Search results

This paper applies a volume-price probability wave differential equation to propose a conceptual theory and has innovative behavioral interpretations of intraday dynamic market equilibrium price, in which traders' momentum, reversal and interactive behaviors play roles.

The authors select intraday cumulative trading volume distribution over price as revealed preferences. An equilibrium price is a price at which the corresponding cumulative trading volume achieves the maximum value. Based on the existence of the equilibrium in social finance, the authors propose a testable interacting traders' preference hypothesis without imposing the invariance criterion of rational choices. Interactively coherent preferences signify the choices subject to interactive invariance over price.

The authors find that interactive trading choices generate a constant frequency over price and intraday dynamic market equilibrium in a tug-of-war between momentum and reversal traders. The authors explain the market equilibrium through interactive, momentum and reversal traders. The intelligent interactive trading preferences are coherent and account for local dynamic market equilibrium, holistic dynamic market disequilibrium and the nonlinear and non-monotone V-shaped probability of selling over profit (BH curves).

The authors will understand investors' behaviors and dynamic markets through more empirical execution in the future, suggesting a unified theory available in social finance.

The authors can apply the subjects' intelligent behaviors to artificial intelligence (AI), deep learning and financial technology.

Understanding the behavior of interacting individuals or units will help social risk management beyond the frontiers of the financial market, such as governance in an organization, social violence in a country and COVID-19 pandemics worldwide.

It uncovers subjects' intelligent interactively trading behaviors.

This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes.

The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper aims to illustrate the theory using some simple examples.

The paper discusses population games and describes the notion of revision protocols that agents use to change strategies. As an example of an evolutionary dynamic, the paper discusses the replicator dynamic in detail. It shows convergence of this dynamic to Nash equilibrium in simple 2 strategy games. The paper then applies this dynamic to a particular class of 3 strategy games to establish the possibility on cyclical behavior around a Nash equilibrium.

The paper can serve as an educational briefing for students and researchers who are new to the field of evolutionary game theory.

In the early 1930s, Nicholas Kaldor could be classified as an Austrian economist. The author reconstructs the intertwined paths of Kaldor and Friedrich A. Hayek to disequilibrium economics through the theoretical deficiencies exposed by the Austrian theory of capital and its consequences on equilibrium analysis.

The author approaches the discussion using a theoretical and historical reconstruction based on published and unpublished materials.

The integration of capital theory into a business cycle theory by the Austrians and its shortcomings – e.g. criticized by Piero Sraffa and Gunnar Myrdal – called attention to the limitation of the theoretical apparatus of equilibrium analysis in dynamic contexts. This was a central element to Kaldor’s emancipation in 1934 and his subsequent conversion to John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936). In addition, it was pivotal to Hayek’s reformulation of equilibrium as a social coordination problem in “Economics and Knowledge” (1937). It also had implications for Kaldor’s mature developments, such as the construction of the post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution, the Cambridge capital controversy, and his critique of neoclassical equilibrium economics.

The close encounter between Kaldor and Hayek in the early 1930s, the developments during that decade and its mature consequences are unexplored in the secondary literature. The author attempts to construct a coherent historical narrative that integrates many intertwined elements and personas (e.g. the reception of Knut Wicksell in the English-speaking world; Piero Sraffa’s critique of Hayek; Gunnar Myrdal’s critique of Wicksell, Hayek, and Keynes; the Hayek-Knight-Kaldor debate; the Kaldor-Hayek debate, etc.) that were not connected until now by previous commentators.

This chapter explores a descriptive theory of multidimensional travel behaviour, estimation of quantitative models and demonstration in an agent-based microsimulation.

A descriptive theory on multidimensional travel behaviour is conceptualised. It theorizes multidimensional knowledge updating, search start/stopping criteria and search/decision heuristics. These components are formulated or empirically modelled and integrated in a unified and coherent approach.

The theory is supported by empirical observations and the derived quantitative models are tested by an agent-based simulation on a demonstration network.

Based on artificially intelligent agents, learning and search theory and bounded rationality, this chapter makes an effort to embed a sound theoretical foundation for the computational process approach and agent-based micro-simulations. A pertinent new theory is proposed with experimental observations and estimations to demonstrate agents with systematic deviations from the rationality paradigm. Procedural and multidimensional decision-making are modelled. The numerical experiment highlights the capabilities of the proposed theory in estimating rich behavioural dynamics.

Scholars increasingly depict hybridity as pervasive across organizations. The authors offer insight about how paradox theory informs and expands this approach to hybridity. To do so, the authors do a deeper dive into paradox theory, comparing and contrasting a dynamic equilibrium approach with a permanent dialectics approach. Integrating these two approaches offers paradox theory insights that can enrich and expand hybridity scholarship. The authors offer suggestions for how paradox theory can help develop a future research agenda for organizational hybridity.

In this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.

This study applies fair game and repeated game theory.

This study reveals that, in a one-shot game, if consumers have fairness preferences, dynamic prices will slightly decline. In a repeated game, dynamic prices will be reduced even when consumers do not have fairness preferences. When fairness preferences and repeated game are considered simultaneously, dynamic prices are most likely to be set at fair prices. The authors also discuss the effect of platforms' discounting factors, the consumers' income and alternative choices of consumption on the dynamic prices.

The study findings illustrate the importance of incorporating behavioral elements in understanding and designing the dynamic pricing strategies for platforms and the implications on social welfare in general.

The authors developed a theoretical model to incorporate consumers' fairness preference into the decision-making process of platforms when they design the dynamic pricing strategies.

This chapter develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts in which national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. The long run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players: the external predator, the government, and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases: submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium, and full-protected equilibrium. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects, and sustainable growth will endogenously induce adjustment of defense strategies.