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Article
Publication date: 18 July 2023

Arash Arianpoor and Somaye Efazati

The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies…

Abstract

Purpose

The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Design/methodology/approach

The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.

Findings

The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.

Originality/value

The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

Details

Asian Review of Accounting, vol. 32 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1321-7348

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 20 April 2023

Jonghan Park, Tianming Zhang, Spencer Pierce and Yonghong Jia

The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are…

Abstract

Purpose

The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.

Design/methodology/approach

Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.

Findings

The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.

Originality/value

This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.

Details

Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 45 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0737-4607

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Article
Publication date: 18 January 2024

Maha Khemakhem Jardak, Marwa Sallemi and Salah Ben Hamad

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the…

Abstract

Purpose

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

Design/methodology/approach

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

Findings

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

Practical implications

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

Originality/value

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

Details

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 15 August 2022

Serdar Turedi and Asligul Erkan-Barlow

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial myopia on information technology (IT) investment. Specifically, it aims to investigate the influence of chief…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial myopia on information technology (IT) investment. Specifically, it aims to investigate the influence of chief information officer (CIO) compensation on IT investment and the moderating role of the board monitoring strength on this relationship.

Design/methodology/approach

The study examines a sample of 194 firms listed on US stock exchanges with a CIO position in 2019. The authors employ hierarchical regression analysis to test the hypothesis.

Findings

The results show that CIO compensation negatively influences IT investment. Further, even though vigilant board monitoring does not necessarily reduce such opportunistic behaviors, weak board monitoring creates an environment for such actions.

Research limitations/implications

First, the cross-sectional data can limit the results' generalizability. Second, the sampling frame is not perfectly random as it consists of firms that have CIO compensation information in the ExecuComp for 2019. Third, we include only two measures of board monitoring strength.

Practical implications

Board of directors should wisely select compensation packages' components since equity incentives potentially exacerbate managerial myopia. Moreover, firms may regulate CIOs' investment behaviors through board-level IT governance.

Originality/value

This study is one of the few studies that utilize CIO sensitivity to measure CIO compensation. Moreover, by examining the factors affecting IT investment behavior, this study sheds light on CIO incentives' impact on IT investment behaviors. Finally, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board monitoring's role in the relationship between CIO sensitivity and IT investment intensity.

Details

Review of Behavioral Finance, vol. 15 no. 6
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1940-5979

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 27 November 2023

Marcellin Makpotche, Kais Bouslah and Bouchra B. M’Zali

The intensity of carbon emissions has led to the serious problem of global warming, and the consequences in terms of climatic disasters are gaining increasing attention worldwide…

Abstract

Purpose

The intensity of carbon emissions has led to the serious problem of global warming, and the consequences in terms of climatic disasters are gaining increasing attention worldwide. As the energy sector is responsible for most global emissions, developing clean energy is crucial to combat climate change. This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and renewable energy (RE) consumption and explore the interaction between RE production and RE use.

Design/methodology/approach

The study adopts an econometric framework of a panel model, followed by the robustness check using alternative methods, including logit regressions. The bivariate probit model is used to analyze the interaction between the decision to use and the decision to produce RE. The analysis is based on a sample of 3,896 firms covering 45 countries worldwide.

Findings

The results reveal that appropriate governance mechanisms positively impact RE consumption. These include the existence of a sustainability committee; environmental, social and governance-based compensation policy; financial performance-based compensation; sustainability external audit; transparency; board gender diversity; and board independence. Firms with appropriate governance mechanisms are more likely to produce and use RE than others. Finally, while RE use positively impacts firm value and environmental performance, the authors find no significant effect on current profitability.

Originality/value

This study goes beyond previous research by exploring the impact of multiple governance mechanisms. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is also the first study examining the relationship between RE use and firm value. Overall, the findings suggest that RE transition requires, first of all, establishing appropriate governance mechanisms within companies.

Details

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 4 July 2023

Sangyong Han and Hyejeong Mun

This study investigates the relationship between outside directors, managerial compensation, and firm performance in the Korean insurance industry.

Abstract

Purpose

This study investigates the relationship between outside directors, managerial compensation, and firm performance in the Korean insurance industry.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors employ a simultaneous equation framework by using three-stage least squares (3SLS) to address the endogeneity problems that could result from the joint determination of outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in Korean insurance companies.

Findings

The authors find that the ratio of outside directors on the board is negatively associated with insurance firm's value and financial profitability. In addition, this study's evidence shows that greater representation on the board by outside directors leads to a higher level of executive pay. In particular, the authors provide evidence that variable compensation scheme and outside directors who have backgrounds in the legal profession and former high-ranking government officials drive this study's main results.

Originality/value

This study adds to the literature by first demonstrating the interaction effects between outside directors, firm performance, and executive compensation in the Korean insurance industry. Unlike previous studies that typically focus on US companies, the authors study the Korean insurance sector that is an emerging power in the global insurance market, ranking seventh in terms of total premium volume, and show that the Korean insurance firm's outside directors system does not work in the manner that it is intended to function.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 49 no. 12
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 27 November 2023

Ziyun Yang, Lanyi Yan Zhang and Claire J. Yan

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis…

Abstract

Purpose

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Design/methodology/approach

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Findings

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

Research limitations/implications

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Practical implications

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Originality/value

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

Details

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, vol. 32 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1358-1988

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 8 January 2024

Ahmed Bouteska, Taimur Sharif and Mohammad Zoynul Abedin

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms…

Abstract

Purpose

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

Findings

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

Practical implications

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

Originality/value

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

Details

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1472-0701

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 29 June 2023

Praveen Kumar

This article investigated whether the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demands for higher corporate voluntary…

Abstract

Purpose

This article investigated whether the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demands for higher corporate voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the study also examined the moderating role of the auditor's reputation in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

Design/methodology/approach

The study used a sample of S&P BSE index constituents' 90 Indian firms for 2017–2019. The voluntary disclosure scores were fetched from the India Disclosure Index Report published by FTI Consulting. This analysis was carried out in two parts by applying four panel-data regression models in the agency and signalling theories framework. First, the study examined the association between executive compensation, board strength, composition, gender diversity, and voluntary disclosures. Second, the article investigated the moderating role of the “Big 4” in the direction of association among executive compensation, corporate governance attributes, and voluntary disclosures.

Findings

The willingness of executives to share private information with stakeholders depends on the compensation they receive from their employer. The higher compensation paid to executives leads to a higher “tone from the top,” which is better aligned with stakeholder interests. Further, the research also found that bigger board sizes, a higher proportion of independent and woman directors (indicators of good governance), and an auditor's reputation are associated with increased voluntary disclosure.

Research limitations/implications

The findings showed that the executives' compensation and corporate governance attributes are aligned with stakeholders' demand for higher voluntary information from firms. Moreover, the study also found that the “Big 4” play a moderating role in this direction. The choice of a reputed auditor indicates the firms' long-term positive future perspectives, which strengthens investor confidence in the financial market.

Practical implications

The study suggests that fair executive compensation can address the agency problem.

Originality/value

This research furnishes managers and different stakeholders with significant implications of executives' compensation, corporate governance, and auditor's reputation in the best interests of a firm through reducing potential risks of information asymmetry.

Details

Journal of Applied Accounting Research, vol. 25 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0967-5426

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 27 June 2023

Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Pablo San Martín and Ryan McWay

This study aims to investigate how gender diversity and remuneration of boards of directors’ influence earnings quality for Spanish-listed firms.

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to investigate how gender diversity and remuneration of boards of directors’ influence earnings quality for Spanish-listed firms.

Design/methodology/approach

The sample includes 105 nonfinancial Spanish firms from 2013 to 2018, corresponding to an unbalanced panel of 491 firm-year observations. The primary empirical method uses a Tobit semiparametric estimator with firm- and industry-level fixed effects and an innovative set of measures for earnings quality developed by StarMine.

Findings

Results exhibit a positive correlation between increased gender diversity and a firm’s earnings quality, suggesting that a gender-balanced board of directors is associated with more transparent financial reporting and informative earnings. We also find a nonmonotonic, concave relationship between board remuneration and earnings quality. This indicates that beyond a certain point, excessive board compensation leads to more opportunistic manipulation of financial reporting with subsequent degradation of earnings quality.

Research limitations/implications

This study only covers nonfinancial Spanish listed firms and is silent about how alternative board features’ influence earnings quality and their informativeness.

Originality/value

This study introduces measures of earnings quality developed by StarMine that have not been used in the empirical literature before as well as measures of board gender diversity applied to a suitable Tobit semiparametric estimator for fixed effects that improves the precision of results. In addition, while most of the literature focuses on Anglo-Saxon countries, this study discusses board gender diversity and board remuneration in the underexplored context of Spain. Moreover, the hand-collected data set comprising financial reports provides previously untested board features as well as a nonlinear relationship between remuneration and earnings quality that has not been thoroughly discussed before.

Details

Gender in Management: An International Journal , vol. 39 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1754-2413

Keywords

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