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The publication presents an analysis of the cost and schedule performance of incentive/disincentive projects and case studies toward developing a systematic disincentive valuation process, with Construction Analysis for Pavement Rehabilitation Strategies (CA4PRS) software integration that aids agencies in minimizing the likelihood of court challenges of disincentives.

From a California transportation database, the authors performed cost and schedule analyses of 43 incentive/disincentive (I/D) projects and case studies on four of those I/D projects. Interviewees included subject matter experts from transportation organizations to ensure applicability and maximum value-adding, and the process was implemented on ten California transportation projects and monitored for performance.

The presented process mitigates the contractor's ability to claim disincentives as penalties in a court of law through the following: (1) all calculations are performed using project-specific bases, backed by estimations of actual incurred costs; (2) the CA4PRS software allows for estimation transparency and (3) the clarity of cost inclusions reduces any chances of “double-dipping” between disincentives and liquidated damages.

Transportation agencies have historically faced legal challenges to their enforcements of disincentives. As agencies continue to apply disincentives on more megaprojects, contractors will likely attempt to pursue legal challenges more frequently. The presented process mitigates the likelihood of these challenges going to court and increases the accuracy and efficiency of disincentives.

While there have been publications that discuss the legal challenges of imposing disincentives, they mainly provide guidelines and lack applicable processes. Existing literature that does present incentive/disincentive valuation process focuses on incentive valuations and neglects the disincentives' legal challenges. The following publication fills this gap by presenting an applicable disincentive valuation process for transportation projects which incorporates the guidelines for legal mitigation.

Purpose – Although many have expressed concern over whether generous welfare policies discourage the employment of single mothers, scholars have rarely exploited cross-national variation in the generosity of social policies to assess this question. This is the case even though much previous scholarship has examined the effects of social policy on women's and mothers' labor force engagement. This chapter evaluates whether generous social policies have a disincentive effect on single-mother employment.

Methodology/approach – Using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), we conduct a cross-national, multilevel analysis of the effects of social policy generosity on single-mother employment in 17 affluent democracies.

Findings – We find high rates of single-mother employment – above 60 percent in 15 of the 17 countries and above 70 percent in 5 countries. We find little effect of social policy for employment, as our two measures of social policy are insignificant in almost all models. If there are welfare disincentives, they only appear significant for young single mothers, and this evidence is limited as well. We find contradictory evidence for the employment incentive for low-educated single mothers.

We determine that single-mother employment is largely driven by the same individual characteristics – educational attainment, age, and household composition – that drive employment in the general population, and among women and mothers.

Originality/value of chapter – To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few cross-national, multilevel tests of the welfare disincentive thesis for single-mother employment. We provide evidence that welfare generosity does not discourage single-mother employment.

The analysis presented in this chapter defines three different synthetic measurements of disincentives for formal work: two standard measurements, namely, the tax wedge and the marginal effective tax rate (METR); and a new, innovative measurement called formalization tax rate (FTR). The novelty of the latter is that it measures disincentives stemming not only from labor taxation but also from benefit withdrawal due to formalization. A descriptive analysis across a large number of OECD and Eastern European countries reveals that the disincentives for formal work – when measured through the FTR – are especially high for low-wage earners. This suggests that formal work might not pay in this segment of the labor market, in particular for the so-called mini-jobs and midi-jobs (low-paying part-time work).

Another novelty of the chapter is its empirical approach. Using EU-SILC 2008 data and OECD Tax and Benefit data for six Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovakia), we match disincentives for formal work to individual observations in a large data set. Applying a probit regression, the analysis finds a significant positive correlation between FTR or METR and the incidence of being informal. In other words, controlling for individual and job characteristics, the higher the FTR or the METR that individuals are facing is, the more likely they are to work informally. The tax wedge, on the other hand, yields a negative correlation. This indicates that the tax wedge is not sufficiently capturing disincentives for formal work. We also conclude that in cross-country analysis, it might be more useful to use the tax wedge that applies to low-wage earners as opposed to average wage earners.

The conventional economic analysis of welfare programmes is based on the work disincentive issue. This has become a leading justification for recent discussions of welfare reform in the USA that emphasize getting recipients off the rolls and back into productive employment. The presumption is that recipients are rational and selfish agents, and that welfare is sufficiently attractive as to provide substantial work disincentives. Questions that view. This questioning is motivated by the surprisingly high attachment of welfare recipients to the labour force, and is based on the development of a more general framework for viewing the motivations behind economic behaviour. By allowing for diversity of personality types, we are led to a less pessimistic scenario regarding the possibility of designing a system with adequate benefits and without inappropriately high work disincentives.

Postulates that project financing from pre‐completion marketing accentuates the tendency for the property developer to shirk from exercising the optimal level of care and effort, and leads to a higher incidence of building defects. Evaluates the disincentive effects of pre‐completion marketing against the mitigatory effects of providing defect warranty by way of a simple model of effort aversion. Derives the condition under which defect warranty can eliminate pre‐selling disincentive effects. Concludes that three policy implications follow from this model. The problem of building defects can be alleviated by imposing a longer defect warranty period; tightening building inspection standards; and limiting the extent to which developers can sell their property development prior to completion.

While school reform literature calls attention to incentives for teachers, little research or policy making has focused on school administrators′ incentives. Career incentives perceived by a sample of elementary school principals and the influence of career background on those incentives are examined. It was found, using both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis, that principals perceive their career as having economic, ancillary and task‐related rewards. However, principals varied in the kinds of incentives they preferred and the nature of their future goals. Principals who have moved among several school districts in their administrative careers are more likely to be satisfied and to emphasise incentives, such as contact with school constituencies, which come from staying in the principalship. In contrast, principals who have remained in the same district throughout their administrative careers are more likely to prefer those incentives which advancement to central office can offer.

Delays in construction projects can be very expensive due to their adverse effects on project cost and profit margin. To overcome this problem, clients in the construction industry sometimes use schedule incentive/disincentive (I/D) contracting strategy. However, previous studies have shown that inadequate understanding and wrong implementation of schedule I/D provisions could result in unintended results. Moreover, the use of the I/D contracting method is in its initial stages in many countries such as India. The purpose of this paper is to identify various factors that are essential for schedule I/D success in construction projects.

A questionnaire survey was conducted among experienced professionals (clients, contractors and consultants) from across the Indian construction industry.

Top success factors related to clients in the descending order of their importance are: realistic targets; detailed guidelines for I/D implementation; close coordination with other stakeholders; correct estimation of I/D duration and amount; and imposing disincentives after due consideration. Meanwhile, factors related to contractor organisations are: continuous monitoring and control; thorough understanding of schedule I/D targets; specific considerations in appointing senior project personnel; effective communication; and proper labour management.

This empirical research was conducted in the Indian construction industry. Similar studies from developed construction markets may provide more insights into the successful use of schedule I/D provisions in construction projects.

The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the success of schedule I/D provisions in construction projects, especially in developing countries where the use of I/D contracting strategy is not very popular.

This research highlights the specific roles of both clients and contractors in the success of schedule I/D projects in developing countries such as India.

A well known feature of insurance systems is that they reduce incentives to avoid loss. This feature is known as moral hazard. Unfortunately the term has normative overtones; this is particularly unfortunate in the present application to industrial injury insurance since the conclusions can lead to very different welfare conclusions. The term has, in fact, been used in the normative sense to describe behaviour which is considered morally improper or even illegal [l]. However, a more useful interpretation for current purposes simply describes the behavioural effects of insurance cover and their effect on loss experience. This paper examines, in the neutral sense, the disincentive effects of the National Insurance injuries scheme on absence from work.

Most workplace health promotion efforts have failed to consistently and sustainably encourage employees to take responsibility for their health. The purpose of this paper is to explore a potentially high-impact solution – Health Codes of Conduct – for engaging and motivating employees to assume responsibility for their health.

This mixed methods study draws on interview and survey methodology with a sample of 149 working adults to examine the feasibility of Health Codes of Conduct. Descriptive and inferential statistics are calculated to understand reactions, characteristics of the companies likely to support the idea, and components of a Health Code of Conduct.

Nearly all employees offered moderate to high support for Health Codes of Conduct; this included overweight but not obese employees. Additionally, all demographic groups either moderately or strongly supported the policy when they included either monetary incentives (such as prescription discounts) or often overlooked non-monetary incentives (such as employee recognition). Some of the more popular features of Health Codes of Conduct included annual physical exams, exercise routines, and simply being encouraged to stay home when ill.

Health Codes of Conduct offer a surprisingly well-supported potential solution. Favorable reactions were observed across all examined segments of workers, even overweight (but not obese) employees. Using the specific features of Health Codes identified here, visionary companies can tailor their company’s Health Code of Conduct with the appropriate monetary and non-monetary incentives and disincentives.

What if the workplace could be a positive source of health and empowerment for valued employees? The authors show employee Health Codes of Conduct could be this empowering, engaging solution that has been missing.

This paper is the first to propose the concept Health Codes of Conduct and solicit feedback from employees on this novel idea. Furthermore, the authors identify both the monetary and non-monetary incentives and disincentives that employees believe would be most compelling.

This conceptual paper aims to present a new framework for the use of incentives when encouraging small businesses to adopt more sustainable business practices. It seeks to identify and categorize various types of incentives.

The incentives framework was designed as a practical tool for use during the development of a small business sustainability program. Although conceptual in nature, the framework is based on research conducted by the Washington State (USA) Department of Ecology that used, in part, a modified grounded theory approach.

In addition to identifying and categorizing potential incentives, the paper presents an overview of mainstream thought on incentives and argues that incentives and disincentives are significantly different concepts. The paper identifies seven potential barriers to implementing incentives and summarizes potential solutions to those barriers. It also explains how incentives can be used to encourage sustainable behavior and corporate social responsibility reporting.

The framework presented is intended to assist practitioners develop and structure incentive programs. It is also intended to provide guidance to practitioners regarding the current mainstream paradigm on incentives and recommends changes to that paradigm.

The framework presented is entirely original. No similar framework appears to currently exist.