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1 – 10 of over 48000Haidong Zhao, Sophia T. Anong and Lini Zhang
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of financial incentives on consumers’ intention to adopt near field communication (NFC) mobile payment.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of financial incentives on consumers’ intention to adopt near field communication (NFC) mobile payment.
Design/methodology/approach
An online experiment was conducted crossing two levels of incentive types (cash back and discount), two levels of incentive amounts (5 and 10 percent), and two levels of incentive promotion periods (one and three months). A total of eight treatment conditions plus one control group comprised the 2×2×2 factorial design. A sample of 463 subjects with no prior experience with NFC mobile payment was recruited using a Qualtrics panel.
Findings
This study found that: the availability of financial incentives had a positive effect on intention to adopt NFC mobile payment; financial incentives indirectly affected intention through perceived risk; and while different types, amounts or promotion periods did not seem to matter for those in the low perceived risk group, the main effect of promotion period and the interaction effect between amount and promotion period were significant for those in the high perceived risk group.
Research limitations/implications
The study sample was limited from 18 to 35 age group, which could have affected the varied effect of the different attributes of incentives that were examined.
Originality/value
This study is the first to give some empirical evidence about the impact of financial incentives on NFC mobile payment adoption. The results provide insight to providers as well as retailers offering the incentive payment option.
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Noel Murray, Ajay K. Manrai and Lalita Ajay Manrai
This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
Design/methodology/approach
The study’s analysis has identified common structural flaws throughout the securitization food chain. These structural flaws include inappropriate incentives, the absence of punishment, moral hazard and conflicts of interest. This research sees the full impact of these structural flaws when considering their co-occurrence throughout the financial system. The authors address systemic defects in the securitization food chain and examine the inter-relationships among homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. The authors also address the role of exogenous factors, including the SEC, AIG, the credit rating agencies, Congress, business academia and the business media.
Findings
The study argues that the lack of criminal prosecutions of key financial executives has been a key factor in creating moral hazard. Eight years after the Great Recession ended in the USA, the financial services industry continues to suffer from a crisis of trust with society.
Practical implications
An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that the federal government does a poor job of regulating the financial services industry (Puzzanghera, 2014). A study argues that the current corporate lobbying framework undermines societal expectations of political equality and consent (Alzola, 2013). The authors believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point to restructure regulatory agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to special interests. Finally, the widespread perception is that the financial services sector, in particular, is ethically challenged (Ferguson, 2012); perhaps there would be some benefit from the implementation of ethical climate monitoring in firms that have been subject to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations (Arnaud, 2010).
Originality/value
The authors believe the paper makes a truly original contribution. They provide new insights via their analysis of the role of financial incentives, moral hazard and conflicts of interests leading up to the 2008 financial crisis.
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Enhancing the innovative behaviour of knowledge workers is a main task in knowledge management. The pay-for-performance policy is one of the management practices for innovative…
Abstract
Purpose
Enhancing the innovative behaviour of knowledge workers is a main task in knowledge management. The pay-for-performance policy is one of the management practices for innovative behaviour enhancement and has been gaining popularity in the knowledge-intensive context. However, it is still uncertain whether such practice really enhances the innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. To address this issue, this paper aims to propose and verify a conceptual framework incorporating kernel notions of social exchange, psychological empowerment and work engagement rooted in the social cognition paradigm.
Design/methodology/approach
The current study conducts a survey on 608 knowledge workers and their supervisors, validating the model structure and causal path pattern of the proposed framework. The causality is delineated from social exchange attributes of financial incentive, psychological empowerment and work engagement to innovative behaviour of knowledge workers.
Findings
Perceived organisational support and perceived pay equity are primary antecedents of symbolic incentive meaning reflected in the financial incentive of the pay-for-performance policy. Symbolic incentive meaning comprising dimensions of relative position, control and personal importance relates positively to innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. Psychological empowerment and work engagement are partial mediators of the positive relationship.
Originality/value
The current study explicates why and how social exchange attributes of the financial incentive provided by the pay-for-performance policy may enhance innovative behaviour of knowledge workers. Implications are supplied to knowledge management scholars and practitioners to optimise the pay-for-performance policy for innovative behaviour enhancement.
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Robert J. Dijkstra and Michael G. Faure
The purpose of this paper is to understand the incentive effects of existing compensation mechanisms in case of the bankruptcy of a financial institution.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to understand the incentive effects of existing compensation mechanisms in case of the bankruptcy of a financial institution.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper uses insights of law and economics to predict the effects of compensation mechanisms on the incentives of depositors, financial institutions, financial regulators and government.
Findings
The paper shows that the current compensation system in The Netherlands will not provide sufficient incentives for all stakeholders to prevent the failure of a financial institution. Adjustments to this system are necessary to improve these incentives.
Original/value
The paper examines for the first time the impact of different compensation mechanisms on the incentives of multiple stakeholders. It also shows how these mechanisms influence each other regarding their incentive generating capability. These findings offer important insights for policy makers.
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Michael J. Turner and Leonard V. Coote
While investment decisions may be financial decisions, there is a growing recognition that they are also often non-financially based decisions. The purpose of this study is to…
Abstract
Purpose
While investment decisions may be financial decisions, there is a growing recognition that they are also often non-financially based decisions. The purpose of this study is to report findings focused on the project selection stage of capital budgeting, which has the objectives of exploring for: the relative degree of emphasis decision makers attach to a financial and non-financial orientation in capital budgeting; and the role, if any, that two agency theory variables have on the relative degree of emphasis: a personal incentive for project go-ahead and monitoring of project outcomes through a post-audit.
Design/methodology/approach
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are used and framed in a between-subjects 2 (personal incentive) × 2 (monitoring) design. DCEs are well-suited to research questions which examine some tension between competing alternatives. For example, trade-offs involving the relative degree of emphasis decision makers attach to a financial and non-financial orientation in capital budgeting.
Findings
In the absence of a personal incentive and monitoring, decision makers attach a significant degree of emphasis to cash inflows and cash outflows, both financial factors, and one strategic non-financial factor being improvement in the position of the firm vis-à-vis competitors in capital budgeting. However, when decision makers receive a personal incentive from project go-ahead, they attach a lower degree of emphasis to cash outflows. Alternatively, when there is monitoring through a post-audit and a personal incentive, decision makers attach a higher degree of emphasis to cash outflows.
Practical implications
Decision makers attach a significant degree of emphasis to only a relatively narrow band of attributes in making a capital budgeting decision, which is true in both the absence of and in the presence of the agency conditions. There is also little support for the view that there is any higher degree of emphasis attached to a financial orientation vis-à-vis a non-financial orientation. A particularly important finding relates to the overarching goal of monitoring through a post-audit. One view is that it should foster more accurate forecasting by making forecasters aware that their efforts will be reviewed. However, the findings of this study appear to be more supportive of a view that post-audits might lead agents to become more conservative or even shy away from projects.
Originality/value
The study makes contributions to the growing field of research which has the objective of exploring for the relative degree of emphasis decision makers attach to a financial and non-financial orientation in capital budgeting. In particular, it extends the prior research through its investigation of the role that two agency theory variables play in the relative degree of emphasis decision makers attach to a financial and non-financial orientation: a personal incentive for project go-ahead and monitoring of project outcomes through a post-audit.
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Abdelhakim Ben Ali and Jamel Chouaibi
This study aims to investigate whether integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices mediates the relationship between executive incentive compensation and the…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate whether integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices mediates the relationship between executive incentive compensation and the financial performance of Islamic and conventional banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used multiple regression models to analyze the effectiveness of ESG practices as a mediating variable in explaining the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance between 2015 and 2021. The sample consisted of 57 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the MENA region, and the data were collected from the Thomson Reuters database (Data Stream).
Findings
This research paper showed the positive and significant mediating effect of the ESG practice on Banks’ financial performance. Thus, banks’ financial and stock market profitability is influenced by ESG information disclosure. This finding shows that taking ESG into account improves the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance.
Practical implications
The results may interest academic researchers, regulators and policymakers and would support stakeholders and decision-makers who wish to discover how executive incentive compensation affects financial performance in banks.
Originality/value
This study contributes to previous literature by studying the mediating effect of ESG practices on the relationship between executive incentive compensation and banks’ financial performance. Indeed, the originality of this research paper is justified by the scarcity of studies and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, constitutes one of the first attempts to examine this relationship via a mediating variable, i.e. ESG.
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Cristina Bailey and Matias Sokolowski
This study contributes to a growing body of literature on the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by examining how lender incentives affected prioritization of large borrowers. In…
Abstract
Purpose
This study contributes to a growing body of literature on the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by examining how lender incentives affected prioritization of large borrowers. In addition, this study separately examines incentives for commercial banks and credit unions during the program.
Design/methodology/approach
Using 2020 PPP loan data, the authors create a proxy for lender loan prioritization by comparing the skewness statistics of large and small loan distributions. A regression model is used to examine lender reporting incentives and loan prioritization.
Findings
Results show that larger borrowers were prioritized in receiving PPP loans earlier. Lenders with financial reporting concerns and commercial banks favored large borrowers to a greater extent.
Practical implications
This study may inform social planners and regulators about the benefits and costs of delegating emergency funding loan decisions to financial institutions.
Originality/value
The authors believe this paper is the first to examine financial institution reporting incentives in relationship to PPP lending practices. It adds novelty by examining lender incentives, while prior research has focused heavily on the economic consequences of the program and how borrower–lender relationships affected loan practices during the program.
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Tomoki Kitamura and Kunio Nakashima
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential and cost of policy incentives for individuals to defer public pension (social security) claims.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the potential and cost of policy incentives for individuals to defer public pension (social security) claims.
Design/methodology/approach
Using Internet survey experiments, the impacts of introducing three potential policies to defer public pension claims are examined: (1) a tax incentive for private term pension premiums, (2) a tax incentive for private term pension benefits and (3) a tax disincentive for financial asset holdings. Effectiveness of information provision regarding projection of future financial assets is also examined.
Findings
Tax incentives have a certain impact on deferment of public pension claims. Among incentives, increase of benefits is the most effective one. Providing information regarding future financial assets reduces incentives.
Originality/value
This study is original in measuring cost for delaying public pension claims according to incentives and information provision.
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Despite the importance of hosts who contribute to the success of accommodation sharing through sharing underutilized space with guests, current literature sheds little light on…
Abstract
Purpose
Despite the importance of hosts who contribute to the success of accommodation sharing through sharing underutilized space with guests, current literature sheds little light on what exactly incentivizes hosts to grow their properties. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of multifaceted motivations including financial benefits, online social interaction and membership seniority and their interplay on hosts’ multiple listing behavior.
Design/methodology/approach
The study is instantiated on real-world business data collected from an accommodation-sharing platform in China. The data set includes 3,199 observations of 252 multi-listing hosts in Beijing who managed 815 properties from September 2012 to October 2016.
Findings
The study discloses that financial benefits, online social interaction and membership seniority significantly incentivize hosts to list multiple properties on the accommodation-sharing platform. In particular, the social incentive is the most important driver among the three. With a 1 per cent increase in online social interactions, the number of properties operated by a host would increase by 13.5 per cent. While the financial benefits and online social interaction motivate hosts to engage in the multi-listing behavior, such effects are significantly mitigated as the membership seniority increases.
Research limitations/implications
This study adds to the extant literature a unique yet less researched perspective of supply expansion driven by hosts. It also provides important practical implications for managing multiple properties for a healthy and viable accommodation-sharing community.
Originality/value
While a majority of the extant research on the sharing economy primarily takes a consumer-related perspective, this study addresses a different and original topic about hosts’ multiple-listing behavior that drives the supply of accommodation sharing. It is a first empirical investigation of the increase of accommodation sharing supply with host motivations explained.
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Sue Llewellyn, Ron Eden and Colin Lay
Traditionally in health care and in the public sector more generally, little thought has been given to the impact of provider‐oriented incentives on the delivery of services…
Abstract
Traditionally in health care and in the public sector more generally, little thought has been given to the impact of provider‐oriented incentives on the delivery of services. There has been an assumption that the language of incentives belonged to the private sector and was inappropriate in the public sector. Instead, the governance of health care has relied on the professional ethos of clinicians to direct decision making. Implicitly there has been an expectation that the ethical stance of clinicians would ensure that their actions were always in the best interest of patients. However, in the context of a heightened awareness of cost constraints there has been a greater emphasis on the active management of resources in medical organizations. This article argues that the structure of incentives in health care is highly significant in resource allocation, as medical ethics does not provide an unambiguous guide to clinical decision making. The paper defines the nature of the financial and professional incentives in medical organizations and discusses their impact on the delivery of services through an analysis of positive and negative effects. By undertaking a comparison between the UK and Canada, the paper identifies the differential nature of the incentives present in the health care systems of these two countries and discusses some of their consequences.
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