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This is the second part of a long investigation under the title of, Principia Oeconomica; the first having appeared in this journal in 1986. The substance of the argument in this contribution is in the form of a dialogue with Henri Guitton, member of l'Institut de France and author of a book in French, De l'Imperfection en Economie (1979). Guitton is leading a new French Economic School critical of a modern economy characterised by ‘Econosm” or “Economy of Counter‐sense”. Economism refers to the practice of conceiving problems of a modern society in strictly economic‐accounting terms and neglecting a host of social and human aspects. The second term means that the sole attention given to growth in production did not increase the happiness of man but on the contrary it created for him new problems (pollution, noise, atomic radiation and other hazards). To cope with these problems, the French school recommends wise policies which Guitton called “creative imperfection”. Guitton's presentation is followed step by step, with an interpretation in terms of stable equilibrium. The recommendation stresses structural reforms to solve the same problems but following a road of “creative perfection” leading to the same goal sought by Guitton: a better world of tomorrow.

Our economies are rapidly evolving toward being primarily service-driven, with information and communication as fundamental drivers for the service deployment. Strategic choices are increasingly driven by other parameters than the traditional goods-driven industrial type of economies. In this paper, the major drivers for making strategic choices in a competitive service economy are examined. It is shown how the competition in services based on information and communication technology (ICT) is competence-based. Competition aims at bringing additional value through services, but may also deploy specific techniques to stop value from leaking in particular business processes. Value creation and prevention of value leaks cannot just rely on the traditional material-based techniques, which are grounded in the strong tangible nature of the traditional economies. Today ICT-based services involve creative combinations of technologies, resources, and assets to answer as well as anticipate the growing demand for flexible solutions that create sustained added value. In this paper, the particular role of imperfections in service systems is explored, extending the well-known theories of information imperfections. Imperfections are not always solved but are sometimes even maintained in favor of sustained competitive advantage. Various ways to realize service rent are discussed with extensive examples. The concluding part of the paper points to some crucial service configuration issues, including the need for a sufficient degree of corporate-wide standardized service components and interfaces to address the growing demand for agility in competence-driven markets.

Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American and Western European countries. Such institutional and organizational differences might shape firms’ operational environment in general and the type of competition in product and labor markets in particular. The purpose of this paper is to identify and quantify industry differences in product and labor market imperfections in Chile and France.

The authors rely on two extensions of Hall’s econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins by nesting three labor market settings (LMS) (perfect competition (PC) or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining (EB) and monopsony). Using an unbalanced panel of 1,737 firms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 firms over the period 1994-2001 in France, the authors first classify 20 comparable manufacturing industries in six distinct regimes that differ in the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. The authors then investigate industry differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters.

Consistent with differences in institutions and in the industrial relations system in the two countries, the authors find regime differences across the two countries and cross-country differences in the levels of product and labor market imperfection parameters within regimes.

This study is the first to compare the type and the degree of industry-level product and labor market imperfections inferred from consistent estimation of firm-level production functions in a Latin American and a Western European country. Using firm-level output price indices, the microeconomic production function estimates for Chile are not subject to the omitted output price bias, as is often a major drawback in microeconometric studies of firm behavior.

This paper aims to weigh the restrictions to job creation imposed by labor market imperfections with respect to financial market imperfections. The authors want to see which restriction is more severe, and thus assess which is more powerful in creating permanent employment if it were removed.

A structural estimation is performed. The policy rules of the dynamic programming model are integrated into a simulated maximum likelihood procedure by which the model parameters are recovered. Data come from the CBBE (Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). Identification of key parameters comes mainly from the observation of debt variation and sluggish adjustment to permanent labor.

Long-run permanent employment increases up to 69% when financial constraints are removed, whereas permanent employment only increases up to 54% when employment protection or firing costs are eliminated. The main finding of this paper is that the long-run expansion of permanent employment is larger when financial imperfections are removed than when firing costs are removed, even when there are important wage increases that moderate these employment expansions.

The removal of firing costs has been suggested by several economists as a result of the analysis of labor market imperfections. These policies, however, face the strong opposition of labor unions. This paper shows that the goals of permanent job creation can be accomplished without removing employment protection but by means of enhancing financial access to firms.

The connection between financial constraints and employment has been studied in recent years, motivated by the Great Recession. However, there is no assessment of how financial and labor market imperfections compare with each other to restrict permanent job creation. This comparison is crucial for policy analysis. This study is an attempt to fill out this gap in the economic literature. No previous research has attempted to perform this very important comparison.

The economic and financial picture of the whole world in the early 1980s does not look at all good despite the optimistic rhetoric used by the leaders of the seven major industrial democracies during the May 1983 Summit Conference held in Williamsburg, Virginia, USA. Almost everywhere there are artificial monetary injections to produce another problematic boom with the well‐known residual effects, negative social and financial consequences. But beyond there are no visible signs that on this road the prevailing conditions of disequilibrium embedded in contemporary economies will vanish and a new, better international economic and financial order will emerge.

Political risk should be seen as arising from renegotiation of implicit or explicit contract under which foreign investors enter a host country. Governments will legitimately enter into renegotiation to increase the share of rents earned by the society. Corrupt political leaders, however, will use their powers to extract rents from foreign investors for personal gains rather than for the good of the society. Political risk assessment, therefore, should assess the intentions of government as well as the strengths of political and social institutions that keep leaders under control. Firms should also understand that their own actions may contribute to creating political risk.

There is a double crisis in modern science and in particular in physics and mechanics. Among others Einstein and Stephane Lupasco, in the 1930s, warned about this crisis. The Quantum Theory cannot be reconciled with the Relativity Theory. Specifically there is a gap (cleavage) between micro – and macro‐physics and mechanics. Parallel or beneath there is also a second crisis derived from a discontinuity (again a cleavage) between classical and modern science, that is between two previous revolutions. A new research programme of a simultaneous equilibrium versus disequilibrium approach, initially applied in economics has now been extended to include natural sciences. It is the question of a new, more comprehensive methodology which is actually a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern heritage. The rigorous application of the new research programme leads to the organisation of an Orientation Table, that is, a methodological map of all possible combinations (systems). The Table shows, without any exaggeration, a few revolutionary results. For instance, with the help of the Table, modern science or the second revolution (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg) does not appear contradictory but rather complementary to classical science or the first revolution (Newton, Lavoisier). The Kuhnian thesis to the contrary is disproved and the second crisis is solved. With the help of the Universal Hypothesis of Duality (the basis of the Orientation Table), matter and energy, at the micro – and macro‐level, appear in a double form (the Principle of Duality): stable (equilibrium) particles and unstable (disequilibrium) waves. The strong interactions from modern physics are associated with the law of gravitation (attraction) or stable equilibrium which governs stable matter and energy. The weak interactions are associated with the law of disgravitation (dispersion or repulsion) including entropy or unstable equilibrium which governs unstable matter and energy. In this way the first crisis is also solved.

Most of us believe that entrepreneurs are special. We do this because both scholars and practitioners tell us so.

The purpose of the chapter is to compare social and economic effects that accompany crises of economic systems.

According to the adopted classification of causes of conflicts of socio-economic systems, the indicators that reflect potential social and economic causes of crisis are determined. Regression analysis is performed, and multiple regression dependence of economic growth of Russia’s economic system (values of growth of GDP in constant prices) on the indicators that characterize social and economic causes of crisis is determined; correlation analysis is performed and correlation of each indicator of causes and the indicator of economic growth is determined.

It is shown by the example of modern Russia that subjective (social factors) have the key role in determining cyclic fluctuations of economic system – together with objective (economic effects). Social causes of crisis are almost as important as economic causes. In view of generally acknowledged social consequences of crises (growth of inflation and unemployment level), it is possible to state a relatively equal role of economic and social effects that accompany crises of economic systems. The information and empirical basis of the chapter consists of the statistical materials of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the OECD. The research is performed by the example of modern Russia’s economic system; its timeframe covers 1999–2018 (recent 20 years).

The obtained conclusions show the necessity and open perspectives for specifying the existing theory of cycles in the aspect of inclusion of social effects into the model of cyclic (wave) fluctuations of economic systems.

Introduction It has been said that the word imperialism is no word for scholars. It is too value‐laden and uncertain in its meaning, a meaning which has altered with the passage of time. Nevertheless, taking account of its current use, the definition given by Benjamin Cohen (1974, p. 16) seems to be relevant. He defines imperialism as “any relationship of effective combination or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over another”. This definition covers old and new imperialism and neo‐colonialism or neo‐imperialism even though it can be charged that it is too wide to be helpful (Mommsen, 1981) especially bearing in mind that the political or economic dependence of one state or set of states on another is relative (Barratt Brown, 1974). Indeed, unequal economic and political relations between nation states appear to be normal or usual, some might even say inescapable, no matter what is the economic system of the day and it is debatable whether all international political and economic relationships involving some degree of one‐way dependence should be described as involving imperialism.