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Commentators express concern that when auditors investigate for but fail to detect fraud, jurors might effectively penalize the auditors for having investigated for the fraud (AICPA, 2004; Coffee, 2004; Golden, Skalak, & Clayton, 2006). Consistent with these concerns, Reffett (2010) finds that, in a between-participants setting, evaluators in cases of undetected fraud are more likely to hold auditors liable for damages when the auditors identified the perpetrated fraud as a fraud risk and then investigated for the fraud, relative to when the auditors did neither. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which identifying versus investigating fraud risks increases evaluators’ between-participants assessments of auditor liability. That is, when auditors investigate for, but fail to detect fraud, is the increase in evaluators’ liability assessments due to the fact that the auditors identified (i.e., were aware of) the fraud risk but did not detect the fraud, or that the auditors unsuccessfully investigated for the fraud (or both)? This study addresses these questions by reporting evidence that both identifying and investigating fraud risks can each, in isolation, increase evaluators’ perceptions of auditor negligence. The processes by which identifying and investigating fraud risks increase evaluators’ negligence verdicts, however, appear to differ.

This study examines the effects of key audit matter (KAM) disclosures in auditors' reports on auditor liability in cases of fraud and error misstatements using evaluators with audit experience.

The experiment is conducted using 174 professional auditors as participants.

The participating auditors assess higher auditor liability when misstatements are related to errors rather than when they are related to fraud. In addition, the results also demonstrate that KAM disclosures reduce auditor liability only in cases of fraud and not in cases of errors. Together, the results support the view that KAM reduces the negative affective reactions of evaluators, which in turn, reduce the assessed auditor liability.

This study did not analyze the setting in which auditors who act as peer evaluators had an opportunity to discuss the case among their peers, which may have affected their judgments.

The results of KAM disclosures on auditor liability in cases of error and fraud misstatements inform auditors that, different from the auditors' concern that disclosing KAM may increase auditors' legal risk, it tends to decrease or at least have no impact on the liability judgment.

This study contributes to the accounting literature by adding findings on another aspect of KAM in different audit settings, particularly, in the Thai legal environment with different types of undetected misstatements. The current conflicting results on how KAM disclosures affect auditor liability warrant further investigation of this issue in other audit contexts in different countries.

This paper synthesizes the extant research on the outcome effect in the accounting domain, focusing primarily on the context of performance evaluation. It reviews the current state of our knowledge about this phenomenon, including its underlying cognitive and motivational causes, the contexts in which the outcome effect is observed, the factors that influence its various manifestations, and ways in which undesirable outcome effects can be mitigated. It also considers various perspectives about the extent to which outcome effects represent undesirable judgmental bias, and whether this distinction is necessary to motivate research on this topic. The paper is intended to motivate and facilitate future research into the effects of outcome knowledge on judgment in the accounting context. Therefore, we also identify important unanswered questions and discuss opportunities for future research throughout the paper. These include additional consideration of instances in which the outcome effect is reflective of bias, how this bias can be effectively mitigated, ways in which outcome information influences judgment (regardless of whether this influence is considered normative), and how the underlying causes of the outcome effect operate singly and jointly to bring about the outcome effect. We also consider ways that future research can contribute to practice by determining how to encourage evaluators to retain and incorporate the relevant information conveyed by outcomes, while avoiding the inappropriate use of outcome information, and by enhancing external validity to increase the generalizability of experimental results to scenarios frequently encountered in practice.

In crafting Auditing Standard No.3 (AS3), a primary objective of the PCAOB was to reduce auditors' exposure to litigation by raising the standard of care for audit documentation. We examine whether the increased documentation requirements of AS3 affect legal professionals' perceptions of audit quality and auditor responsibility in the event of an audit failure. Our experiment consists of a 3 × 2 between-participants design with law students serving as proxies for legal professionals. The results of our experiment indicate that when an audit procedure, namely the investigation of inconsistent evidence, is not required to be documented, legal professionals perceive the performance of the work itself but not its documentation to significantly increase audit quality and reduce the auditor's responsibility for an audit failure. When documentation of the procedure is required, as per AS3, legal professionals perceive enhanced audit quality and reduced auditor responsibility only if the performance of the work is documented.

In 1988, the US standard form audit report experienced its first major modification in 39 years. Among the objectives of the “new” report were better auditor/user communications leading to, among other things, an abridgement of auditor liability. Nearly a decade later, this issue has yet to be addressed empirically and with rigour. The empirical research reported examines the ability of the “new” audit report to reduce perceptions of auditor responsibility/liability across two instances of alleged audit failure. It is argued that a jurist’s advantage of “perfect hindsight” may mitigate the effectiveness of revised communications contained in the audit report, in instances where audit risk at the time of the audit appears high. Accordingly, consideration of environments of both high and low perceived risk were provided in a behavioural experiment conducted with 81 investors serving as subjects. Findings reveal that the revised audit report language may provide relief for auditor liability, but the presence of red‐flags, or red‐flag related environmental conditions, may exacerbate negative perceptions.

During the last several years, a stream of research has evolved that investigates the influence of outcome information on evaluation judgments in an auditor legal liability context. These studies have included judges and jurors and have utilized different cases and scenarios. Our objective in this paper is to review and discuss insights from this stream of research. This research consists of three phases. Phase 1 focuses on the robust manifestation of outcome effects in an audit legal liability context, Phase 2 examines the effectiveness of selected mitigation strategies in moderating outcome effects, and Phase 3 begins the process of developing a preliminary theoretical framework. We also discuss future research that could be done to better understand outcome effects and to test operational responses and proposed remedies.

Using China’s key audit matters (KAMs) data, this study aims to examine whether negative press coverage alleviates boilerplate KAMs.

This study uses Levenshtein edit distance (LVD) to calculate the horizontal boilerplate of KAMs and investigates how boilerplate changes under different levels of the perceived legal risk.

The findings indicate that auditors of firms exposed to substantial negative press coverage will reduce the boilerplate of KAMs. This association is more significant for auditing firms with lower market share and client firms with higher financial distress. Additionally, the authors find that negative press coverage is more likely to alleviate the boilerplate disclosure of KAMs related to managers’ subjective estimation and material transactions and events. Furthermore, the association between negative press coverage and boilerplate KAMs varies with the source of negative news.

The findings suggest that upon exposure to negative press coverage, reducing the boilerplate of KAMs has a disclaimer effect for auditors.

The study here helps to fill the gap between the current practices of management performance audits for firms and government agencies. The study advances recent theories of program evaluation and marketing management auditing. While the application in this chapter refers to government agencies managing destination marketing programs (tourism agencies), the algorithmic model construction is applicable for all management audits. The study applies the perspectives from two streams of theory to describe five relevant activities for managing destination marketing programs: scanning, planning, implementation, assessing, and administering. The analysis proposes impact assessments to improve management performances of DMOs via checklists for assessing the quality of information in tourism-management performance audits. Checklists can serve as a management tool by management performance auditors and by DMO executives to enhance the quality in executing destination marketing programs. A meta-evaluation of 10 tourism management audit reports identifies good and bad practices. The findings indicate that substantial improvements are possible in the practice of DMO’s management performance auditing, and the proposed checklist may ensure both high quality performance audit reports and improved performances in DMO practices.

We investigate the social and legal blame that investors assign to auditors following unfavorable outcomes using the precision of accounting guidance described as principles-based (i.e., less-precise) or rules-based (i.e., more precise), and why investors assign blame at differing levels. We also examine how the precision of accounting guidance is related to perceptions of auditors’ ethical characteristics. We posit that blame assigned to auditors differs based on auditors’ perceived decision-making control. Results indicate a significant association between the precision of accounting guidance and social blame, and a positive association between social blame and legal blame under standards described as less-precise. Investors are also more likely to make negative evaluations of the auditor’s ethical characteristics under less-precise accounting following an unfavorable outcome, which helps explain the association between social and legal blame. Our findings suggest that auditors could face additional blame as a result of a trend toward less-precise accounting guidance, with investors being more likely to question the auditors’ ethical characteristics following unfavorable outcomes.

This study aims to examine the association between corporate governance and audit fees using directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance premiums as a proxy for overall governance quality. The use of an overall governance measure that captures both structural and non-structural governance features may shed light on the association between governance and audit fees, which is known to be inconclusive in the literature.

The authors employ D&O insurance premiums as a proxy for governance quality that reflects both the structural features and non-structural features of governance. D&O insurance premiums are hand-collected from a proxy circular of Canadian firms. Multivariate regression analyses are used for testing.

The authors find a positive association between D&O premiums and audit fees, suggesting that auditors charge higher fees to firms with heightened corporate governance risk. Even after controlling for structural governance variables in the regression model, the authors find a significantly positive association between D&O premiums and audit fees.

The findings suggest that mandatory disclosures of D&O insurance policies can be useful for market participants. This study uses a relatively small sample of Canadian firms. A larger sample could strengthen the implications of the findings.

The findings suggest that structural features of governance may be insufficient to provide a full understanding of the impact of corporate governance on audit pricing and add to the understanding of the determinants of audit fees.