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Purpose – This study examines both the short- and long-term share price reaction to announcements of financial restatements cited in the U.S. General Accounting Office (2006) database.

Methodology – It uses the augmented four-factor Fama-French model for assessing share price reaction.

Findings – The study finds that the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a sample of 553 restatements (by 437 companies) is significantly negative (−1.58) for the three-day window surrounding the day of announcement. The average CAR for the one-year period prior to the announcement (−9.6%) and for each of the four years after the announcement is negative as well, with the average CAR for the four years adding up to −22%. The study also documents differences in CARs based on the entity prompting the restatement (company, auditor, and Securities and Exchange Commission), the reason behind the restatement (revenue, cost, reclassification of item, etc.), and for one-time versus repeat offenders.

Social implications – Taken together, the findings indicate that financial restatements impose significant short-term as well as long-term costs on shareholders.

Originality/Value – The evidence about long-term share price reaction to financial restatements is missing in prior research. The relationship between long-term and short-term share price reaction to financial restatements fails to suggest systematic over/underreaction by the market.

Prior research finds evidence that audit quality is positively associated with the joint purchase of tax nonaudit services (NAS) and concludes that jointly provided tax services result in audit-related knowledge spillovers that lead to improved audit quality. We extend this line of research. We examine the relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements and determine whether this relation differs when the auditor is a small or large accounting firm. We also examine whether the Securities Exchange Commission’s restrictions on certain tax consulting practices (SEC, 2006) altered this relation. Specifically, we measure whether the probability of financial statement restatements varies with (1) variation in accounting firm size (measured as PCAOB annually inspected firms versus PCAOB triennially inspected firms), and (2) the joint provision of audit and tax services. We find a negative relation between auditor-provided tax services and restatements which is consistent with prior research. We also find that this relation is significantly more negative when the auditor is a small accounting firm. Finally, we find that the lower probability of a restatement associated with the joint provision of audit and tax services persists regardless of auditor size after the SEC-imposed restrictions on certain tax consulting services in 2006. Our study provides evidence that accounting firms, and particularly small accounting firms, benefit from knowledge spillovers when jointly providing audit and tax services and these benefits lead to improved audit quality. Prior research concludes that large auditors provide higher audit quality and that the provision of tax services improves audit quality. Our results provide evidence that audit quality improvements are greater for small auditors and their clients. This improvement narrows that audit quality gap between large and small auditors. We do not find evidence that the SEC’s restrictions on certain tax consulting services altered the relation between audit quality and tax services.

The research question we address in this paper is whether the effort invested by the internal auditor in the firm is associated with better firm performance. Our measure of effort is the number of audit hours invested in the firm, and firm performance is measured by the likelihood of a restatement of the firm's financial results. This study is the first to analyze this question, an endeavor made possible by a difference in disclosure requirements regarding internal audit effort between the US and Israel. Our analysis is conducted using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during the period 2010–2014. We expect that auditor effort is negatively associated with the likelihood of restatements of the firm's financial results. Indeed, our findings support this hypothesis. We also consider the association between restatements and two audit committee characteristics – the degree of independence and the degree of expertise of its members. However, these associations are not upheld by the data.

This study examines whether knowledge about a loan applicant's auditor affects commercial loan decisions. The research questions addressed are: (1) whether a loan officer's familiarity with an applicant's audit firm affects lending decisions, and (2) whether an applicant is negatively impacted by having an audit firm with a history of associations with past borrowers who have defaulted or who have experienced financial statement restatements or regulatory enforcement actions. Participating loan officers were assigned to one of four treatment groups formed by manipulating the above two factors. They made risk assessments of the loan applicant as well as providing probabilities of granting credit. Results indicate that familiarity with a borrower's audit firm reduced assessments of risk associated with lending, but this did not appear to translate into increasing the likelihood that lenders would approve the line of credit. The study also finds an adverse impact on risk assessments and lending decisions when a borrower's audit firm has a negative history of associations with past borrowers.

It has been said that standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) are more congruent with a principles-based approach to standards setting than those of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Revelations concerning accounting manipulations at Enron Corp., and the ensuing scandal resulting from these revelations, have prompted the FASB to reassess its approach to accounting standards setting with the possible intent of moving FASB standards-setting processes closer to a principles-based approach. One area that IASB standards tend to emphasize more than FASB standards is the concept of substance over form. The bankruptcy of Enron Corp. provides a vivid illustration of how companies may use the legal form of transactions to obscure their economic substance. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of substance over form by investigating Enron’s use of misleading accounting practices in the following areas: (1) off-balance sheet financing; (2) revenue recognition; and (3) financial statements disclosures. In these three areas of accounting concern, the chapter sets forth the relevant US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) requirements, along with the ways in which Enron manipulated GAAP while concealing the economic substance underlying the transactions. It is the argument of this chapter that had the concept of substance over form been properly applied at Enron, investors and creditors would have been provided with a more realistic view of the company’s financial position and its results of operations, perhaps avoiding what became the one of the largest corporate bankruptcies in US history. The conclusion is that the FASB should focus on the concept of substance over form as it contemplates moving toward a principles-based approach to accounting standards setting.

The purpose of this study is to review the capital budgeting literature over the past decade.

Specifically, over the years 2004–2013, we review works appearing in the major academic journals in accounting, finance, and management. Further, we review the specialized academic journals in management accounting. We examine the frequency of articles by journal and year published, the type of research method applied, and the topic area studied. We then review the research findings by topic area.

We find 110 articles appearing in the selected journals. While the articles increase in frequency, the research methods applied are predominantly analytical and archival in nature with relatively few experiments, case studies, or surveys. Some progress is observed for capital budgeting techniques and new methods for structuring uncertainty. The studies find that the size of capital budgets is about right for companies with high financial reporting quality, for liquid companies, during periods of normal cash flow, when the budget is financed by equity, for companies when they first go public or first go private. Tax rates and financial reporting methods for depreciation and tax expenses distort capital budgets. Organization structure and performance measurement can distort capital budgeting. Individual differences, especially optimism and honesty, can influence capital budgeting decisions.

This review is limited to the major journals in accounting, finance, and management; and the specialized journals in management accounting. There is much research to be done on capital budgeting, especially case studies of actual practice and experiments related to individual and group decision processes.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

The objective of this research study is to investigate the impact of auditor dismissals and resignations on commercial lending decisions. The study also examines whether a reason given for a dismissal or resignation affects commercial lending decisions. Eighty-five commercial loan officers were given a scenario involving a hypothetical company loan applicant and were first asked to assess the level of risk associated with granting a line of credit. Next, they were asked to assess the probability that they would grant the line of credit. Five different questionnaire versions were created by varying information about an auditor change and the reason for the change. The study finds that risk assessments of and the probability of granting credit to the applicant company do not significantly differ due to knowledge about auditor changes. In addition, participants did not view auditor resignations differently than auditor dismissals. Finally, disclosure of a disagreement as a reason for an auditor change did not have an impact on lending decisions.

This study examines the relation between internal control material weakness (ICMW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and real earnings management. Our measures of real earnings management are abnormal cash flow from operations (ABCFOs), abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISEXP), and abnormal production cost (ABPROD). We use a sample of 1,824 manufacturing firms over the period 2004–2011 to run regressions of ABCFO, ABDISEXP, and ABPROD on ICMW and other independent variables. We find that ICMW is negatively associated with ABCFOs. Another result that emerges from this study is a positive relation between ICMW and ABPROD. Our results imply that manufacturing firms with materially weak internal controls predominantly use overproduction and excessive price discounts to manage operational activities to achieve earnings targets. As SOX Section 404 is designed to reduce the instances of firms having ICMW, our finding that ICMW firms engage in real earnings management suggests that the use of real earnings management could be reduced as SOX Section 404 succeeds in reducing ICMW.