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This chapter discusses the benefits, limitations, and challenges in developing research projects that integrate a combination of archival, behavioral, and qualitative research methods. By demonstrating the inherent strengths and weaknesses of using a single method in isolation, this chapter aims to broaden our understanding of why and how research that examines various issues from the different perspectives is richer than employing any single method and enhances our understanding of a given accounting phenomenon. This chapter also discusses how investigating an issue through multiple research methods can help researchers improve the generalizability of findings and present a panoramic view of a particular phenomenon.

The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the biases in inventory decisions, under the umbrella of behavioural operations, considering research findings that used experimental methods. Research in this field has gained traction but, to the best of our knowledge, review articles that summarize these research findings are scarce. Hence, there is a need to synthesize the anomalies and biases reported in inventory decision-making literature to gain a more integrated understanding.

This study reviews themes relevant to inventory and behavioural operations management from the articles published in recognized top-tier journals during the period between 2000 and 2020 with an aim to build a classification framework. Further, using a systematic review procedure, the relevant research studies are divided into sub-sections and appropriate search strategies are adopted to pleat more information on inventory ordering biases.

This study presents a classification framework by highlighting the factors influencing the biases in inventory decisions and describes the effects of utility preferences on the decision-making behaviour. It highlights the inventory ordering pattern under unconventional settings and also for different supply chain settings. This systematic review helps in identifying the research gap and in giving directions for future researchers.

The study presents a systematic review and detailed analysis of the research in inventory decision making through a behavioural lens. The study shows a clear direction of progress over the years, and implies new directions for looking beyond placing orders and for moving towards a more integrated approach while making supply chain decisions. It will be useful for researchers and practitioners working on newsvendor decisions, supply chain contracts, behavioural economics, behavioural operations management, bounded rationality theory and experimental economics.

This paper draws upon the work of Georgescu‐Roegen to outline some theoretical alternatives to standard welfare theory, and to examine the policy implications of discarding the Walrasian core of neoclassical economics.

Current work in behavioral economics and game theory shows that economic behavior depends on social context, a point understood by social economists for a hundred years or more. This work is related to Georgescu's contributions to utility theory and bioeconomics.

Neoclassical welfare economics continues to dominate economic theory and policy even though its theoretical foundations, economic man and perfect competition, have been discredited by mainstream theorists. Economic processes take place in specific social contexts and also coevolve with the biophysical universe.

Although modern economics is incorporating many of Georgescu's insights about human preferences it has yet to come to grips with the fact that human economic activity is shaped by its biophysical context. It is believed this should be a major focus of future economic research.

Provides further insights into welfare theory and bioeconomics.

Purpose – Motivated by new models of nonprofit organizations, we study a voluntary contributions environment in which the productivity of the public goods process is chosen endogenously by a manager. The experimental treatments incorporate two institutions of transparency in the organization, which we conjecture will assist the manager in achieving an outcome superior to the standard free-riding prediction.

Methodology – The chapter uses the methodology of laboratory experimental economics.

Findings – The findings demonstrate that transparency institutions can be important for assisting the manager and the stakeholders achieve relative stable and efficient outcomes.

Limitations – We discuss obvious areas for further investigation including environments in which firm productivity is only stochastically related to the decisions of the manager.

Practical and Social Implications – The chapter is oriented to real-world issues in the organization of nonprofit enterprises, which were a once ubiquitous and now re-emerging source of charitable activity. The chapter is written so that it should be accessible to informed practitioners in nonprofit organizations.

Originality – The study of endogenous environments and institutions in the provision of charitable and public goods is a relatively new advance and is indeed the theme of Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 13, “Charity with Choice.”

This paper is devoted to the question of what motivates man in his pursuit of economic activities. Particular attention is given to the notion that economic activities of individuals may not be motivated by their self‐interest alone.

Using literary analysis, the paper first reconsiders the role of self‐interest and non‐selfish motives in the historical schools. Then it is demonstrated that at least some non‐selfish motives were incorporated in the voluntary exchange theory of public economy. Next it is shown that during the evolution of the theory of public goods these non‐selfish motives were lost and that the modern theory of public goods rests entirely on the self‐interest hypothesis. However, over the last two decades results of public goods experiments have cast considerable doubt on the pure self‐interest hypothesis.

A major finding of this paper is that several non‐selfish motives of man that show up in recent public goods experiments were already discussed by representatives of the historical schools.

An agenda for future research on the topic is sketched in the final section.

Practical implications include that the allocation of many goods, not just public goods, may improve if agents pay more attention to non‐selfish motives of man.

The paper adds to the existing body of related writings by linking developments in the evolution of theory of public goods, in particular recent findings from public goods experiments, to a specific aspect already advocated by representatives of the historical schools, that is, the notion that man in his pursuit of economic activities is not motivated by his self‐interest alone. To this extent, the paper is of interest for researchers working on public goods theory, experimental economics and the history of economic thought.

The purpose of this paper, and a companion paper (Duxbury, 2015), is to review the insights provided by experimental studies examining financial decisions and market behavior.

Focus is directed on those studies examining explicitly, or with direct implications for, the most robustly identified phenomena or stylized facts observed in behavioral finance. The themes for this first paper are theory and financial markets.

Experiments complement the findings from empirical studies in behavioral finance by avoiding some of the limitations or assumptions implicit in such studies.

The authors synthesize the valuable contribution made by experimental studies in extending the knowledge of the functioning of financial markets and the financial behavior of individuals.

Using a dictator game, we examine the other‐regarding behavior of allocators, who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two‐person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same individuals in an analogous interindividual situation. We also explore other‐regarding perceptions of passive recipients, who are asked to give behavioral forecasts of how they would behave if assigned the allocator role and how they think their allocators would behave. Gender differences are found in both behavior and perceptions. Males are significantly more self‐interested and less other‐regarding when they are responsible for a group, while females behave similarly under both conditions. Female recipients' forecasts of their own behavior are significantly higher than both their expectations of allocators and the actual female behavior observed in the experiment. Both male and female recipients underestimate the other‐regarding behavior of allocators.

The relevance of present consumption bias on personal finance has been confirmed in several studies and has important theoretical and practical implications. It has important, measurable implications when analyzing commitment or self-control, adherence to healthy habits (e.g. exercising or dieting), procrastination tendencies or savings. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of these issues by postulating a model of income uncertainty within a hyperbolic discounting framework that measures the cost of financial intertemporal inconsistencies related to this bias. The emphasis is on the analysis of this cost. We also propose experimental designs and consistent estimation methods, as well as agent-based modelling extensions.

The authors develop a finite-horizon model with hyperbolic preferences. Individuals have a present bias distinct from their discount rate so their choices face intertemporal inconsistencies. The authors further extend the analysis with uncertainty about future incomes. Specifically, individuals live for three periods, and the authors find the optimal consumption levels in the perfect-information benchmark by backward induction. They then proceed to add biases and uncertainty to characterize their implications and measure the costs of the intertemporal inconsistencies they cause.

The authors measure how an agent's utility is greater when they “tie their hands” than when they are free to re-evaluate and change their consumption schedule. This “cost of being vulnerable to falling into temptation” only depends (increasingly) on the measure of the present bias and (decreasingly) on the discount factor. They analyze the varying effects on utility and consumption of changes in impatience and optimism. They conclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications; they also propose agent-based simulations, as well as empirical and experimental designs, to further test the relevance and applications of the results.

This model has important, measurable implications when analyzing commitment or self-control, adherence to healthy habits (e.g. exercising or dieting), procrastination tendencies or savings.

The results enhance the estimation of the costs of present biases such that employers can better identify the incentives required to acquire and retain human capital. The authors provide evidence that workers are vulnerable to contract renegotiations and about the need for a regulator that restores ex-ante efficiency. Similarly, in the private sector, firms could recognize the postulated consumer profiles and focus their resources on anxious, too-optimistic or potentially addictive consumers; this, again, provides some justification about the need for a regulator.

In traditional exponential discounting, the marginal rate of substitution of consumption between two points depends only on their distance; thus, it allows none of the intertemporal inconsistencies we often observe in real life. Therefore, hyperbolic discounting better fits the data. The authors model choice under uncertainty and focus on the costs caused when present biases (ex-post) push behaviour away from ex-ante optimality. They conclude by proposing experimental designs to further enhance the estimation and implications of these costs. The postulated refinements have the potential to improve previous analyses on commitment devices and commitment-related regulation.