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This article examines relationships between capitalism and democracy as perceived by contending perspectives within the liberal capitalist‐liberal democratic tradition(s). Bentham and the Mills are taken as initiating both this tradition and the core elements of the debate within it. Pre‐Benthamite theories are first reviewed. Then, after discussion of Bentham and James Mill and of John Stuart Mill, Mill's late nineteenth and early twentieth century successors are examined. We then go on to consider hypotheses concerning the “exceptional” quality of relationships between capitalism and democracy in the United States. The penultimate section of the article adumbrates the main contours of mid‐twentieth century pluralist‐elitist theories. We conclude with a summary.

Capitalist peace theory asserts that economic freedom or capitalism, contract-intensity, trade, foreign investment, financial openness, or the avoidance of state property ownership promote peace. But the capitalist peace also includes the democratic peace. If democracy itself is an effect of economic freedom or the prosperity generated by it, then the democratic peace is no more than a mere component of the capitalist peace. Then capitalism and economic interdependence promote peace by two or even three routes, directly and indirectly, through democracy and, possibly, by common memberships in intergovernmental organizations, too. Admittedly, this argument relies on compiling lots of diverse pieces of evidence, some of which are still debated in the scientific community. The idea that capitalism might be more important as well as more beneficial for peace than democracy rests on two reasons. First, without capitalism or the prosperity it promotes, democracy might no longer be viable. Under capitalism, nations may enjoy prosperity and peace together. Better still, poor nations benefit from the existence of more advanced ones that are sources of technology, models for emulation, and markets for labor-intensive products. Second, democratic peace theory has invited the dangerous idea that one might or even should promote democracy by war. The consequences of the financial crisis of 2008 and the political responses to it, however, threaten to undermine globalization. That is why the capitalist peace faces an uncertain future at a time when we need it. The rapid economic rise of Asia, in particular of China and somewhat later probably of India to great power status, is likely to undermine the global pecking order and to imply some power transitions. In the past, power transitions have been related to increased risks of war. That is why we need a capitalist peace between China and the West.

To examine whether indigenous critiques of globalization and critical theories of modernity are compatible, and how they can complement each other so as to engender more realistic theories of modern society as inherently constructive and destructive, along with practical strategies to strengthen modernity as a culturally transformative project, as opposed to the formal modernization processes that rely on and reinforce modern societies as structures of social inequality.

Comparison and assessment of the foundations, orientations, and implications of indigenous critiques of globalization and the Frankfurt School’s critical theory of modern society, for furthering our understanding of challenges facing human civilization in the twenty-first century, and for opportunities to promote social justice.

Modern societies maintain order by compelling individuals to subscribe to propositions about their own and their society’s purportedly “superior” nature, especially when compared to indigenous cultures, to override observations about the de facto logic of modern societies that are in conflict with their purported logic.

Social theorists need to make consistent efforts to critically reflect on how their own society, in terms of socio-historical circumstances as well as various types of implied biases, translates into research agendas and propositions that are highly problematic when applied to those who belong to or come from different socio-historical contexts.

An effort to engender a process of reciprocal engagement between one of the early traditions of critiquing modern societies and a more recent development originating in populations and parts of the world that historically have been the subject of both constructive and destructive modernization processes.

Extensions/applications/revisions of the Marxian vision of socialism can broadly be categorized into two polar strands: the centralized and the decentralized strands of socialist economic systems. Explores the main postulates of a decentralized version of a socialist economic system as provided by Kautsky, Luxembourg, Bernstein, Bukharin and Lange. The centralized strand of socialist economic systems has been elaborated drawing mainly from the writings of Lenin, Trotsky, Dobb, Sweezy and Baran.

This chapter maps existing patterns of broad-based worker ownership and control in contemporary advanced capitalism and considers future possibilities for expanding democracy within firms. Section one discusses worker ownership and control arrangements in relation to different theories of the firm and shows how these arrangements map onto different national systems. Section two compares Germany, which is characterized by worker control without ownership, and the United States, which is marked by worker ownership without control. Section three explores three pathways through which broad-based worker ownership and control might be deepened and more strongly coupled in the future.

The hypothesis is that social inequalities tend to increase in the historical phases characterized by a high level of integration of the international economy, generating protectionism-oriented pressures. The analysis of the capitalistic evolution in the last centuries is oriented to outline the strict connection between deep international economy integration and high level of social inequalities in advanced economies.

Recent deep integration in international economy generated, in advanced economies, a significant increase in socio-economic inequalities, with negative effects on social cohesion and democratic dynamics. The paper, examining the historical evolution of capitalism, analyses the consequences generated by the deep integration, achieved by the international economy, on social inequalities in advanced countries. The discussion is focussed on three models of capitalism: competitive capitalism, Fordist capitalism and cognitive capitalism.

As a result, for governments, two alternatives open up in the hyper-globalization phases: to preserve deep international economic integration, with risks for democracy; to preserve internal social cohesion, with risks of protectionism and closure to the international economy.

The article is oriented to underline the intrinsic incompatibility between hyper-globalization and democracy, for the strong negative effects generated by hyper-globalization on social inequalities and on social cohesion.

“All things are in a constant state of change”, said Heraclitus of Ephesus. The waters if a river are for ever changing yet the river endures. Every particle of matter is in continual movement. All death is birth in a new form, all birth the death of the previous form. The seasons come and go. The myth of our own John Barleycorn, buried in the ground, yet resurrected in the Spring, has close parallels with the fertility rites of Greece and the Near East such as those of Hyacinthas, Hylas, Adonis and Dionysus, of Osiris the Egyptian deity, and Mondamin the Red Indian maize‐god. Indeed, the ritual and myth of Attis, born of a virgin, killed and resurrected on the third day, undoubtedly had a strong influence on Christianity.

To reexamine the Weber Thesis pertaining to the relationship between ascetic Protestantism – especially Calvinism – and modern capitalism, as between an economic “spirit” and an economic “structure,” in which the first is assumed to be the explanatory factor and the second the dependent variable.

The chapter provides an attempt to combine theoretical-empirical and comparative-historical approaches to integrate theory with evidence supplied by societal comparisons and historically specific cases.

The chapter identifies the general sociological core of the Weber Thesis as a classic endeavor in economic sociology (and thus substantive sociological theory) and separates it from its particular historical dimension in the form of an empirical generalization from history. I argue that such a distinction helps to better understand the puzzling double “fate” of the Weber Thesis in social science, its status of a model in economic sociology and substantive sociological theory, on the one hand, and its frequent rejection in history and historical economics, on the other. The sociological core of the Thesis, postulating that religion, ideology, and culture generally deeply impact economy, has proved to be more valid, enduring, and even paradigmatic, as in economic sociology, than its historical component establishing a special causal linkage between Calvinism and other types of ascetic Protestantism and the “spirit” and “structure” of modern capitalism in Western society at a specific point in history.

In addition to the two cases deviating from the Weber Thesis considered here, it is necessary to investigate and identify the validity of the Thesis with regard to concrete historical and empirical instances.

The chapter provides the first effort to systematically analyze and distinguish between the sociological core and the historical components of the Weber Thesis as distinct yet intertwined components.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the theory and practice of stakeholder democracy. After examining the liberal notion of representative democracy, the paper seeks to identify the democratic deficit associated with the shareholder and stakeholder approaches to corporate governance. Investigating stakeholder democracy in nationalized industries in both market‐ and state‐capitalist societies, the argument presented is that neither type of society has significantly increased stakeholder involvement in decision making.

The paper uses a Hegelian dialectical approach to stakeholder democracy; relying on such modes of analysis as identifying internal contradictions.

The paper concludes that stakeholder democracy is both real and nominal in the political sphere, but restricted and contested in the private and public sectors in the economic sphere.

The paper calls for the setting‐up of democratic structures to oversee the production and distribution of the goods and services necessary for human wellbeing.

The paper investigates the relatively neglected topic of stakeholder democracy, using a Hegelian dialectical methodology. In the context of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and its recessionary aftermath, the paper calls for a radical re‐evaluation of corporate governance.

The relationship between capitalism and democracy has been questioned recently by economists and political scientists. In view of this debate, a reappraisal is made of the writings of Richard Henry Tawney, the English economist and social philosopher. Central to his personal, intellectual and socio‐political project was the ideal of the creation of a genuinely democratic community. Capitalism; the principles of a democratic economy; institutions and processes; and the alternative perspectives on political economy are discussed.