concept of the “marketplace of ideas” to evaluate speech even though the defendants were convicted of espionage as they exercised their “freedom of speech.” For the educator, freedom of speech is essential in having the academic freedom to pursue their discipline.

Purpose – This chapter has three general purposes: to trace Canada’s hate speech laws from their policy inception to their current state; to identify the importance that media and mass communication have played in the creation and development of Canada’s hate speech laws; and to demonstrate the critical relationship that media has had to significant legal cases on hate speech. Methodology/Approach – This chapter historically maps the policy development of and legal challenges to Canada’s hate speech laws. It takes directed notice of the relationship of media and mass communication to the development and implementation of those laws. It engages with libertarian and egalitarian arguments on free speech throughout the chapter testing these ideas through an examination of the legal cases cited. Findings – Canadian legislators and courts have long grappled with the balancing of rights with respect to the issue of “hate speech.” Advances in mass communication technology have added intricate challenges to that legal balancing. Awareness of media’s allure to hatemongers and racial extremists and of media’s protean characteristics make regulation of its hateful content a continuous legal challenge. Canada’s greatest challenge yet to the regulation of hate speech will be its adaptive response to the growing phenomenon of online hate. Originality/Value – This chapter highlights the little recognized prescient statements made by the Cohen Committee about the allure of media and the dangers of its technological advancements in Canadian free speech debates. Providing a comprehensive survey of Canada’s “hate speech” laws, it recognizes the importance that advancements in mass communication have played in the creation and development of Canada’s “hate speech” laws.

This chapter is about online hate speech propagated via platforms operated by social media companies (SMCs). It examines the options open to states in forcing SMCs to take responsibility for the hateful content that appears on their sites. It examines the technological and legal context for imposing legal obligations on SMCs, and analyses initiatives in Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union and elsewhere. It argues that while SMCs can play a role in controlling online hate speech, there are limitations to what they can achieve.

Purpose – This chapter demonstrates the power that Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft (or the “GAFAM”) exercise over platforms within society, highlights the alt-right’s use of GAFAM sites and services as a platform for hate, and examines GAFAM’s establishment and use of hate content moderation apparatuses to de-platform alt-right users and delete hate content. Approach – Drawing upon a political economy of communications approach, this chapter demonstrates GAFAM’s power in society. It also undertakes a reading of GAFAM “terms of service agreements” and “community guidelines” documents to identify GAFAM hate content moderation apparatuses. Findings – GAFAM are among the most powerful platforms in the world, and their content moderation apparatuses are empowered by the US government’s cyber-libertarian approach to Internet law and regulation. GAFAM are defining hate speech, deciding what’s to be done about it, and censoring it. Value – This chapter probes GAFAM’s hate content moderation apparatuses for Internet platforms, and shows how GAFAM enable and constrain the alt-right’s hate speech on their platforms. It also reflexively assesses the politics of empowering GAFAM to de-platform the alt-right.

This chapter explores the “Constitutional Revolution” of the 1930s, as it played out beyond the walls of the U.S. Supreme Court. It argues that a radically revised historical memory of the Constitution accompanied the ascent New Deal liberalism. Prior core values associated with the Constitution's history, such as federalism and the sanctity of private property, were dramatically downgraded, while the civil liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights dramatically rose. By so redefining their historical memory of the Constitution, Americans could enjoy the active government that most desired while still celebrating the constitutional traditions of individual freedom and limited government.

Immigration enforcement along the Southwest border between United States and Mexico has long channeled migrants into perilous desert corridors, where many thousands have died, out of general public view. In response to this humanitarian crisis, activists from organizations such as No More Deaths (NMD) trek deep into the treacherous desert, hoping to save lives, honor the remains of those who did not survive, and influence public opinion about border enforcement policies. NMD’s activism is not merely utilitarian but also deeply expressive; ultimately, they hope to convey the message that all lives – including those of unauthorized migrants – are worth saving. The Trump Administration has escalated repressive tactics intended to silence these forms of border-policy dissent. Some federal land managers now blacklist NMD, preemptively denying requests for access permits. Meanwhile, the US Attorney’s office has aggressively prosecuted members for humanitarian activities. This chapter explains the expressive components of humanitarian activism in this context and of the government’s attempt to suppress it, suggesting the need for constitutional scrutiny and legal change.

What does it mean in practice to claim a right? Does claiming a right add to the persuasive power of political demands? Does it clothe political demands with a moral urgency, setting such claims apart from the ordinary class of interests? In examining these questions, I suggest that in practice rights’ claims add little to political discourse. This is because Americans equate their policy preferences with rights. I find scant evidence for the belief that Americans have sufficient knowledge of rights to make them meaningful or that pronouncements of rights have persuasive power or imbue issues with heightened moral legitimacy.