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With the increasing prevalence of awards for reporting fraudulent activity, it is important to learn if there are unintended consequences associated with the language offering such awards. Aside from issues regarding submitting unsubstantiated claims of fraud to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Section 922 of the Dodd–Frank Act may inadvertently encourage would-be whistleblowers to delay reporting fraud. Potential whistleblowers may choose to delay reporting due to the consideration of alternatives to external reporting, in a misguided attempt to increase the size of an award, or due to their ethical stance on the issues. Using a three-stage mixed methods (experiment, open-ended interviews, and experiment) approach, this study provides evidence that increased knowledge of statutes involving external whistleblowing may result in reporting delays. The data suggest that despite statements from the SEC forbidding this, managers may choose to delay reporting when under the threshold necessary to receive an award. In such a manner, managers may be allowing the fraud to grow to a necessary perceived level over time. As might be expected, the accountants in this study were more cautious, checking to see if internal reporting worked first. Of particular note, 16 individuals indicated that they would never report, with the motivation apparently driven by fear of job loss and/or retaliation. Lastly, the intention to delay or speed up reporting may be very different based on the perception of ethics involved in the decision.

Part V analyzes the details of how to assess materiality. It first tackles qualitative versus quantitative criteria and the role of professional judgment. It then analyzes the selection of quantitative threshold, to expand to the choice of benchmarks. It contrasts the whole financial statements with subaggregates, line items, and components.

Specific sections contrast IASB, FASB, SEC, and other guidance on materiality applied to comparative information, interim reporting, and segment reporting.

The section on estimates mingles complex guidance coming from accounting, auditing, and internal control over financial reporting to explain how the management can improve its assessment of materiality concerning estimates.

After explaining the techniques to move from individual to cumulative misstatements, the part tackles verification ex post, and finally summarizes the intricacies of whether immaterial misstatements are permissible and their consequences.

The economic doctrine of market efficiency plays an essential role in securities fraud litigation. In lawsuits alleging violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs typically must argue that the market for the relevant security is efficient, and therefore that the “fraud on the market” doctrine applies. However, the term “market efficiency” is often applied imprecisely. In this chapter, we discuss properties of efficient markets that have been proposed in academic research, legal scholarship, and case law. We explore what must be assumed about capital markets for each of these properties to hold. We then ask how, in practice, each property could be rebutted.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

This exercise provides comprehensive coverage of audit materiality, assessing inherent risk, and allocating tolerable misstatement appropriate for an undergraduate auditing course. The Delphi method could be an appropriate tool in any accounting setting where the learning goals involve judgment, consensus, or learning through group interaction.

This chapter describes a classroom exercise that required students to establish planning materiality, assess inherent risk associated with balance sheet accounts, and allocate tolerable misstatement using a modified application of the Delphi method. Additionally, the exercise calls attention to group processing skills and the role played by professional judgment in planning an audit. We assigned students to five-person audit teams and through a series of Delphi rounds asked them to establish planning materiality and assess the inherent risk associated with each balance sheet account for a fictitious company. Students prepared a matrix, both individually and as a team, that compared each statement account to every other account to determine which account in each pairing they viewed as having higher inherent risk. As a final step, they allocated tolerable misstatement mathematically for each account based on pairing results.

The result was a consensus of opinion and an early attempt at forming professional judgment. The students’ responses to a debriefing questionnaire and the results of a pre-/post-test suggest that the learning objectives of the exercise were met.

The specific learning objectives of the exercise were to help students understand the concepts of tolerable misstatement and planning materiality, the elements of inherent risk, the Delphi method for reaching group consensus, the need to work as a team, and the importance professional judgment plays in the audit process. The result was a consensus of opinion and an early attempt at forming professional judgment. The students’ responses to a debriefing questionnaire and the results of a pre-/post-test suggest that the learning objectives of the exercise were met.

The current study examines the effect of fraud training on auditors' ability to identify fraud risk factors. This is important because most auditors have little or no direct experience with fraud; thus, research that investigates the potential effect of indirect experience through training is vitally important to fraud detection and audit quality. A total of 369 experienced auditors completed a complex audit simulation task that involved 15 seeded fraud risk red flags. A total of 143 auditors participated in a 30-minute training session focused specifically on fraud risk, while the remaining 226 auditors learned about general internal control risk during this time block. The results indicate that auditors with fraud training identified significantly more red flags and obtained greater knowledge about fraud risk than auditors who did not receive the training. Considering that the fraud training consumed only 30 minutes out of a 64-hour training session, the findings suggest that even modest exposure to fraud training is quite effective.

In this chapter, we study the evolution of the auditor’s report from its emergence more than 150 years ago to the present. During this period, the standard auditor’s report has evolved from a rudimentary form to its current and more sophisticated structure with a clearly defined title, addressed to specific entities, and systematically divided into sections that are meant to highlight certain aspects of the audit examination. We describe the major events that have affected the financial reporting environment in the United States and, in turn, how these events have transformed the auditor’s report over the last century. As will be demonstrated in the chapter, the progression of the presentation of the auditor’s report, from being a certification to the standard report of the present day, has been guided primarily by the kind of information that investors and creditors wanted to know in relation to their investments in public companies. However, the desire for that information was often influenced by periodic incidents of corporate scandals. These scandals made it imperative that a monitoring mechanism was established to maintain the confidence of investors and creditors in the reporting of financial information about companies and the overall functioning of the capital markets.

The American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) and the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) encourage experiential learning as a component of accounting and business curriculum. This chapter introduces a business partnership framework for experiential learning in accounting information systems, internal control, and auditing courses. Accounting students establish a partnership with a business client at the beginning of their accounting information systems and internal control study and continue the learning approach through the first auditing course. The framework brings real-world experience to accounting information systems, internal control, and auditing concepts. Accounting students learn to solve unstructured problems in complex realistic business settings, integrating technical and experienced-based knowledge. The project provides a structure for strengthening students’ personal competencies including developing successful team behavior and professional skills. The author has used the business-partnership model effectively for 15 years.