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This chapter explores the implications of patrimonial politics in the Dutch East India Company empire in the context of establishing a settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa in the mid-seventeenth century. The Cape extended the reach of Company patrimonial networks with elite Company officials circulating throughout the Indian Ocean empire and consolidating their familial ties through marriage both within the colonies and in the United Provinces. These patrimonial networks extended to the Cape as elite Company officials created families locally or married Cape-born women. As the colony grew, the Company created a class of free-burghers some the wealthiest of whom were tied directly into elite Company patrimonial networks. But from the early eighteenth century onwards these elite Company networks came into conflict with the evolving free-burgher patrimonial networks with which they were in direct competition. This paper argues that local patrimonial networks can evolve in a settler colony that challenge the elite patrimonial networks of the imperial elite.

Given the growing interest in social movements as policy agenda setters, this paper investigates the contexts within which movement groups and actors work with political elites to promote their common goals for policy change. In asking how and why so-called outsiders gain access to elites and to the policymaking process, I address several contemporary theoretical and empirical concerns associated with policy change as a social movement goal. I examine the claim that movements use a multipronged, long-term strategy by working with and targeting policymakers and political institutions on the one hand, while shaping public preferences – hearts and minds – on the other; that these efforts are not mutually exclusive. In addition, I look at how social movement organizations and actors are critical in expanding issue conflict outside narrow policy networks, often encouraged to do so by political elites with similar policy objectives. And, I discuss actors’ mobility in transitioning from institutional activists to movement and organizational leaders, and even to protesters, and vice versa. The interchangeability of roles among actors promoting social change in strategic action fields points to the porous and fluid boundaries between state and nonstate actors and organizations.

This chapter reviews three analytical perspectives – ‘structural’, ‘network’ and ‘cultural’ – on the study of power and their implications for theorizing elites. It builds on this initial theoretical review by developing a critical realist approach to the study of organizational elites out of the structurally based perspective identified in the first section of the chapter. The explanatory potential of this critical realist approach is then illustrated through two case studies of ruling elites embedded in contrasting historical, political and social contexts. The final section of the chapter provides a discussion of the wider implications of these case study analyses for understanding and explaining the ‘new feudalism’ which is emerging in advanced political economies and societies.

Problems arose in the “market for information” (MFI) during the “dot.com” boom, the Enron case, Northern Rock failure and during the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. This paper aims to extend the understanding of the MFI through field research and theoretical sources. It also aims to understand the MFI during relatively stable periods and during periods of rapid change, crisis and failure. It seeks to use these insights to propose changes to reduce the possibilities for negative change and problems in the MFI.

Field studies are used to develop an “empirical narrative” for ongoing MFI structures, processes and outcomes during relatively stable periods. The paper develops a “theoretical narrative” to extend the understanding of the MFI empirical insights.

The paper reveals that the MFI structure that includes knowledge and social context is central to ongoing MFI economic processes for MFI agents. Outcomes include changes in markets, firms and others. Changes and problems are means to understand interactions between the MFI social structure, knowledge, actions and outcomes as they rendered visible the previously invisible issues.

The paper shows that a coherent combination of new empirical narrative and theoretical narrative is essential to develop a critical stance, new policy prescriptions and new regulations to deal with problems and changes in the MFI. This provides the frame to propose changes in the “world of knowledge” and in (concentrated and elite) social and economic structures in the MFI. It proposes: making explicit shared knowledge in the MFI, monitoring change processes and promoting active formal learning.

The purpose of this paper is to present an alternative perspective on understanding the coordinating role of destination management organizations. Destination Management Organizations (DMOs) are known to have a coordinating role within a destination. Many qualitative case studies discuss this role in the institutional context, assuming that the DMO is supposed to coordinate the network of the organizations and stakeholder groups in the destination. By contrast, this paper analyzes the coordinator role of DMOs by focusing primarily on the prominent individuals (directors and board members) affiliated with it. In so doing, it proposes an alternative perspective on these organizations. Looking at the influential individuals in the destination, in particular those affiliated with the DMO, reveals new insights into what the DMO alternatively could be from an individual’s perspective.

Using social network analysis, the coordinator role of the actors affiliated with the DMO for six destination cases in Switzerland, Italy and Austria was measured. First, the network of the most salient individuals in the destination was identified. Second, the coordinator score with the help of the Gould and Fernandez measure was measured. Third, the coordinator scores of individuals affiliated with the DMO were compared against those of the other actors in the network. Fourth, the scores of actors affiliated with the DMO and other actors were compared to the coordinator role attributed to the whole organization by those individuals (i.e. how they see the DMO as coordinator). Fifth, the analysis of the results with case-specific information was completed.

In each of the six destinations, there are actors affiliated with the DMO as top scorers; these are usually the president of the board and other board members, as well as the director. Additionally, the analysis identifies further board members of the DMO among the tourist elite in the destination. The DMO as an organization is generally seen as an important coordinating institution. In particular, the actors affiliated with the DMO attribute a higher coordinating role to the organization than do the other respondents.

In their board constellation, DMOs support the formation of interlocking directorships through the representation of various stakeholder groups. They increase the concentration of power in favor of a small group (elite), but they can also increase the effectiveness of decisional processes. In so doing, a DMO serves as a valuable platform for leaders in its destination.

This study affords a surprising insight into the difference between the overall image actors have of DMOs and the organizations’ self-images, expressed by the actors affiliated to the organizations – the former is always lower than the latter. The study also clearly demonstrates that the role of an institution largely depends on the actors affiliated to it and hence points to the constantly adapting coordinating role of DMOs within destinations.

A DMO can be seen as an organization constituted by individuals who join and leave its board or its management. This paper proposes an actor-based analysis of these often small, but controversially discussed organizations. We do it with a combination of quantitative measures from network analysis and qualitative information. The alternative perspective (actors of the DMOs inside the elite) and the application of social network analysis for this purpose have not been used in studies before. Further research points to two new research streams, namely, to understanding the role attributed to the DMO by different actors in the destination and the reasons for joining/leaving the organization and the shift of the self-concept of the DMO.

Why, despite clear economic incentives, did eighteenth-century slave traders fail to defend their business interests against the abolition campaign? We focus on the outport of Bristol as a case in point. Our main argument is that slave traders lacked an organizational basis to translate their economic interests into political influence. Supporting evidence from merchant networks over the 1698–1807 period shows that the Society of Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of this chartered company controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce and held chief elective offices in the municipal government. However, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed elite. High barriers to entry prevented the slave traders from using the Society as a vehicle for political mobilization. Social cohesion among slave traders outside the chartered company hinged on centrally positioned brokers. Yet the broker positions were held by the few merchants who became members of the Society, and who eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading. The result was a fragmented network that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize against the political pressure of the abolitionist movement.

Neoliberal urban regimes focus on redeveloping downtowns to compete for economic development. Chattanooga has been lauded by urban development organizations such as Brookings and the Urban Institute for its public-private partnership model dubbed the Chattanooga Way. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this paper, the authors use social network analysis to analyze elites highly involved in local economic development, education policy and social entrepreneurship in Chattanooga, TN.

The results suggest a strong group of nonelected local elites dominate policymaking in policy arenas traditionally reserved for elected elites. The overlap between elites who shape local policy and elites who fiscally benefit from local policies raises troubling questions for local democracy, public accountability and transparency.

This analysis is valuable to public policy scholars who are interested in analyzing neoliberal coalitions and their impact on local development initiatives.

Purpose – In this chapter, I examine critically the assumption in the literature that many lawyers decide to leave the practice of law, and especially large law firms, due to lawyer dissatisfaction. I take a macro focus on employee flows and networks at large law firms, particularly at the elite level.Methodology/approach – I use a large archival data set of alumni data, internal memos, and newsletters from the 1930s through the 1990s from four large New York City corporate law firms. I perform statistical analysis of 2800 cases. I also include qualitative analysis of the newsletters and firm records of comings and goings. I analyze lawyer migration as a mobility project of lawyers in conjunction with Domhoff#x02019;s class-domination theory to explain the interconnectedness of the corporate community, policy networks, governmental positions, the federal judiciary, and high-powered private lawyers.Findings – I explore the various ways that lawyer migration benefits the original firm by creating or strengthening relationships with other large law firms, corporate clients, and governmental organizations. It is clear that most lawyer departures are not meant to signal negative outcomes. Elite lawyers in large firms make both corporate and political connections through their migration, connections that have important repercussions not only for the lawyers but from their original firms.Originality/value of chapter – A fundamental question for sociological analyses of elite professions, and a more practical concern in the field of legal studies, is why do so many lawyers decide to leave the practice of law? The focus of these accounts, both journalistic and academic, is on the fact that lawyers leave – and, in particular, that they leave the practice of law entirely. The explanatory variable, in many cases, is some variation on individual lawyer dissatisfaction. Instead, I show that most lawyer departures are not meant to signal negative outcomes. Lawyer migration benefits the original firm by creating or strengthening relationships with other large law firms, corporate clients, and governmental organizations.

Representation of women on boards is getting more and more attention these recent years (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Nielsen & Huse, 2010), all the more as recent influence by the legislator accelerates the pace of change. Indeed, in France, a new law adopted in January 2011 stated that the proportion of female directors should not be lower than 40% in all major companies.

Most previous research focused on the impact of the presence of women in boards on performance, but there are few studies on female directors' networks. In order to help to better understand the ties at the origin of these networks, we study several characteristics and network ties of female directors of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index and we compare them with male characteristics. We test the specificity of four types of board of directors' networks: attendance at the same elite educational institutions, use of business networks, civil servants' networks, and interlocking directorates.

Our findings suggest that female directors' networks tend to find their origin in business networks more than men. Conversely, male directors have more board interlocking and are more often graduated from elite schools than women. These results show that female directors' networks have specific origins in comparison with men's ones. The exploration of this specificity could be an asset to better understand the role and influence of female directors' networks in governance.

This chapter examines interlocks among the governing boards of 12 leading policy-planning organizations and changes in the structure of this network between 1973 and 2000. Methods of multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering are used to construct topographical maps of the pattern of interlocks among policy-planning groups and their change over time. In contrast to the findings on corporate interlocking directorates, the study shows that board interlocks among policy-planning organizations are substantively meaningful and relatively stable at the dyadic level, although several changes in the topology of the network are also found. In all three decades, big-business “moderate-conservatives” like the Business Council and the Business Roundtable occupied the most central locations in the network. In the 1970s these organizations were linked with the “corporate liberals” to form the core cluster of the policy network. In the 1980s and 1990s the corporate liberals became relatively isolated from the core and their places were taken by several conservative groups. There was also a sharp rise in the cohesion of the network in the late 1970s and 1980s – a period that is widely seen as one of conservative political mobilization and heightened political unity among business elites. These changes in the structure of the policy network are consistent with and help to account for the rightward shift in U.S. state policy during this period.