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1 – 10 of 851The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many…
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many effects: the managerial power effect, the portfolio consideration effect, the learning effect, and the career concern effect.
Design/methodology/approach
Tobit regressions were run of the percentage of equity‐based compensation on CEO tenure and the effect of tenure compared between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.
Findings
It was found that the percentage of equity‐based compensation increases during the early years of tenure for outside CEOs, and decreases during the later years of tenure for inside CEOs. Before they are tenured, outside CEOs have significantly higher and faster growing percentage of equity‐based compensation than inside CEOs. Furthermore, the portfolio consideration effect and the learning effect are the major effects in explaining the effect of tenure on the compensation structure.
Practical implications
The evidence that boards of directors take into account the CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives, the types of CEOs, and their years on tenure to adjust the structure of CEO compensation indicates that firms should, and do, try to optimize their CEO compensation structure on the basis of firm‐specific or CEO‐specific characteristics. It is suggested that there is no simple formulaic approach to governance reform.
Originality/value
The paper contributes to the literature by studying and explaining the different patterns of compensation structure over CEO tenure between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.
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Chunwei Xian, Fang Sun and Yinghong Zhang
This study aims to investigate the moderating effect of equity-based compensation on the sources of book-tax differences. The authors investigate whether equity-based compensation…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the moderating effect of equity-based compensation on the sources of book-tax differences. The authors investigate whether equity-based compensation affects the association between book-tax differences and tax planning, and the association between book-tax differences and earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use a sample of 9,024 firm-year observations (913 firms) spanning the period 1992-2011, obtained from ExecuComp and Compustat. They estimate cross-sectional regressions of the proxy for tax planning, discretionary accruals and their interactions with equity-based compensation on book-tax differences.
Findings
The authors find that tax planning-related book-tax differences increase as the equity-based pay of executives does, and that earnings management-related book-tax differences decrease as the equity-based pay of executives increases. The results are robust across three alternative measures of tax planning.
Originality/value
Equity-based compensation plays an important role in managerial discretion on tax planning and earnings management. The findings suggest that, although equity incentives promote a high level of both tax planning and earnings management, they motivate managers to constrain the level of earnings management to avoid larger book-tax differences.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of cross-listing on the size and structure of director compensation at individual director level. While much of the prior…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of cross-listing on the size and structure of director compensation at individual director level. While much of the prior literature has focused on executive compensation, more recent literature has started to examine director compensation. Additionally, there has been extensive literature examining the impact of cross-listing on the corporate governance and equity valuation of listed firms. The literature, however, has largely ignored the effect of cross-listing on director compensation schemes. This study attempts to combine these two literature streams and examine the effect of cross-listing on director compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and matched non-ADRs from the same country and industry to test the relationship between cross-listing and director compensation. Regressions with country, year and industry fixed-effects are employed. The relationship is further examined using only ADR firms during pre-listing and post-listing periods.
Findings
This study finds that directors of ADR firms receive higher total compensation and greater percentage equity-based compensation relative to directors of non-ADR firms. This study also finds that such differences in director compensation are dependent on the cross-listing program a firm is registered to. Directors of ADR firms also receive higher total compensation and greater percentage equity-based compensation during post-listing periods relative to their own compensation during pre-listing periods.
Originality/value
This study extends the literature on director compensation in a global setting, and is the first to examine an unanswered question regarding the effect of cross-listing on director compensation. This study provides important information that cross-listing affects the size and structure of director compensation between ADR and non-ADR firms, as well as between pre-listing and post-listing periods for ADR firms themselves.
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Arash Arianpoor and Somaye Efazati
The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies…
Abstract
Purpose
The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).
Design/methodology/approach
The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.
Findings
The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.
Originality/value
The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.
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Chialing Hsieh, Vivek Pandey and Hongxia Wang
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Design/methodology/approach
Univariate and multi-variate tests are implemented. CEO compensation is designed as a function of the origin of a firm’s founder (immigrant or native), executive characteristics and firm characteristics with firm and year fixed effect regressions. CEO compensation is measured with cash pay, equity-based pay and total compensation.
Findings
CEOs of immigrant-founder firms receive higher equity-based compensation and higher total pay than CEOs of non-immigrant-founder firms and the levels of their equity-based and total compensation are contingent upon their stock ownership. CEOs in high-growth immigrant-founder firms receive higher stock-based pay than their counterparts in non-immigrant-founder firms. Immigrant-founder family firms compensate their CEOs with higher equity-based pay than immigrant-founder non-family firms.
Practical implications
The paper provides some explanations on the success of immigrant-founder firms. CEO compensation designs in immigrant-founder firms can be adopted in other firms.
Social implications
The paper provides some rationale for immigration legislation to encourage the talented to come to the USA and start their business in the USA.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to study executive compensation practice in immigrant-founder firms. The findings provide some practical and policy implications on immigration reform.
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Ranjan D’Mello and Mercedes Miranda
We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top…
Abstract
We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.
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Hyungkee Young Baek and Philip L Fazio
Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this…
Abstract
Purpose
Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of family ownership, control, and CEO dividends on CEO incentive compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample consisted of 194 firms, covering about 40 percent of the relevant S&P SmallCap 600 firms. Employed were a logistic regression of the presence of incentive compensation plan and a panel regression of incentive compensation ratio against the family ownership, family CEO, CEO ownership, and dividend income variables as well as firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables.
Findings
For 1,532 firm-year observations among S&P SmallCap600 index firms during 1999-2007, the authors found that family ownership and CEO dividend income ratio negatively related to the likelihood of an incentive compensation plan and to the ratio of equity-based compensation to total CEO pay. Additionally, the effect of CEO dividend income was limited to firms with outside CEOs.
Practical implications
Boards of small capitalization firms should consider the incentive effects of CEO dividend income and CEO family membership when setting their compensation policies.
Originality/value
S&P SmallCap600 index firms are unique because they are much smaller than those listed in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, and are subject to more family influence. SmallCap firms are comparable in size to the foreign firms previously researched but are still well covered by analysts, and benefit from audited financial statement variables, which include dividends and stock market returns.
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This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in…
Abstract
This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.
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Melissa A. Williams, Timothy B. Michael and Edward R. Waller
The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize research into managerial incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use and structure of compensation to mitigate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize research into managerial incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use and structure of compensation to mitigate agency problems in the firm.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors discuss studies of size elasticity and compensation, pay for performance, changes in managerial compensation due to merger activities, incentives and risk taking, and the relationship between managerial risk aversion and acquisitions.
Findings
The paper identifies several prominent themes in the literature. First, size and performance both appear to be positively related to managerial compensation. There appears to be a strong relation between pay and performance, but results depend upon whether the pay measure includes all forms of compensation. With mergers, any merger gains seem to accrue to the acquired firm. It appears that acquiring managers can increase their pay by merging with other firms, and this is likely to happen in cases where shareholder returns are negative. Regarding managerial risk taking and compensation, it is likely that the sensitivity of a manager's equity‐based compensation (options, in particular) to changes in the total risk of the firm is an indicator of how willing managers will be to seek out more risk on behalf of shareholders.
Originality/value
This paper synthesizes a large body of research into an organized discussion of the issues relating to merger activity, managerial incentives, compensation, and pay for performance issues.
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Jonghan Park, Tianming Zhang, Spencer Pierce and Yonghong Jia
The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.
Design/methodology/approach
Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.
Findings
The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.
Originality/value
This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.
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