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First contract arbitration (FCA) provisions are posed as a solution to the difficulties of negotiating a first contract for newly certified bargaining units. FCA is a longstanding, and no longer controversial, element of Canadian labor legislation. FCA provisions now exist in six Canadian jurisdictions and four distinct FCA models have developed (the exceptional remedy or fault model, the automatic access model, the no-fault model, and the mediation intensive model). In the United States the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) included a highly contested proposal to amend the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to include an FCA provision similar to the Canadian automatic access model. This chapter offers a balanced assessment of FCA evidence from Canada addressing the main objections to FCA in the EFCA debates. Individual case level data from jurisdictions representing each of the four FCA models is examined. The evidence demonstrates that although FCA is widely available in Canada, it is an option that is rarely sought and, when sought, rarely granted; that parties involved in FCA are able to establish stable bargaining relationships; and, that this process does not, as critics charge, simply prolong the life of nonviable bargaining units. This chapter concludes by suggesting that the practice under Quebec's “no-fault” model and British Columbia's “mediation intensive” model merit consideration for adoption elsewhere. These models position the FCA process as a mechanism fostering collective bargaining and voluntary agreements, rather than treating it as a remedy for dysfunctional negotiations and as part of the unfair labor practice framework.

This chapter examines the rise and fall of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (Dunlop Commission) in the early 1990s. It uses the events surrounding the Commission to provide an insight into the dynamics of the struggle over federal labor law reform. The inability of the Dunlop Commission to get labor and management representatives to agree on proposals for labor law reform demonstrated, yet again, that employer opposition is the greatest obstacle to the protection of organizing rights and modernization of labor law. For the nation's major management associations, labor law reform is a life and death issue, and nothing is more important to them than defeating revisions to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) intended to strengthen organizing rights. The failure of labor law reform in the 1990s also demonstrated that the labor movement would never win reform by means of an “inside the beltway” legislative campaign – designed to push reform through the US Senate – because the principal employer organizations would always exercise more influence in Congress. Instead, unions must engage with public opinion, and convince union and nonunion members about the importance of reform. Thus far, however, they lack an effective language with which to do this.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the development of employee representation systems in the USA from the Ludlow Massacre of 1914 up to the events in 2015 at the Volkswagen plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The study begins with the strike at the Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation which led to the deaths of several women and children. In the aftermath of Ludlow, John D. Rockefeller, Jr, visited the mines in 1915 and persuaded workers that an internal employee representation plan would serve their interests better than an outside trade union. Rockefeller’s influence shaped American industrial relations until the passage of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act in 1935, when company unions were outlawed. The ongoing decline of unions and collective bargaining has prompted academic speculation that a return to internal workplace committees might lead to a rejuvenated labor movement in the USA.

The study uses both archival materials and secondary sources to construct a narrative of one important element of industrial relations. It explains Wagner’s ban on company unions as a component of his economic agenda. Company unions provided a voice for a firm’s workers, but Wagner believed they were powerless to redistribute corporate wealth. The decline of American unions is so profound that they no longer serve an economic role in our capitalist system, but workers’ voice in the workplace remains an important consideration.

The key finding of this paper is that employee representation plans are not merely an industrial relations anachronism but continue to be relevant to today’s workplace. The paper compares an influential representation plan developed in 1914 by John D. Rockefeller, Jr, to current schemes of representation and argues that labor law should be modified to permit modern versions of the older “company unions”.

Works councils play a crucial role in European labor relations, and they could do so in America if labor laws were modified to permit it. An exposition of the deep historical context of representation helps to legitimate the concept. Future research into specific cases, including an international perspective, would add to an understanding of the benefits and costs of representation.

The originality of this paper is its combination of a historical event and a contemporary case study that brings together a theme present in managerial history for over a century. By emphasizing the aims of Rockefeller, Jr. in 1914 and the objectives of the Volkswagen Company in 2014 in establishing a participatory workplace, we gain a long-term framework through which to evaluate a particular managerial technique. The paper also suggests ways to bring our labor laws into conformance with the idea of employee representation.

The purpose of this article is to provide analysis of organizational communication used by one major US airline during a Teamsters unionizing campaign as a means for readers to examine what airlines do when faced with the threat of unionization, how they prepare front‐line management for communication with employees, and what role these managers play in unionizing campaigns.

A range of corporate communications from the airline were gathered within a seven‐month period and qualitatively analyzed, including management training manuals, e‐mails, and conference calls between line managers and regional directors.

Anti‐union communication strategies position front‐line managers in the key persuasive role of controlling and disseminating essential top‐down information in the effort to keep employees union‐free, utilizing a complex and multi‐layered organizational approach to train managers for employee communication during a unionizing campaign.

While granted access by America West to observe conference calls and view internal documents the authors were not granted access to listen to Teamsters Union conversations or view Teamsters' internal documents. As a result, the authors realize that their study is limited to an analysis of only one side of the story. Additional research into this topic could include data from both campaigns.

Analysis of organizational anti‐union campaigns and the role of front‐line managers in these campaigns identify key areas of interest for both organizations and unions. This analysis, in conjunction with assessment of the overall results of a unionizing campaign, provides information that organizations can use when selecting strategies for internal communication in times of potential change.

This paper provides useful information about the complex function of line management in supporting and promoting the organization when external factors are perceived as endangering internal infrastructure. It also offers a practical glimpse into a unique type of managerial communication whose aim is to be both cautious and persuasive.

The decline of collective representation and rise of individual employment rights is a transformative shift in employment relations that has changed the landscape of workplace dispute resolution. I propose a model that seeks to provide a new approach to understanding how workplace dispute resolution functions in the era of individual employment rights.

The model I propose focuses the analysis on the elements that connect the structure of rights that are enacted to the patterns of employment practices in the workplace.

My argument is that the systems for enforcement of individual employment rights and the mechanisms of representation for the employees affected are as important as the substantive rights themselves in determining the impact of the individual rights regime. These three elements combine to determine the degree to which the individual employment rights serve as an effective source of power for employees in relation to their employers.

The establishment of these sources of power is what then results in the individual rights regime producing an effect on the employers’ patterns of practices in the workplace and ultimately determining the nature and character of the employment relationship.

A “new” interpretation of Section 7 in the National Labor Relations Act could serve as the basis of union renewal, in enabling and supporting non-majority, non-exclusive representation as an alternative to the difficulties of union certification. One potential shortcoming of this form of representation is interunion conflict associated with ongoing competition between unions trying to attract each other's members in the same bargaining units. However, interview evidence collected from union executives in New Zealand, where non-majority, non-exclusive representation already exists, suggests that such conflict is normally limited. Focusing representation on areas that make the most sense (for both unions and workers) and following union federation protocols, when conflicts occur, have both contributed to the overall low conflict level. Lessons for US unionism are explored.

In light of the low‐union density and a huge representation gap in the US representation system. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of the system under majority rule and to provide some empirical evidence on how much union membership would increase in the USA if a policy of non‐exclusive representation, as adopted in New Zealand, are to be implemented.

The sample for the study consists of 227 New Zealand organizations, employing over 180,000 workers. Logistic regression is used for the analysis with the dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether there is majority union support.

If the USA allowed and supported minority unionism, union membership could increase by 30 percent or more. Workers in smaller, private‐sector organizations outside healthcare, education, and manufacturing are most disadvantaged by the majority‐rule system.

Given that many workers' needs for representation have not been addressed by the current US majority rule system, consideration of minority representation to enhance representation effectiveness and understanding its implications are of critical importance, especially for a democratic society.

The paper offers empirical data on the implications of a change of the US representation system and proposes three options for incorporating minority representation.

We present evidence regarding how a card check recognition process affects the labor relations climate during the period preceding recognition and that which immediately follows. Interviews with managers, interviews with union representatives, and surveys of workers indicate that card check typically results in a less prolonged, costly, and stressful recognition and negotiations process. Although the resulting contracts are often similar to those in other parts of a heavily unionized corporation, sometimes they reflect a different business context – and hence are somewhat more favorable to employers without being substantially less favorable to employees. This reality is reflected in the positive reaction of the U.S. stock markets to union recognition by an employer through a card check process. Employers make card check agreements primarily for business reasons, and investors respect their judgment as to the impact of such agreements on the bottom line.

This chapter considers the provocative yet unexplored idea that a relationship exists between the nature by which a union wins recognition from an employer and the collective bargaining outcomes that are produced. Since at least the Ronald Reagan Administration, many trade, service and industrial unions in the United States have deployed alterative means to win recognition. Unions have negotiated a host of neutrality and card-check agreements as alternatives to petitioning for elections under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board. The use of these diverse organizing mechanisms has been well documented by numerous authors writing in the “union revitalization” genre, but what has not been done is the evaluation of the bargaining outcomes – effects – of different organizing tactics. The critical questions that have not been answered until now are, “What difference does it make how a union wins recognition?” Are the fortunes of newly organized union workers influenced by the way that they are brought into the labor movement? Based on a ten-year review of several successful union organizing cases, the findings from this chapter suggest that the key variable in gaining certification and ultimately a first contract is the ability of the union to leverage power and to do so in a timely manner.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting has been theorized as a key communication device and an integral part of a broader stakeholder integration management strategy. This paper aims to examine the relationship between CSR disclosures and organized labor, an important internal stakeholder, whose institutional role in dynamically advancing employee interests creates opportunities and challenges for strategic management and firm sustainability.

By using a sample of 2,526 US firm-year observations for the period 2002–2015, the authors demonstrate that managers in unionized contexts are more likely to issue CSR reports than managers in firms, where labor is not organized.

The authors demonstrate that managers in unionized contexts are more likely to issue CSR reports than managers in firms where labor is not organized. Considering stakeholder theory, they argue that, in unionized contexts, managers more intensively resort to CSR disclosures to form an alignment of interests, develop collaborative bonds with unions and smoothen relationships with external financial stakeholders. This effect is more prominent in areas where corporate spatial clustering and the prevailing political ideology facilitate the role of unions.

First, the data refer to USA, which may limit the generalization of the results. Hence, researchers could use cross-country datasets to overcome this limitation. Second, it would be important to know what benefits are enjoyed by the unionized companies that issue CSR reports. Third, they acknowledge that there is useful qualitative information they do not analyze. This analysis could potentially relate specific CSR information to unions’ needs and demands. Further, there are alternative channels through which companies disclose relevant information such as 10-K filings, annual reports, firm websites, media, public announcements, etc. These are not captured by the data.

Managers could benefit from the empirical analysis, which suggests that through the initiation of CSR reports a dialogue with unions is greatly facilitated. Managers should consider that CSR reports reduce information asymmetries and may attract the interest of investors. Unionists should be aware that CSR reports constitute an opportunity to identify mutual interests and align goals. Business analysts, investors and shareholders should be aware that standalone CSR reports are used by managers to reduce information asymmetries and disparities with unions and to communicate an investment-friendly context. So, market participants should factor such policies by unionized firms into their investment analyses.

The authors offer implications for managers, labor unionists and market participants.

This paper examines the relationship between CSR disclosures and organized labor, an important internal stakeholder, whose institutional role in dynamically advancing employee interests creates opportunities and challenges for strategic management and firm sustainability.